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TiE broad scope of federal habeas corpus as a remedy for state pris-
oners1 established in Fay v. Noia2 and Townsend v. Sain3 has aggravated
the tension in federal-state relations. These cases radically increase the
tasks, if not the power, of federal courts in handling post-conviction
applications, and similarly affect the tasks of state courts which seek to
minimize federal collateral review. We wish to make clear at the outset
our agreement with the principles enunciated in Noia and Townsend.
The rules and practices which govern the writ's present use have
evolved 4 as the necessary procedural complement to the expanding pro-
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1. The increasing number of habeas corpus and other post-conviction applications by
state and federal prisoners is undoubtedly at the heart of this tension. There was a steady
increase in the number of federal habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners between the
years 1941 (127 petitions) and 1961 (984 petitions). Since then the number has increased
dramatically: 1962 (1,115 petitions); 1963 (1,903 petitions); 196 (3,531 petitions); and 1965
(4,664 petitions). ANN. REP. Diu ADmmN. OrFicE U.S. CouRTs 155-56 (1964); id. at 11-26
(1965 prelim. draft). See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAuv. L. REv. 441 (1963); Brennan, Some Aspects of Fed-
eralism, 39 N.Y.U.L Rrv. 945 (1964); Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the justices,
The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. R-v. 84, 101-21 (1959); Reitz, Federal Habeas
Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 Hnv. L. Rnv. 1315 (1961); Reitz,
Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 103 U. PA. L REv.
461 (1960); Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39
N.Y.U.L REv. 78 (1964).
2. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
3. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
4. Professor Paul Bator has taken the position that there was a sudden change in the
law. He has asserted "there can be no doubt that when Brown v. Allen reached the
Court in 1952, the central thrust of the law was as Judge Learned Hand described it"
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tection the Constitution has been read to provide,5 and there appears
to be ample authority in the Act of 1867 to support their adoption.0
Moreover, the many indispensable functions served by the writ in
assuring vindication of federal rights cannot, we feel, acceptably be
served through alternative means. A great deal can be done, however,
to accommodate the writ's use to the needs of the federal system with-
out diluting its role in protecting fundamental rights. With this aim in
mind, it is our intention here, after a brief discussion of the writ's
present use and of the lack of acceptable alternatives, to explore and
suggest guidelines for the suitable exercise of the power of federal
courts to find the facts underlying the federal claims of state prisoners.
in Schectman v. Foster, 172 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 924 (1950).
Bator, supra note 1, at 499. In Schectman. Judge Hand said that a federal district court
has no power to issue the writ "if the state courts have honestly applied the pertinent
doctrines to the best of their ability," no matter how erroneous the federal judge may
think the state judge's conclusions to be. 172 F.2d at 341.
Actually, there is serious doubt about this assertion, to the extent Schectinan is sup-
posed to represent the view generally held by lower courts prior to Brown v. Allen.
In Collingsworth v. Mayo, 173 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1949), decided only months after
Schectman, the district judge denied habeas corpus to a state prisoner on the ground
that the state court had fully considered his allegations. The Fifth Circuit held that,
while the state court decision demonstrated an exhaustion of state remedies, it settled
nothing else: "[Ilt remains the duty of the federal court to examine for itself whether
in fact and law the due process clause of the Federal Constitution has been violated."
Id. at 697. The issue to be answered was whether "in truth" the applicant was being
deprived of liberty without due process of law. Ibid. The court ordered a hearing to
determine the validity of the allegations. Even more conclusive is Coggins v. O'Brien,
188 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1951), a pre-Brown v. Allen case, where Judge Magruder (referred
to "as an exemplar . . . for judges as well as others who are called upon to play a
statesman-like role in the troubled conflicts of authority that beset a federal union,"
Freund, Federal-State Relations in the Opinions of Judge Magruder, 72 HAtry. L. REv.
1204, 1224 (1959)), in a concurring opinion, and Judge Ford, dissenting, both explicitly
agreed that Judge Hand's dictum in Schectman was an incorrect statement of the law.
188 F.2d at 140, 150.
5. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 410 (1963); Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 78, 79-80, 96 (1964);
see Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945). and the cases
cited therein.
6. See generally Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953); Fay v. Noia, supra note 5; Am-
sterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Re-
moval and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 11. U. PA. L. REv.
793, 819-25 (1965). This is not to say there are not powerful arguments contra. E.g., Fay
v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 452-53 (dissenting opinion of Harlan, J.); Bator, supra note 1; Mayers,
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Ctit. L.
Rav. 31 (1965). But surely the test cannot be, as Professor Bator demands, that "over-
whelming evidence" show "it was the purpose of the legislative to tear habeas corpus
entirely out of the context of its historical meaning and scope . . ." 76 HARv. L. Rtv.
at 475. Legislative history seldom provides "overwhelming evidence" of anything.
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L INTRODUCTION
Federal district courts, in the exercise of their habeas corpus juris-
diction, have been called upon to perform significant institutional func-
tions. They have virtually become the Supreme Court's "delegates or
masters,"7 providing full and complete records to make Supreme Court
review more meaningful.8 Moreover, the district courts are far more
able than the Supreme Court to perform the role of supervising state
court dispositions of federal claims because of their number," their
ability as trial courts to make findings, 10 and their freedom from the
strictures of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction on direct review.1' Their
7. Geagan v. Gavin, 181 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D. Mass. 1960) (Wyzanski, J.), affirmed, 292
7.2d 244 (lst Cr. 1961), rert. denied, 870 U.S. 903 (1962).
S. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 488 (1963). A striking example of this is Chessman v.
Teets, 354 US. 156 (1957), where the Court found a violation of Chessman's rights after
denying certiorari in five earlier applications. The Court stated: "[lI]t was not until the
present proceedings in the District Court that the facts surrounding the settlement of
the state court record were fully developed." Id. at 164 n.13.
9. ".xperience has shown that the Supreme Court does not now have the time to
consider all the many certiorari petitions filed with it . . ." Letter of Judge Frank to
Congressman Celler, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in Hearings on ILK.
5649 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. ser. 6, at 16 (1955); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 437. See generally Griswold, Fore-
word: Of Time and Attitudes-rofessor Hart and Judge Arnold, The Supreme Court,
1959 Term, 74 HAuv. L. Rnv. 81, 85 (1960).
10. Consideration of a claim on the merits in habeas corpus therefore will not depend,
as it does on direct review, upon the state of the record. Thus, in a case where it was
unclear whether the federal question had been properly presented in the state courts,
the Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted, Neuron v. Smyth, 365
U.S. 604, 605 (1961), but the district court was able to grant a hearing, ascertain that no
waiver had occurred, and therefore that relief could be afforded on the claim azserted.
Newson v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1965). In addition, federal questions not raised
on direct review will often be uncovered in habeas corpus fact-finding hearings. E.g.,
Chase v. Page, 343 F-2d 167 (10th Cir. 1965).
District courts have been able to develop facts in cases such as Sas v. Maryland, 334
F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964), where a hearing was ordered to determine, among other
things, whether the proposed objectives of the Maryland Defective Delinquent Act were
"sufficiently implemented in its actual administration to support its categorization as a
civil procedure and justify the elimination of conventional criminal safeguards .... "
In a number of cases, e.g., Mitchell v. Stephens, 232 F. Supp. 497, 507-09 (E.D. Ark. 194).
district courts have developed statistics to determine whether statutes providing the death
penalty for rape are unconstitutional as applied because the punishment is imposed only
upon Negroes.
11. Habeas corpus lies even if direct review would be unavailable because of the pres-
ence of an adequate non-federal ground. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). The principal
limitations on direct review, however, stem from the nature of the certiorari jurisdiction.
See Darr v. Burford, 839 US. 200, 227 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.). Profes-
sor Henry Hart had suggested before Noia that the habeas corpus jurisdiction might be
justified by the principle that all state prisoners should have an equal opportunity to havc
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utilization has made possible a thoroughgoing implementation of the
Court's apparent decision to establish, through the fourteenth amend-
ment, uniform constitutional standards for criminal trials in the
state and federal courts. It is undoubtedly one of the roles of constitu.
tional courts to be the "architects and guarantors of the integrity of the
legal system,"'12 and, as in the area of civil litigation, while "the
Supreme Court is the ultimate judicial exponent of federal rights;
the lower federal courts are their vindicators."'3l It seems clear that the
exercise of this function is necessary, even if it were not required, be-
cause state courts have not adequately performed their role.1 4 The
their federal claims passed upon by a federal constitutional court, rather than be subject
to the limitations of the certiorari jurisdiction. Hart, supra note 1, at 106-07. The Court
in Noia assumed such a role for habeas corpus courts when it said: "The goal of prompt
and fair criminal justice has been impeded because in the overwhelming number of cases
the applications for certiorari have been denied for failure to meet the ('special and
important reasons] standard of Rule 19." 372 U.S. at 437. The "appeal as of right" has
a restrictive character virtually equal to that of certiorari. See Hart, supra at 89. The
Court in Noia overruled the Darr v. Burford requirement that state prisoners ordinarily
seek certiorari before applying for habeas corpus. 372 U.S. at 435.
12. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. Rzv. 239, 274 (1955).
13. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLU ,. L. REV. 157,
170 (1953). Rulings of the Supreme Court bind all lower courts in all federal matters,
but to be "practically meaningful," FRANK, LAw AND THE MODERN MIND at XVill (1949),
statements of uniform applicability must lead to similar results in particular cases. "Tile
abstraction performs an effectual function in the operating machinery of law, but the
ultimate consumer of the product will always be some quite concrete individual." CAIIN,
THE SENSE OF INJUSTIcE 2 (1949).
14. Professor Bator's thoughtful comment on why federal judges may be better suited
to pass on federal issues is worth quoting at length:
Important values may be served by having federal judges pass on federal Issues.
Even in a very general sense a federal judge, operating within a different system
and with a differently defined set of institutional responsibilities, may bring to bear
on such issues an objectivity, a freshness and insight which may have been denied
to the state judge, no matter how conscientious, whose perspective will be subtly
shaped by implicit assumptions derived from his responsibilities within the state
institutional framework, who stands within that system. More particular considera-
tions may be mentioned too. The federal judge is independent by constitutional
guarantee; the state judge may not be. The difference surely does bear on conditions
necessary for principled judging; it is, at least, a common assumption-perhaps Im-
plicit in the Constitution itself-that state courts may be more responsive to local
pressures, local prejudices, local politics, than federal judges. And there is, too, the
fear that state officials, including judges, will somehow be less sympathetic or
generous with respect to federal claims raised by state prisoners than federal judges.
Bator, supra note 1, at 510. Professor Anthony Amsterdam takes a stronger position
against the quality of state judges, at least in the area of civil rights litigation. Amster-
dam, supra note 6, at 800-02, 834.
The inadequacy of state court handling of federal claims in criminal cases Is largely
atributable to the narrow scope of state post-conviction remedies, rather than to the
bias or insensitivity of state court judges. See generally Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336
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number of times federal courts have released prisoners for blatant
denials of their federal rights, uncorrected by the state courts, is sur-
prisingly high;15 and the number of cases in which release is ordered
has increased strikingly in the last few years.10
Despite these important functions, the very existence of habeas
corpus, a constant reminder to the states of the supremacy of federal
law, and its increasing scope, have created tension and have evoked a
number of suggested alternatives. An acceptable alternative to habeas
corpus, as we see it, must both serve the interest in maximizing state
autonomy and state participation in the adjudication of federal rights,
and at the same time assure the same degree of protection for federal
rights habeas corpus presently affords. The two most widely publicized
of the alternatives offered, however, would either destroy state auton-
omy as the price for state court participation by replacing habeas corpus
with a comprehensive body of federal substantive law,' 7 or would estab-
lish standards to govern the scope and availability of the writ which
are at odds with fundamental assumptions of present-day constitutional
(1965); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 103
U. PA. L. Rv. 461 (1960); Bator, supra note 1, at 521-22; Notes, State Post.conviction
Remedies and Federal Habeas Corpus, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 154 (1965).
15. Some recent examples include: United States ex rel. Conroy v. Pate, 240 F. Supp.
237 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (held 36 hours in abandoned police station; 15-day delay after con-
fession before taking accused to magistrate and doctor); Perkins v. North Carolina, 234
F. Supp. 333 (W.D.N.C. 1964) (counsel given one evening to prepare for trial); United
States ex rel. Simon v. Maroney, 228 F. Supp. 800 (W.D. Pa. 1964) (18-year-old moron
tried without counsel); Holland v. Gladden, 226 F. Supp. 654 (D. Ore. 1963) (intensive
interrogation); United States ex rel. Walker v. LaVallee, 224 F. Supp. 661 (N.D.N.Y. 9q)
(intensive interrogation and brutality). See also the cases collected in Note, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Rxv. 78, 132 n.322 (1964), and the cases discussed in Reitz, supra note 14.
16. In 1955, for example, only 5 of 668 petitions resulted in release. H.R. REP. No.
548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-40 (1959). Recent statistics obtained from the Administrative
Office reveal that in fiscal 1963, 42 of 1,662 petitions in which action was taken resulted
in judgments for plaintiff; in 1964, 125 of 3,220; and in 1965, 154 of 4,186. Federal Ques-
tion Habeas Corpus Terminations (1963-1965) (charts available from Admin. Office U.S.
Courts, Supreme Court Bldg., Washington, D.C.).
17. It is indeed doubtful whether the interests of federalism would be served by
adoption of Chief Judge Desmond's recommendation that federal habeas corpus for state
prisoners
be abolished, and that there be enacted comprehensive, detailed federal legislation
imposing on the states minimum but precise requirements applicable to state police.
prosecutors and courts, as to procedure and postconviction remedies, so that we may
have something to rely on other than the vagueness and vagaries of "due process"
and its ad hoc application.
Desmond, Federal and State Habeas Corpus: How to Make Two Parallel Judicial Lines
Meet, 49 A.B.AJ. 1166, 1168 (1963). Earlier proposals to limit the writ's use are discussed
and rejected in the still useful article by Poliak, Proposals to Curtail Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the Great Writ, 66 Yau L.J. 50 (1956).
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adjudication, and which would drastically reduce the protection pres-
ently afforded.'8
One suggestion, which would augment rather than replace habeas
corpus, is that the states be compelled to provide post-conviction reme-
dies to hear all federal claims. 0 This would lessen state autonomy,
since it would make mandatory some form of post-conviction remedy;20
18. Professor Bator made a number of suggestions prior to Noia and Townsend which
appear inconsistent with the Court's most basic assumptions. His- most elaborate is that
habeas lie only to hear claims that the state court lacked "jurisdiction" in the traditional
sense, Bator, supra note 1, at 460-62, or failed to provide "corrective process," a term
defined to mean "the conditions and tools of inquiry ... assure a reasoned probability
that the facts were correctly found and the law correctly applied," id. at 455. Compare
Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and The Due Process of Time
and Law, The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1965). Some constitu-
tional allegations would be heard, under this view, and apparently some non-constitu-
tional allegations as well. The distinction, argues Bator, between constitutional and non-
constitutional rights in determining what is fundamental is "wooden." Bator, supra note
1, at 508-09. Perhaps it is, but it is principled and. workable, while the "corrective process"
approach would leave relief largely in the discretion of individual judges. Cf. Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 292 (1930): "It is not our province to measure the extent
to, which the Constitution has been contravened and ignore the violation if, in our
opinion, it is not, relatively, as bad as it might have been."
The suggestion that a time limit be placed on the writ's availability so that a "pris-
oner" is not "free" to raise claims "at his pleasure," Bator, supra note 1, at 460, runs
afoul of Mr. Justice Harlan's eloquent reminder "that the overriding responsibility of
this Court is to the Constitution of the United States, no matter how late it may be that
a violation of the Constitution is found to exist," Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 165
(1957). See United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 309, 313 (2d Cir. 1963),
and cases cited therein. Compare Hysler v. Florida, 35. U.S. 411, 422 (1942). Finally, Bator
suggests that the habeas jurisdiction be used as "a roving extraordinary commission to
undo injustice . . " Bator, supra note 1, at 527, which leads to the conclusion that
release should be granted when constitutional error exists. only if the district judge feels
"justice will be served . . . . taking into account in the largest sense all the relevant
factors, including his conscientious appraisal of the guilt or innocence of the accused on
the basis of the full record before him," id. at 528. The Court has often repeated that
the requirements of the Constitution must be respected, no matter how guilty the
accused. E.g, Chessman v. Teets, supra.
19. There appears to be authority under either the due process or equal protection
clauses for such a step. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965), and authorities cited
therein. In Case, the Court vacated its grant of certiorari to consider this specific ques-
tion and remanded to the Nebraska courts for reconsideration in light of a state statute
passed after certiorari was granted which, on its face, extended to all federal claims.
The gist of two concurring opinions is that the states lag far behind in this area and
should catch up soon, the implication being that if they do not voluntarily provide
remedies they will be required to do so. The issue is discussed in Sandalow, Henry v.
Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965, Sur.
Or. REav. 187, 210-15.
20. The extent to which state autonomy is lessened will depend upon whether due
process. or equal protection is used to impose the requirement, and upon the minimum
scope which the remedies will be required to, have. If due process is used, the Court
will have to establish controlling standards for what constitutes an adequate procedure.
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but it would serve numerous useful purposes by increasing state court
participation, by involving state judges in the enforcement of all
federal rights, and by relieving the federal courts to some extent of the
significant burden placed upon them by habeas corpus peddons.2  Of
course, it would be preferable for the states voluntarily to provide
adequate remedies, both because this would avoid an extension of
federal control, and because if states are required to do so their failure
to comply in itself becomes a violation of federal law, entitling pris-
oners to release. Presently, the failure of a state to provide adequate
post-conviction review of an alleged violation of a federal right gives the
prisoner no more than an opportunity in federal court to prove the
claim the state failed properly to adjudicate. But the greater likelihood
of releasing state prisoners should not prevent the Court from imposing
the constitutional requirement if the states do not act voluntarily. Once
the requirement is imposed, with noncompliance a ground for release,
states will probably comply with more than deliberate speed. The
Court in recent years has established a number of procedural protec-
tions the violation of which has provided grounds for releases al-
though prisoners as a consequence have often managed to prove viola-
tions of these rights, the states have complied, and avoided releases, in
the vast majority of cases.
If the states are required to provide adequate post-conviction reme-
dies, it is arguable that federal collateral review should be eliminated
If equal protection is used, each state will have to afford equal opportunities to all pris-
oners to prove all federal claims that they afford any prisoner asserting a federal or
non-federal claim. The Court's occasionally exercised supervision of state post-conviction
remedies -which have voluntarily been provided has been quite broad. See, e.g., Pennsyl-
vania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 250 US. 116 (1956) (requiring a hearing). On what
authority this supervision is based is unclear.
21. If states provide remedies, prisoners may be satisfied with the disposition of their
claims and forego application for federal habeas corpus. Some evidence, admittedly mea-
ger, supports the proposition that, if a remedy is provided, federal applications will
decrease. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L R.v. 78, 132 n.321 (1954). In any event, once the state
has disposed of a claim on the merits, after a lull and fair proceeding, the job of the
federal court becomes far easier. "[It would assure not only that meritorious claims vould
generally be vindicated without any need for federal court intervention, but that non-
meritorious claims would be fully ventilated, making easier the task of the federal judge
if the state prisoner pursued his cause further." Case v. Nebraska, 331 US. 336, 345
(1965) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.).
22. E.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 9351 U.S. J2 (1956) (equally adequate and effective appellate
review), and the other equal protection cases relating to appellate and post-conviction pro-
cedures; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 US. 534 (1961) (application of erroneous constitutional
standard in deciding federal question); Carnley v. Corcoran, 369 U.S. 505 (1962) (inade-
quate record to prove waiver of right to counsel); Jackson v. Denno, 378 US. INS (1954)
(submission to jury of question whether confession voluntary in fact).
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or severely curtailed. But requiring the states to grant collateral review
will not assure fulfillment of the most important functions federal
habeas corpus courts now perform. The state courts presently are ex-
pected to provide the Supreme Court with adequate records on direct
review, and all of them have undertaken to provide some form of post-
conviction relief. Despite this, the Court has had to turn to the district
courts for preparation of records to make meaningful its own review,
and for vindication of federal claims even in cases where the states
have provided post-conviction remedies. While it would be wholly
inconsistent with maintenance of a federal system to deny state courts
the power, and indeed to hesitate to impose upon them the duty, to
enforce federal rights, it seems equally inconsistent with such a system,
in light of the limited supervision the Supreme Court has time to
exercise, to allocate to fifty different court systems, many of which
have arguably demonstrated their unfitness for the responsibility, the
ultimate power-the "final say"-in the application of federal law.2-
Attempts to limit the tension generated by federal collateral review
should therefore be directed primarily toward emphasizing and exploit-
ing those doctrines and practices governing habeas corpus which
-provide potential predicates for accommodating the writ's use to the
needs of the federal system. There are numerous doctrines and require-
ments surrounding the use of habeas corpus which serve to soften its
impact upon state rules and procedures, and otherwise to decrease
tension. The prisoner must, of course, allege, in a non-frivolous peti-
tion,2 facts which, if true, would prove a ground for relief. The custody
requirement in effect places a time limit on the writ's availability; once
a person is released, the writ does not lie.25 The doctrine of McNally
v. Hill26 prevents federal courts from hearing claims which, even if
23. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 500 (1953) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
24. An application "is frivolous only if the applicant can make no rational argument
on the law or facts in support of his claim for relief." Blair v. California, 840 F.2d 741,
742 (9th Cir. 1965). Petitions should be liberally construed, Darr v. Burford, 839 U.S. 200
(1950), and if the court is in doubt the petitioner should be called upon to amend or
clarify, Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 291 (1948), with the help of counsel if necessary.
For a detailed discussion of the steps through which a district court must go in handling
petitions, see SOKOL, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL HABEAs CoRPus (1965).
25. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole is custody); Benson v. Call-
fornia, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964) (probation is custody); see generally SOKOL, Op. Cit.
supra note 24, at 19-30. For a discussion of some of the pernicious effects of this doctrine,
see DRAFr REPORT, Co,%rm. ON Posr-CoNVxIcoN RENIEDiEs, ABA Comm. on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice (1965).
26. 293 U.S. 131 (1934). This doctrine has been rejected by one state as a rule govern.
ing the writ's availability in its own courts. Stevens v. Myers, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2188 (Pa.
Sept. 29, 1965).
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true, would not result in the applicant's release, as when he is detained
on an adequate ground independent of the one challenged. The ex-
haustion doctrine requires federal courts to defer jurisdiction when the
prisoner still has an available state remedy and encourages federal
courts to give state courts the opportunity to pass on federal claims
when a reasonable chance exists that the claim will be heard on the
merits.27 Even if the exhaustion doctrine has been technically satisfied,
the district court may, because of special circumstances, refuse to enter-
tain the prisoner's application on grounds of comity.2 For example,
the state courts, between the time the exhaustion requirement was
satisfied and the time the habeas corpus proceedings are concluded, may
have adapted its post-conviction remedies so as to have increased signifi-
candy the likelihood of the prisoner's obtaining an adjudication of his
federal claim. 9 Comity would appear to demand a similar course when,
during the same time interval, an authoritative decision in the federal
courts has established some new rule or fact-finding standard. In such
cases the state courts should have an opportunity to apply the new
federal ruling or to adapt their fact-finding procedures to the new fed-
eral standard in order to avoid a federal hearing. The federal courts
may also refuse to grant relief when the prisoner has waived his federal
claim, or has forfeited his right to assert it in the state courts by a tacti-
cal or other move amounting to a deliberate bypassing of state proce-
dures.30 Furthermore, while the doctrine of res judicata is not appli-
cable in habeas corpus, a modified form of the doctrine allows habeas
courts to dismiss repeat applications presenting no new "ground" for
relief.31
These rules and doctrines enable the federal courts to deny or to
defer jurisdiction, often allowing states the first opportunity to pass on
their prisoners' federal claims. Other techniques enable the federal
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964); see generally Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78, 96-103 (1964);
Comment, 13 U. PA. L. REv. 1303 (1965). It is often sensible and proper to dispose of a
claim on the merits, where the question is dearly presented and easy to settle, rather
than to defer jurisdiction. E.g., United States ex reL Drew v. Myers, 327 F.2d 174, 183
(3d Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Whiting v. Myers, 230 F. Supp. 868 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
Exercise of jurisdiction in these cases operates to ease federal-state tension.
28. Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78, 102 (1964), and authorities cited therein; cf. Case v.
Nebraska, 381 US. 336 (1965).
29. A state with a remedy of limited scope may have expanded the remedy's scope
or created a new remedy to encompass the claim raised. Or a state which had heard such
claims in the past may have decided to avoid federal hearings by raising its fact-finding
standards to meet those established in Townsend v. Sain.
30. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965); Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391, 439 (1953).
31. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963); Hurt v. Page, 355 F.2d 169 (10th
Cir. 1966).
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
courts to minimize tension in cases where state prisoners prove federal
claims entitling them to habeas corpus relief. While release has thus far
been the only proper remedy once a federal claim is proved, this relief al-
most invariably32 is conditioned by an order that the prisoner be held for
a reasonable time33 so that the state can retry him.3 4 Moreover, states may
sometimes be allowed to correct constitutional defects without granting
new trials. For example, if a prisoner proves he was denied equal protec-
tion because he was not afforded an equal opportunity to appeal, the
state should be able to correct this violation by allowing an appeal,s so
long as the appeal would be roughly equivalent to one immediately
after trial.3 6 Jackson v. Denno37 carries this even further and allows state
32. Under exceptional circumstances the federal habeas court will order release out-
right. In Wilson v. Reagan, 354 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1965), the court upheld the district
court's order that the prisoner be released immediately upon proving he had been denied
the right to effective assistance of counsel in the state courts. At the time of his trial,
the prisoner was a juvenile and had special rights under California law. "These have
gone with the passage of time and are irretrievable." While the disposition Is appealing,
under what theory is a prisoner entitled to greater relief in habeas because of the loss
of non-federal rights? Is the prisoner denied equal protection of state laws If lie loses
rights conferred by state law because the state imprisoned him under a constitutionally
invalid conviction?
33. The federal court may, of course, set a specific time within which corrective action
must be taken. E.g., Cobb v. Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95, 102 (5th Cir. 1964).
34. E.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 US. 534, 549 (1961). Authority for conditioning
orders for release is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964), which requires the habeas corpus
court to "dispose of the matter as law and justice require."
35. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 210 (1951); Bland v. Alabama,
356 F.2d 8, 16 (5th Cir. 1965) (inadequate appellate review because of failure to provide
counsel at motion for new trial); Chase v. Page, 343 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1965); Newsoin
v. Peyton, 341 F.2d 904 (4th Cir. 1965). An interesting issue is posed in United States
ex rel. Mitchell v. Follette, 358 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, J.), where the court
reversed and remanded for a hearing on whether the petitioner's failure to appeal was
caused by "culpable silence" of the trial judge. The court raised the question whether
the district court should determine, even if petitioner proved he was deprived of his
appeal, whether any appeal "would be so plainly without arguable basis that it would
have been dismissed as frivolous." Id. at 929. This sort of decision should not be made
by a federal court. The right involved is to an appeal on state as well as federal Issues.
It seems inappropriate and unauthorized for federal courts to determine whether state
prisoners could raise non-frivolous state law issues. Even as to federal issues, state courts
are always free to afford more protection than the Constitution requires.
36. Thus a new trial may be necessary where too much time has passed since the
original trial for the court to assume safely that the state will be able to provide a mean-
ingful appeal. See Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764, 777 (5th Cir. 1965). In Coffman v.
Bomar, 220 F. Supp. 343, 549 (M.D. Tenn. 1963), the district court decided not to con-
dition its order of release on the state's granting an appeal because there appeared to
be no provision under which the state courts could grant an appeal, and the district
court feared that an order of release so conditioned would necessarily result In the
prisoner's release. The court therefore ordered the prisoner released if he was not tried
within a reasonable time. Rather than speculate as to the ability of the state courts to
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courts, at least in some circumstances, to correct constitutional defects
in limited hearings rather than at new trials. Jackson declared invalid
a procedure which had been upheld by the Court in Stein v. New
York, 38 whereby the voluntariness of a confession was given to the jury,
along with the issue of guilt or innocence, without a preliminary finding
of voluntariness by the trial judge. The Court pointed out that, if
Jackson's confession is determined to have been voluntary at a hearing
limited to that issue, then he was not prejudiced even if the jury con-
sidered it; if, on the other hand, his confession is found involuntary,
he would be entitled to a new trial. The Court also said there was no
reason to assume the state would fail to grant Jackson a hearing con-
sistent with due process; in fact, the state courts which followed Stein
had justifiably assumed they were complying with due process.3
It would appear, therefore, that federal courts may condition release
upon limited hearings when the possibility of prejudice created by a
constitutionally defective procedure can be negated. This device should
be especially useful in cushioning resentment caused by retroactive
rulings, though it should not be limited to such situations. It may not
be resorted to, however, where a nunc pro tunc hearing would be inade-
quate because of the nature of the issue involved,40 or where the issue is
so related to guilt or innocence that a limited hearing would deprive
the prisoner of his right to a trial by jury.
41
There are a number of ways, therefore, in which federal courts must
or may avoid or minimize federal-state tension, by refusing or deferring
jurisdiction, and by making it easier for the states to take corrective
action when constitutional deprivations are proved. This article, how-
ever, deals primarily with the obligation of federal habeas courts, once
provide an appeal or other limited corrective action, it would appear proper for the
federal court to condition its order on the state's taking appropriate limited corrective
action or in the alternative granting a new trial. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 363,
895-96 (1964).
37. Supra note 36.
88. 846 U.S. 156 (1953).
39. 878 US. at 594-95. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), where a nev trial
was ordered, was distinguished on the ground that the possibility of a disposition
allowing a limited hearing in the state courts was neither argued nor considered. 378
U.S. at 394 n.22. But see Justice Frankfurters language, 565 US. at 548. Rogers falls
squarely within the Jackson rationale for limited hearings.
40. Pate v. Robinson, 883 US. 375, 387 (1966) (competency to stand trial).
41. A possible claim which might require a new trial is the prisoner's sanity at the
time of the acts charged. See Brief for Respondent, pp. 74-76, Pate %. Robinson, supra
note 40. It has long been Justice Black's position that limited hearings of the sort al-
lowed in Jackson are improper. E.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443. 453 (1965) (dis-
senting opinion).
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they assume jurisdiction, to assure all state prisoners a full and fair
hearing of their federal claims, and the steps they may take consistent
with this obligation to preserve a meaningful role for state courts in the
adjudication of federal rights and to minimize tension. With respect
to questions of law, the federal courts have no discretion; their duty
is to redetermine all questions of federal law, and to order appro-
priate relief if it appears the state court incorrectly concluded that
no federal right was violated. 42 With respect to disputes concerning
the facts underlying federal claims, however, while the federal courts
have power to redetermine the facts in all cases, it is their duty to do so
only when the state has failed to find the facts after a "full and fair"
hearing as defined in Townsend v. Sain. In discharging this duty, the
federal courts may resort to two alternative corrective devices. We
intend here to elaborate these devices and to suggest standards to
determine, first, which alternative should be followed once some cor-
rective action is deemed necessary, and, second, the circumstances under
which corrective action is necessary or appropriate.
II. ALTERNATIVE CORRECTIvE DEVICES
A hypothetical case will serve to illustrate the alternatives. A state
prisoner alleges in a federal habeas corpus application that he was
denied due process because a confession introduced at his trial was in-
voluntary. The state's reply contests the prisoner's factual allegations.
One particular factual dispute arises from the prisoner's allegation
that he was held for six hours before being arraigned; the state claims he
was held for only three hours. The federal district court concludes, on
the basis of other uncontested facts in the case, that if petitioner's
version of the disputed fact is accepted his confession was involuntary.
The record reveals no explicit resolution of the factual dispute by any
state court. This lack of a finding was caused by the procedure followed
in the state courts under which the confession was admitted into evi-
dence and the jury was asked to pass upon its voluntariness in deter-
mining the defendant's guilt or innocence without a preliminary
finding of voluntariness by the trial judge. The district court concludes
that it would be improper under the circumstances to find implied
in the jury's general verdict of guilt a resolution of the dispute in the
state's favor. The failure in this case of the state courts to provide an
explicit resolution of the factual dispute upon which a federal claim
rests, or to provide a basis from which a resolution could properly be
42. Brown v. Allen, 344 US. 443 (1953).
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inferred, is a defect in the state's fact-finding processes which the
federal court must correct.
To correct this fact-finding defect, the federal court might grant a
hearing, resolve the factual dispute underlying the claim of involun-
tariness, and then decide whether the confession was involuntary. But
the presence in a state adjudication of a federal right of a defect sub-
stantial enough to require correction does not automatically call for
the grant of a federal hearing to find the facts. The defective adjudica-
tion could be corrected in the state courts instead. The advantages in
such a course for the federal system are patent. The state courts, in
effect, are given the responsibility of correcting their own fact-finding
deficiencies. Moreover, since the state courts can afford protections to
defendants which are not required by the federal constitution, allowing
the state courts to correct their errors in some situations may benefit
the habeas applicant as well; states may go beyond what the Constitu-
tion requires. This course of action, however, is available only after the
federal court, once having assumed jurisdiction, finds a violation of
federal law in the defective adjudication which entitles the prisoner
to an order of release on habeas corpus, appropriately conditioned.4
3
If no constitutional violation is found, the only corrective device open
to the federal courts is a hearing to find the facts underlying the claim,
and then to decide that claim.
These observations can be exemplified by returning to our hypothet-
ical. Once having assumed jurisdiction, the habeas court would nor-
43. The writ of habeas corpus extends to state prisoners held "in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . " 28 U.S.C. § 2041(c)(3) (1958).
On its face this seems to mean that proof of any constitutional claim entitles a prisoner
to habeas relief. Able arguments have been made to the contrary. Professor Bator appar-
ently would limit relief to failures of the state courts to afford "corrective process," or
at least would condition release upon a showing that justice will be served in the par-
ticular case. Bator, op. cit. supra note 1, at 455, 527-28, discussed supra note 18. Professor
Mishkin would limit relief to claims which affect the "guilt determining process"; this
would enable the Supreme Court to apply some decisions prospectively simply by deny-
ing habeas review, and would avoid declarations of prospective application which do
harm "to the symbolically based commitments to the High Court . M..." isdkin, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 102. But Mishkin's alternative would do more than harm the "symbolic
value of the Great Writ . . . " It would limit the writs scope to claims serving the
interest of protecting the innocent (arguably not the most fundamental interest served
by enforcement of constitutional claims), and would substitute an approach of some un-
certainty for the unequivocal command of the statute. Compare Mishkin's analysis of
Griffin v. California, 580 U.S. 609 (1965), with the Court's in Tehan v. United States ex
rel Shott, 382 US. 406 (1966). See Amsterdam, op. cit. supra note 6, at 839 n.191: "Mhe
overriding purpose of the Act of Feb. 5, 1867 . . . [was] to give all state prisoners
both a federal trial forum and access to the Supreme Court for litigation of their federal
claims, whatever those claims might be." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 409 (1963), should
have put this issue to rest.
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mally grant a hearing to resolve the disputed issue of fact and then
determine whether the prisoner was held in violation of the Constitu-
tion of the United States because his confession was involuntary. This
would not be the case, however, if the federal courts (usually the
Supreme Court) concluded that either the failure of the state courts
acceptably to resolve disputed issues of fact underlying the issue of
voluntariness, or the use of the particular procedure which caused this
failure, should in itself be deemed a constitutional violation. If the
first rule were adopted, our prisoner would prove he was being held in
violation of the Constitution as soon as he demonstrated that the state
courts had failed to provide him with a resolution of the factual dispute
underlying his claim of involuntariness; if the second rule were adopted
he would have to prove that the failure to render findings of fact was
caused by use of the improper procedure. The role of the federal courts
would be restricted to determining in the first case whether a finding
of fact was provided, and in the second case whether the improper
procedure had been utilized. Of course, even after a finding of consti-
tutional invalidity is made, the state courts may fail in some other way
to afford a full and fair hearing. If so, the habeas court must once again
on reapplication face the question of which corrective device is
appropriate.
Declarations of constitutional invalidity, as a device for securing state
instead of federal corrective action, are probably far more effective
than the threat of a federal hearing. The state courts are more likely to
respond to the command of a constitutional rule than to the pressure
placed upon them "voluntarily" to meet federal standards. This is true
partly because the state's failure to correct a constitutionally defective
adjudication will inevitably result in the prisoner's release, while their
failure to respond to the suggestion (often inherent in an order telling
the prisoner to exhaust state remedies) that state corrective action
will make federal action unnecessary results only in a federal hearing
free of the defect. In our hypothetical case, if the failure to resolve the
factual dispute is deemed a violation of due process, prisoners who are
not afforded a procedure which provides the necessary finding will go
free, regardless of whether their confessions were in fact voluntary or
involuntary. Absent such a declaration, all the federal courts can do if
the state courts fail to provide the necessary finding is grant a hearing,
resolve the dispute, and release the prisoner only when he proves his
confession was in fact involuntary. A state is more likely, therefore, to
correct defects of constitutional dimension in all pending cases, and to
avoid creating such defects in all future cases, than it is to avoid
defects which result only in federal hearings.
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There will be times, however, when the interests in obtaining cor-
rective action in the state courts through a declaration of constitutional
invalidity will be outweighed by considerations which operate against
the establishment of a constitutional rule and in favor of corrective
action in the federal courts through habeas corpus fact-finding hearings.
The Constitution, obviously, is meant to avoid fundamental unfairness;
it is not a device for compelling the state courts to comply with each
and every fact-finding standard the Court thinks desirable. At times,
however, the goals of avoiding unfairness and of upgrading state fact-
finding standards vill both operate in favor of a constitutional rule in
the same case. We do not even faintly suggest that the interest in getting
the state courts to correct their own fact-finding defects should control
the determination in particular cases as to whether the defect should
or should not be deemed one of constitutional dimension. But the flex-
ibility of due process is a fact of life, and reliability inevitably is an
element of fairness." So we do suggest that the interest in obtaining
maximum reliable state court participation in adjudication of federal
issues is a relevant consideration in determining how a fact-finding
defect should be corrected.
The Court's ruling in Jackson v. Denno,4t upon which our hypothet-
ical case is based, illustrates the problem of choosing between the
alternatives of constitutional rule and habeas corpus hearing to correct
defects in state court adjudications of constitutional rights and the
considerations which should be taken into account in handling it.
The basic proposition of constitutional law which led to the ruling
in Jackson is that admission of an involuntary confession in a criminal
trial violates due process. In Stein v. New York4 0 the Court had held it
consistent with this basic proposition for a state to allocate to the jury
rather than to the judge responsibility for determining the voluntari-
ness of confessions. Use of this procedure, however, caused a number of
defects which raised the possibility that federal habeas corpus hearings
would be necessary to correct them. One of these defects was that, when
the Stein procedure was followed, the defendant was not provided with
explicit resolutions of factual disputes underlying the voluntariness
issue. 47 Instead of directing the federal habeas corpus court to adjudi-
44. See Jackson v. Denno, 878 U.S. 868, 380 (1964): "A defendant objecting to the
admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underl)ing fac-
tual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined."
(Emphasis added.)
45. Ibid.
46. 846 U.S. 156 (1953).
47. Compare Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935
(1956) (district judge may reopen issue if justice requires), with United States ex rel.
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cate the claim of involuntariness, the Court in Jackson established a
new constitutional rule. It held that states must provide an adequate
adjudication of voluntariness made by the trial judge before the con-
fession goes to the jury. This, the Court said, would guarantee that the
voluntariness issue was "actually and reliably" determined; 48 it was
impossible, the Court found, to presume such a determination from a
jury's general verdict of guilt.
An application of the considerations affecting the decision whether
to establish a new rule or order a hearing to assure correction of the
defects caused by the Stein procedure demonstrates the correctness of the
Court's choice in Jackson. Although there is undoubtedly substantial
flexibility in applying the due process clause, declarations of constitu-
tional invalidity are never proper simply as a means of compelling
the states to achieve high fact-finding standards. A high degree of
unfairness must be caused by the defect before a constitutional ruling
becomes appropriate. The degree of unfairness caused by the defective
adjudication should be measured both by the effect of any resulting
fact-finding defect upon vindication of the basic constitutional proposi-
tion involved, and by other possibly unacceptable consequences. The
fact-finding defect in Jackson was the failure to provide resolutions of
all disputed issues of fact underlying the claim of involuntariness. In
itself, this was not so fundamental a defect that the Constitution should
have been resorted to for its correction. While the process of finding the
facts underlying an issue does probably increase the reliability of
resolutions of the issue, it is often safe to assume a judge went through
this process, despite his failure to make express findings. Thus, under
Townsend, the absence of explicit findings may not even be a defect
requiring a corrective hearing, since findings can often be inferred
from the state court's expression of the correct standard of law
governing voluntariness, or even from the mere admission into evidence
of a confession, upon the assumption that the court was aware of the
correct standard.49 In Jackson, however, the Court concluded that,
Kulikauskas v. Murphy, 293 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961) (factual conflict must be treated as
resolved). A federal hearing could likewise have corrected another possible deficiency In
the Stein procedure. The defendant would be able to take the stand and testify In the
federal proceeding without the fear of being impeached in the jury's presence. A district
court recently found that holding a motion to suppress hearing during trial violated tile
privilege against self-incrimination where defendant is compelled to take the stand. United
States v. Blalock, 34 U.S.L. WErK 2653 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 1966).
48. 378 U.S. at 380.
49. There will be times, however, when reconstruction of the facts will be Improper
either from a ruling or even from a statement of the correct standard. The absence of
fact findings in such cases is a defect under Townsend, and the Court has decided that,
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because of the highly charged and complex issue involved, the jury
could not be relied upon to make findings and to determine the issue of
voluntariness, even under the proper instructions. Moreover, the
Court felt that, even if the jury could properly be assumed to have
found the facts and decided the voluntariness issue, there was substan-
tial danger that they would allow a reliable but involuntary confession
to affect their verdict. Trial judges, the Court apparently felt, were both
more reliable and less subject to prejudice than juries, and could more
safely be trusted with the voluntariness issue. Thus the Stein procedure
made intolerably unsafe any assumption that the facts had been re-
liably found. In addition, the procedure exposed defendants who had
involuntarily confessed to a high degree of danger from jury prejudice.
The unfairness caused by these two factors made the Stein procedure
one which the Court could reasonably deem fundamentally unfair,
enabling it to utilize the device of a declaration of constitutional in-
validity rather than a federal hearing to correct the fact-finding defect
involved.
Other relevant factors supported the Court's choice. Thus, in deter-
mining whether to correct a defect in the federal courts or to deem
it the product of an unconstitutional procedure the effect of a declara-
tion of constitutional invalidity upon state autonomy should be con-
sidered. A major advantage in using habeas corpus hearings to correct
defects is that the procedure or rule which caused the defect is not
declared invalid, but is left to operate where it does not prejudice
federal rights, thereby leaving the states with greater flexibilityr ° This
advantage is non-existent, however, when the procedure involved causes
error affecting federal rights every time it is followed. Every time the
Stein rule was used, it caused serious deficiencies. It would have been
anomalous to tell the states that the Stein rule was constitutional and
at the same time to require federal hearings every time it was used. Of
course, any constitutional ruling necessarily limits the procedural alter-
natives available to the states in adjudicating federal rights. The effect of
absent other circumstances, it should be corrected through the grant of federal hearings.
This question will be taken up at a later point. See notes 133-62 infra and accompanying
text.
50. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78, 94 (1964):
For example, by refusing to accept the state's forfeiture ruling in Noia, the Court
did not invalidate New York's requirement that appeals be filed within a certain
time after judgment. On the contrary, the rule will still work an absolute forfeiture
in cases where no federal claim is presented and a forfeiture of state remedies and
direct review in the Supreme Court in all cases presenting federal questions. And
an absolute forfeiture may be imposed in all cases where a habeas petitioner delib-
erately bypassed state remedies.
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Jackson, however, is not overly constricting. States may still, with the
exception of the procedure followed in Stein, "allocate functions be-
tween judge and jury as they see fit."5' 1 The interests of federalism,
moreover, are advanced when new constitutional rules are created and
federal hearings avoided in that, although state autonomy may be
diminished, state court participation in adjudication of federal rights
is increased. By making the defect in Stein one of constitutional scope,
the Court has compelled the states to adjudicate the question of volun-
tariness in a manner which at least may result in fact findings acceptable
by the federal courts.
Also relevant in determining whether to establish a new constitu-
tional rule is the effect of such a decision upon the role of the federal
courts. Admittedly, Jackson increased the role of the federal courts by
creating a new right for them to vindicate. But the effect of Jackson
on the role of federal habeas courts must be judged not only by the
new responsibilities created, but also by the responsibilities avoided.
Assuming the Stein procedure's unreliability, habeas courts would
have been required to resolve disputed issues of fact underlying every
claim of involuntariness presented them by state prisoners convicted
in states which followed Stein. Some states might have stopped using
the Stein procedure to avoid this review, but it seems clear that the
responsibilities of the federal courts would have been far more burden-
some had Stein been left on the books.
Finally, in resolving this question it seems essential to consider the
effect of a constitutional rule, with resulting corrective action in the
state courts, on the defendant. First, although federal habeas courts
can ignore non-constitutional deficiencies in vindicating federal rights,
they are often unable to provide advantages which the states may be
willing to provide. For example, a state which formerly applied Stein
might decide after Jackson, either from beneficence or to be on the
safe side of the constitutional line, to allow the jury to pass on volun-
tariness after the judge has found the confession voluntary. This so-
called "Massachusetts" procedure gives the defendant an additional
opportunity, at no additional risk, to prove his confession was coerced.
The federal court is unable to supply this additional protection, and
it seems doubtful that the Supreme Court will ever deem it essential,
or that the grant of federal hearings to correct in individual cases the
fact-finding defects caused by Stein would be as effective in causing
state courts to reappraise their procedures as a decision prohibiting
51. 578 U.S. at 391 n.19.
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Stein's use. Furthermore, a constitutional rule has the additional ad-
vantage of assuring state defendants adequate adjudications of their
federal claims at the time of their original trials. State courts may
often fail to reform their procedures voluntarily to avoid federal hear-
ings. Prisoners in such states would have to remain in jail until they
had exhausted state remedies before obtaining a federal hearing. More-
over, because of this time lapse, prisoners may find it more difficult at
federal hearings than at their original trials to prove their version of
the facts underlying their federal claims. Finally, even operating at
their theoretical best, federal adjudications of the voluntariness issue
could only provide a basis for determining whether the individuals
who actually apply for habeas corpus were subjected to the possibility
of jury prejudice from an involuntary confession. A constitutional rule
avoided the possibility of this prejudice in all cases arising after
Jackson.
Rogers v. Richmond52 is another case where the Court declared con-
stitutionally invalid the manner in which a federal claim was adjudi-
cated and, as a result, left to the state rather than the federal courts
the task of making adequate findings of fact. In Rogers the Court held
that the state court had applied an erroneous standard of law in deter-
mining the admissibility of a confession: instead of testing the con-
fession's admissibility by its voluntariness, the state trial court applied
the standard of reliability.5 3 Application of the erroneous standard
made it possible that a reliable but involuntary confession had been
introduced before the jury at Rogers' trial, in violation of his constitu-
tional rights. The Court felt it would be improper, moreover, for it
or for a federal district court "to make an independent appraisal of the
legal significance of facts gleaned from the record after such a convic-
tion."5r Having the wrong standard in mind "may well have distorted,
by putting in improper perspective, even... [the state court's] findings
of historical fact.": 5 5 Even so, doubt over whether an involuntary con-
52. 365 US. 534 (1961).
53. Although the state trial judge ruled the confessions were "freely and voluntarily
made" the criterion he applied was whether police behavior had a "tendency to produce
a confession that was not in accord with the truth." Id. at 541-42.
54. Id- at 545.
55. Ibid. Justice Frankfurter's observation has been criticized as "employing a psycho-
logical insight that calls in question accepted notions of evidentiary reliability." The
critic suggests that "the development of law and the findings of facts are not entirely
consistent goals, and.. . the Anglo-American legal tradition has preferred the former,"
presumably because "the very sophistication of the theory of tendentious fact-finding
might make its application treacherously difficult ...." The Supreme Court, 1960 Term,
75 H v. L. REv. 40, 176 (1961). That our legal tradition has preferred the development
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fession had been introduced could have been resolved by ordering the
district court to find the facts anew with the correct standard in mind.
Instead, the Court held the state adjudication of voluntariness consti-
tutionally deficient and ordered Rogers released unless the state courts
granted him a new trial within a reasonable time.
Although Rogers involves an error with respect to "substantive" law,
the error is, as in Jackson, one which concerns the manner of adjudi-
cating a federal issue, and one which results in unacceptable findings
of fact. That findings made under an erroneous standard are unaccept-
able, however, does not cause a sufficient degree of unfairness to warrant
a constitutional ruling. A hearing could be held to determine volun-
tariness, and those persons actually prejudiced by the admission oE an
involuntary confession could be ordered released or retried. But the
Rogers deficiency presents an additional consideration, as did the Stein
rule, which made due process treatment appropriate, if not necessary.
It would appear to be a primary obligation of federal courts to make
sure that constitutional claims are decided in accordance with proper
constitutional standards of law. When a state court applies an errone-
ous standard of law in deciding a constitutional claim it seems neces-
sary for the federal courts, not merely to reject findings of fact made
under that standard and to hope thereby that the state court will correct
itself, but to instruct the state with respect to the proper standard and
to require its application. There was an adequate basis, therefore, to
justify a ruling of constitutional dimension in the Rogers situation,
one effect of which was to pass to the states the job of making adequate
findings.
of "law" means, apparently, that it has ignored the more difficult and pervasive problem
of fact finding; it does not follow, however, that we should continue to Ignore this
fundamental problem.
The need for new findings in the Rogers situation stems from the "exquisitely compli-
cated" interaction of rules and fact which takes place in a trial judge's mental processes.
A rule serves as the "attention guide" for a trial judge, who "will focus his attention
sharply on the testimony and demeanor of those witnesses who testify with respect to
matters specifically germane to his version of that rule." FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 180.81
(1963 ed.). Consequently, it seems impossible that a federal district judge could deter-
mine, as one writer has suggested, whether "the verbalization of the improper rule was
harmless error." Note, 76 HAuv. L. REv. 1253, 1265 (1963). Even the trial judge will
often be unable to determine whether his error was harmless. Because of these consider-
ations, findings of fact induced by an erroneous view of the law do not bind appellate
courts. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 396 (1948). Compare
United States v. Aviles, 337 F.2d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1964). If they did, it would be impos-
sible for reviewing courts to make meaningful dispositions in light of the limited scope
of review normally exercised over fact finding. See McGowan v. United States, 296 F.2d
252 (5th Cir. 1961).
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Moreover, just as in Jackson, the other relevant considerations sup-
port the Court in its Rogers disposition. The effect of Rogers upon
state autonomy is minimal. The defective procedure in Rogers argu-
ably was not even a chosen alternative, as in Jackson, but a blunder."0
No state interest in continuing to utilize a procedure would have been
served by avoiding a constitutional declaration, since corrective action
is necessary every time an erroneous standard is applied in resolving
factual disputes. To the extent that state courts do apply erroneous
constitutional standards, moreover, Rogers increases state participation
in the adjudication of federal rights and the finality of their judgments
by requiring state courts in the first instance to apply the correct
standard, thereby at least making it possible that findings will be made
which are acceptable as a basis for habeas review. The role of the federal
courts is increased by Rogers, since a new right is created for them to
vindicate, but the burden of finding the facts whenever state courts
apply erroneous constitutional standards is avoided. Finally, the Court
in Rogers recognized the advantage a declaration of constitutional in-
validity might confer upon habeas applicants, in that it gives them the
benefit of having the state court pass on "the admission of evidence at
the borderline of constitutional permissibility . . ,7 and of possible
procedural advantages (such as the Massachusetts procedure for deter-
mining voluntariness) which are unavailable in federal courts, but
which state courts might voluntarily provide.
There obviously is a limit to the procedural protections the Court
should establish under the Constitution to assure the proper adjudica-
tion of established constitutional rights. Rogers comes close to the line.
The procedural effect of Rogers is potentially drastic. It places defen-
dants against whom confessions have been introduced under an errone-
ous standard in potentially the same position as defendants who have
demonstrated that confessions introduced against them were involun-
tary. There are some differences. Defendants whose confessions were
involuntary are ordered released on habeas, subject to the state's
providing a new trial at which the confession would be inadmissible.
On the other hand, while persons in Rogers' position also are ordered
released, the state probably can avoid this consequence either by hold-
ing a hearing limited to the confession's voluntarinessrB or certainly by
56. The Court had often ruled, prior to Rogers, that reliable but involuntary con-
fessions were improperly admitted into evidence at trials. See -65 U.S. at 541. Moreover,
the state's courts apparently had followed the proper practice in some other cases. See
id. at 543 n.l.
57. Id. at 458.
58. See note 39 supra.
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granting a new trial at which the confession would be admissible if it
is determined to have been voluntarily made. But even so, if the state
fails to act, a person in Rogers' position must be released, for he has
proved he is being held in violation of federal law once he demonstrates
an erroneous constitutional standard was applied at his trial.59 The
risk of this consequence is not worth accepting simply because fact
finding under an erroneous standard is inevitably worthless. Federal
fact-finding hearings could correct this deficiency. Rather, the decision
in Rogers is justifiable on the additional basis of the obligation of
federal courts to forbid state courts from applying erroneous constitu-
tional standards, and the other consequences favorable to the interests
59. There is language in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), however, Implying
that federal courts in some circumstances may take the corrective action appropriate after
finding a violation of federal law, instead of ordering the prisoner released subject to
corrective action in the state courts. If it is true that, once a violation of federal law Is
proved the prisoner is entitled to release and that any corrective action must be taken
in the state courts, then the Court's order in Jackson that the prisoner be held for cor-
rective state action, and that he be released if appropriate action was not taken within
a reasonable time, would seem to have been required by the Court's decision that the
use of Stein in itself violated due process. But after deciding in Jackson that the use of
the Stein procedure "falls short of satisfying . . . constitutional requirements," 878 U.S.
at 391, the Court went on to discuss whether the hearing to which the habeas applicant
was entitled should be held in the federal district court or in the state courts, implying
therefore that the Court could have ordered a hearing in the district court although the
applicant had already proved a constitutional violation.
The Court's reasoning, however, appears to have been caused by a misreading of
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), upon which the Court relied heavily. Rogers
held that the mere use by the state trial judge of an erroneous constitutional standard
in passing on the voluntariness of a confession violated the Constitution and entitled tile
habeas applicant to release. The confusion stems from the discussion by Justice Frank-
furter after this holding of the propriety of ordering a hearing on voluntariness in the
federal courts as opposed to a new trial in the state courts. This discussion was ad-
dressed, however, to the argument made in that case that Rogers was not actually
deprived of his constitutional rights unless application of the erroneous standard led to
the introduction at his trial of a confession which was in fact involuntary. The district
court could determine, it was argued, the "fact" whether his confession was Involuntary,
and could release him if it so found. 365 U.S. at 545-46. Justice Frankfurter rejected this
argument for the same basic reasons given by Justice White in Jackson: the interest In
letting the state courts correct their own defects, and the possible advantages of state
corrective action to the petitioner. Once the decision was made that the error in Rogers
violated the Constitution, it followed that the applicant was entitled to a trial "under
appropriate state procedures which conform to the requirements of the Fourteentih
Amendment." Id. at 547-48.
The advantages in having state courts correct the defects caused by their use of the
Stein procedure was a relevant consideration in Jackson. But since it seems clear under
the language of the Act of 1867 that corrective action must take place in the state courts
once a defect has been deemed one of constitutional dimension, the advantages In state
court correction of their own defects was relevant only to the issue whether the defect
itself should be so characterized.
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of federalism and of defendants which flow from the result. Conse-
quently, where it is unclear that an erroneous standard was applied a
declaration of constitutional invalidity is never appropriate, no matter
how worthless the state court's fact finding may be. The Court stated
in Townsend that, because of "the co-equal responsibilities of state
and federal judges in the administration of federal constitutional law,"
district courts may "in the ordinary case in which there has been no
articulation," assume the correct standard was applied, and reconstruct
the facts from the assumed standard 00 But even where there is evidence
creating a doubt as to whether the correct standard was applied, or
where, because of the difficulty or novelty of the question, it is improper
to assume the correct standard was applied, the district court must
grant a hearing. A constitutional declaration is only proper where it
is clear that an erroneous standard was applied,01 giving rise to the
additional considerations outlined above.
The same point can be made with respect to the decision in Jackson.
The conditional order of release authorized in Jackson for prisoners
whose confessions are submitted to juries without a prior finding of
voluntariness is justifiable, not solely because the jury's verdict is an un-
reliable basis in which to find implied resolutions of factual disputes
underlying the issue of voluntariness, but also because of the possibility
of jury prejudice from a reliable but involuntary confession and the
other consequences beneficial to the interests of federalism and defen-
dants which flowed from the decision. The possibility of prejudice is
not nearly so strong, however, where it is unclear whether Stein was
followed. Consequently, prisoners should become entitled to release
only after a federal court finds that the impermissible procedure was
followed, a matter which will depend upon what the state court said
and did, and whether the state involved normally followed the Stein
procedure or some other procedure or combination of procedures.62
60. 372 U.S. 293, 214-15 (1963).
61. Id. at 315 n.lO. Accord, Paige v. Potts, 354 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1965) (unclear whether
proper standard of probable cause applied). Presumably, if it becomes clear during the
hearing that an erroneous standard u-as applied, the applicant would be entitled to
release.
62. Where the state normally followed Stein, there will be a strong basis for a finding
that it did so in a particular case where the procedure followed is unclear. It may be
equally legitimate in some instances to find the incorrect practice was followed where
the state involved normally followed a correct practice. Any indication of a departure
from normal practice in such a case might provide a basis for inferring that the incorrect
practice was followed in that case. It would be highly questionable to infer the incorrect
practice from an unclear record where the state left it within the discretion of trial
judges whether to follow Stein or some correct practice. In precisely this last situation,
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A recent decision provides a striking example of this problem of
taking the appropriate corrective action with respect to adjudications
which result in fact-finding defects. The Court held in Pate v. Robin-
son63 that due process requires that no person be tried while lie is
incompetent to stand trial. The Court decided, moreover, that states
must provide a procedure of some sort to determine competency. It
can readily be seen that failure to provide a procedure would be a
defect at least requiring a federal fact-finding hearing. But the Court
chose to establish a constitutional rule requiring the states to provide
a procedure. Certainly the degree of unfairness caused by this defect
would be substantial. Its impact upon vindication of the right of in-
competent persons not to be tried would undoubtedly be adverse.
Without a hearing on this technical issue, a finding would be meaning-
less. State autonomy is not seriously limited, since the Court does not
require any specific type of procedure. State court participation, on the
other hand, is clearly increased. Most significant, however, is the fact
that a constitutional rule requiring the states to hold competency
hearings will often enable the federal courts to avoid holding such
hearings. Finally, it is possible that states will provide greater protec-
tion for defendants at competency hearings than the Constitution
demands.
Pate v. Robinson goes even further. The Court held that the state's
competency procedure must be invoked once some evidence of in-
competency is introduced, and emphasized the importance of afford-
ing defendants an opportunity, at such a hearing, to introduce ex-
pert testimony.6 4 In effect, the state procedure must be meaningful
a district court granted a hearing, heard evidence (including testimony of the state trial
judge), and concluded that a preliminary finding of voluntariness had been made which
met Jackson. Smith v. Texas, 236 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1965).
Under this analysis, however, it is never proper to assume Stein was followed where
that fact is unclear. A finding must be made by the district court. The Supreme Court's
holding in Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 (1964), seems to the contrary. Defense counsel
in Stevenson moved at trial to strike a police officer's testimony that the defendant con.
fessed to the crime. The motion was overruled without comment and without a hearing
on voluntariness. The Supreme Court held that this procedure was not "fully adequate
to insure a reliable and clear cut determination" of voluntariness in accordance with
Jackson, and ordered the prisoner released. Actually, it was unclear in Stevenson whether
the requirement in Jackson of a preliminary finding of voluntariness had been satisfied,
since it was possible that, in overruling the motion, the state court had made a finding
of voluntariness. The state had followed the practice of holding hearings as to volun-
tariness outside the presence of the jury. Apparently the Court felt the departure from
this normal practice provided a sufficient basis for assuming the improper practice had
been followed.
63. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
64. Id. at 385 & n.7.
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in its availability and in the opportunity it gives the parties to
develop the facts. It would make little sense not to go this far once a
procedure of some sort is required.65 All the considerations which
operate to require a procedure operate to require a meaningful pro-
cedure. Inadequacies peculiar to particular cases, however, should not
lead to constitutional declarations. Habeas corpus hearings are avail-
able to correct such defects, which generally have little certain adverse
effect upon vindication of established constitutional rights. Probably a
sufficiently accurate guide as to what protections and procedures should
be constitutionally required at competency hearings is the set of rules
governing the protection which must be afforded at trials. Some
modification may be necessary, however, because of the special nature
of the competency issue.60
The question whether a hearing to correct unacceptable fact-finding
caused by deficient adjudications of federal rights or a constitutional
rule invalidating the deficiency is appropriate in a given case is dif-
ficult and not settled mechanically. The mere presence of unacceptable
findings of fact is not enough to justify a constitutional rule. The
federal courts should consider, among other things, the unfairness
involved, as measured both by the possible impact of the defective
adjudication upon vindication of the right at stake and by other
possible prejudice, any special responsibility of federal courts with
respect to the defect, such as the duty to require application of correct
constitutional standards, the extent to which a constitutional rule
would limit state autonomy, the interest in having state courts find
the facts in the first instance, the duties which a constitutional rule
would impose on the federal courts and the tasks such a rule would
enable federal courts to avoid, and the possible disadvantages and
advantages to habeas corpus applicants and to defendants in future
cases. The proper course hopefully should be somewhat more clear
once these factors are considered.
III. CRITERIA FOR GRANTING FACT-FINDING HEARINGS
Unquestionably, the limitation on habeas corpus which if properly
exploited would serve more than anything else to assure the states a
65. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, joined in by Justice Black, agrees with the
majority in principle, but disagrees on the relevance to the issue of incompetency of the
evidence presented.
66. Thus the need for expert testimony may be greater on the issue of competency
than on most other issues. Cf. Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Tex. 1964)
(state must provide psychiatric examination for indigent defendant when sanity in
reasonable doubt). On the other hand, the rules of evidence required at trials to avoid
prejudice on the issue of guilt may be unnecessary at a hearing on competency before
a judge or a special jury.
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meaningful role in the process of constitutional adjudication is the
ruling in Townsend v. Sain that state court findings of fact, arrived at
after "full and fair" hearings, should normally be accepted by the
federal courts. 67 The significance of the power to find the facts is great.
"[T]he trial of an issue of fact may be as important a factor in the
vindication of a federal right as the determination of the legal content
of that right."6 8 So crucial is this role that reserving it for the states
involves substantial risk. "Distortion or biased handling of evidence,
whether the result of deliberate plan or unconscious leaning, can frus-
trate the effectiveness of national law quite as fully as a misconstruc-
tion of that law or an absolute refusal to recognize claims stemming
from it."69 But if the federal courts find the facts anew in all cases,
there would be little purpose in having an original adjudication of
federal rights in the state courts. So long as the state courts are left with
the role of fact-finding, habeas corpus will remain a review, rather
than an original proceeding. Moreover, the practice of accepting state
resolutions of factual disputes made after full and fair hearings appears
on a pragmatic basis to be a proper allocation of fact-finding responsi-
bility, since difficulties inherent in fact-finding are compounded in
habeas corpus by the passage of time and its effect upon memories and
physical evidence, the increased difficulty of proving perjury, and the
67. Professor Bator has argued that, "if meaningful process serves as an adequate
guarantee of the probability of the correctness of fact finding, we are entitled to some
explanation why it does not satisfy us with respect to legal conclusions." Bator, supra
note 1, at 502. There are substantial reasons for the different treatment accorded state
findings of fact and state pronouncements of federal law. A court entrusted with the
power and responsibility to speak with greater authority on questions of law than some
other court can arrive at a "correct" decision. The standard of correctness for questions
of law is no more than the pronouncement of a more authoritative tribunal. Tie
standard of correctness for issues of historical fact, on the other hand, must ultimately
be what really happened, not what the court said happened. Of course, what the court
with greater authority says are the facts become the facts for the purpose of that case.
But courts recognize that fact findings are efforts to ascertain what actually happened,
in the difference in the scope of appellate review of law and fact; fact finders are deferred
to because they are closer to the truth. Sheer practicability is another basis for the dif-
ference in treatment accorded conclusions of law and findings of fact. A reviewing court
is as able to form a judgment on a question of law as the trial court. But because of
the uncertainties of fact-finding, often compounded in habeas corpus by delay, it simply
is not practicable to review the facts as broadly as the law. "[M]ost decisions by a trial
judge, in cases where the testimony is conflicting, are beyond criticism because the means
of adequate criticism are not available." FRANK, IF MEN WEa ANcrls 271 (1942). See
also Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1950).
68. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUMt. L. REv. 157,
171 (1953).
69. Id. at 172; see Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed
Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 793, 841 n.193 (1965).
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problem of bringing available witnesses, evidence and records to the
district within which the prisoner is confined.70
In Brown v. Allen, the Court recognized the importance of allocating
primary fact-finding responsibility to the state courts, and established
vague standards to guide district courts in exercising a broad discretion
as to whether to grant fact-finding hearings.7' A hearing was deemed
necessary in "unusual circumstances" 72 or when a "vital flaw" was
found.73 In Townsend the Court continued to recognize the validity of
this distribution of responsibility, but attempted to correct the con-
fusion caused in the lower courts by the vague standards in Brown 4
by establishing more concrete criteria, and to check the tendency of
district judges to deny hearings75 by limiting the broad discretion
Brown afforded them. Evidentiary hearings are now mandatory when:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported
by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed
by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;
(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state
court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of
fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair hearing.70
The Townsend criteria are as specific as could be expected from an
opinion, in an area with very little established doctrine; increased
particularity and more examples, however, will hopefully provide even
greater guidance. Moreover, while the Court has apparently succeeded
in checking any tendency in district judges improperly to deny hearings,
the opposite tendency may well have set in.77 It is not enough, if state
70. Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding, so the subpoena power extends only to dis-
trict lines. See United States ex rel. Ricco v. LaVallee, 2025 F. Supp. 278. 279 (N.D.N.Y.
1964), for a discussion of this and other weaknesses.
71. 344 U.S. 448, 463-64, 500-13 (1953).
72. Id. at 463.
73. Id. at 506.
74. See 872 U.S. at 810 n.8; Note, 76 HARv. L. Rav. 1253 (1963); Comment, 53 Nw.
U.L. REv. 765 (1959); Comment, 68 YALE UJ. 98 (1958).
75. See Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 78, 122 n259 (1964).
76. 372 U.S. at 313.
77. The percentage of cases disposed of after hearing has increased from 6.7%, in the
1964 fiscal year to 11% in 1965. ANN. Rr,. OF THE Dn OF TnE AD.i.. Orrica U.S. Cours
(1964 & 1965) (table C-4). The number of hearings went from 218 in 1964 to 468 in 1963.
Ibid. The increased number and percentage of hearings does not, of course, prove that
hearings are being held too often; nor even does it disprove that hearings are not being
held often enough. The point is that, unless district courts state their reasons for granting
hearings, there is no way for anyone to know whether they are applying Townsend
properly.
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fact-finding is to have its proper significance, to grant federal habeas
corpus hearings simply because of "the seriousness of the charges." 78
If cooperation from the states is expected, they are entitled to reasons,
and to good reasons, every time their records or findings are deemed
inadequate.7 9 The hopelessness often expressed as to the future of
state court post-conviction review is, in general, still unfounded. Fed-
eral courts often take pains to give weight to state court cooperation.
But the tendency to grant hearings simply to avoid reversal and to "get
the matter settled once and for all" is very real, and jeopardizes the
present distribution of decision-making functions.
The federal district court's task under Townsend is to determine
whether state courts have made findings of fact upon which the federal
claims of state prisoners can properly be reviewed. In handling this
task, the court's inquiry should not be whether the state court findings
are "correct" in some absolute sense. The district courts should, and
Townsend requires generally that they must, direct their attention
principally to the question whether the conditions under which a
challenged finding was made were sufficiently reliable to warrant ac-
ceptance of the finding regardless of its correctness in the absolute
sense.8 0
In effect, district courts should search for discernible indicia of un-
reliability, rather than engage in the treacherous process of evidence
evaluation. The most significant possible exception to this approach
in Townsend is the requirement that a hearing be held when the facts
found by the state court are not "fairly supported" by the record. This
requirement, if broadly interpreted, would entail a full-scale evaluation
and weighing of evidence, tending to relegate state court decision-
making to a substantially meaningless role. As discussed below, the
requirement should therefore be read with a full appreciation of the
complexities and uncertainties inherent in reviewing findings of fact,
and of the need to preserve a meaningful role for the state courts.
We turn now to a detailed discussion of the Townsend standards.
78. Lee v. Walker, 232 F. Supp. 369 (ED. La. 1964). After the hearing the court found
the prisoner's allegations "completely false." Id. at 370.
79. Some courts simply order hearings without giving their reasons for doing so.
E.g., Louisiana ex rel. Jacquillon v. Allgood, 243 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1965); United
States ex rel. O'Neill v. Rundle, 230 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
80. See Bator, supra note 1, at 455: "[I]t is always an appropriate Inquiry whether
previous process was meaningful process, that is, whether the conditions and tools of
inquiry were such as to assure a reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found
and the law correctly applied." (Emphasis in original.) Our basis for distinguishing ques-
tions of law from questions of fact is in note 67, supra.
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A. The State Court Record
When a state prisoner alleges a constitutional deprivation, and resolu-
don of his claim turns on the underlying facts, the district judge must
either obtain the state court record or grant a hearing.8' The state
court record may reveal that the disputed issues of fact have been
adequately resolved or that the claim otherwise lacks merit, so a
hearing should not normally be granted without calling for and ex-
amining the record. But the district judge has discretion to grant a
hearing without calling for a record in order to save time and expense,
as where the issues presented are relatively simple and no record has
been prepared.8 2 Once obtained, the record may be used as the basis
for the prisoner's release, or for denying the writ; but the writ cannot
be denied on the basis of a physically incomplete record, or on the basis
of a record which does not dispose of the claim presented.
1. When Is the Record Incomplete? The state court record was held,
in Townsend, to include "the transcript of testimony (or if unavailable
some adequate substitute, such as a narrative record), the pleadings,
court opinions, and other pertinent documents... ."8 The requirement
of a transcript has raised a number of questions. It does not mean that
complete transcripts of all the state court proceedings need be provided.
In some cases, excerpts may be sufficient to dispose of the claim
properly.84 Moreover, as the Court indicated, if a transcript is unavail-
able, some adequate substitute will suffice. Draper v. W1ashington held
that the Constitution does not require the states to provide stenog-
rapher's transcripts for appeals in every case where a defendant can-
not buy one. "Alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are
permissible if they place before the appellate court an equivalent re-
port of the events at trial from which the appellant's contentions
arise."85 The alternatives mentioned by the Court are: a statement of
81. See Townsend v. Sain, 359 U.S. 64 (1959) (per curiam); Wright v. Dickson, 335
F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964).
82. See Brown v. Allen, 344 US. 443, 504 (1953) (Frankfurter, J. for the Court on this
point).
83. 372 U.S. at 319; United States ex rel. McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.2d 447 (3d
Cir. 1965). Congress has provided by statute for admissibility in habeas corpus proceed-
ings of "documentary evidence, transcripts of proceedings upon arraignment, plea and
sentence and a transcript of the oral testimony introduced on any previous similar appli-
cation by or in behalf of the same petitioner .... 28 U.S.C. § 22-17 (1954). In addition.
the respondent must file "certified copies of the indictment, plea of petitioner and the
judgment, or such of them as may be material to the questions raised, if the petitioner
fails to attach them to his petition . 2..." 8 U.S.C. § 2249 (1964).
84. See Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 98, 105 n.30 (1958).
85. 372 U.S. 487, 495 (1963).
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facts agreed to by both sides; a full narrative statement;80 and a by-
stander's bill of exceptions. s7 There is no reason to suppose these
methods are the only acceptable ones. If a state uses electronic sound
recording, the tapes or a transcription of the recording should normally
be adequate substitutes for a stenographic transcript. 8 Nor should the
fact that the state court record is not an official reporter's transcript be
controlling. A statement prepared and signed by a clerk on the day of
the proceeding should be acceptable when it "appears to be, and was
obviously intended to be, a complete chronological recital of the events
which occurred .... "89 It seems essential, however, in light of the falli-
bility of human memory, that any alternative to a stenographer's tran-
script be based upon some sort of contemporaneous transcription of
the state court proceeding. Thus a full narrative statement is an ade-
quate alternative under Draper when based "on the trial judge's
minutes taken during trial or on the court reporter's untranscribed
notes ... "90
86. 28 U.S.C. § 2245 (1964) provides for admission into evidence at habeas corpus hear-
ings of "the certificate of the judge who presided at the trial resulting in the judgment,
setting forth the facts occurring at the trial .... "
87. Compare Randel v. Beto, 354 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1965) (qualified bills of
exceptions not adequate to resolve issue).
88. Electronic sound recording is increasingly being utilized. There are advantages
in such recording, especially its lower cost, and the fact that it enables a reviewing court
to hear the tone of voice of witnesses. OLNEY, REPORT ON ELECTrONIC SOUND RECORDING
IN THE TRIAL CoURTs OF THE STATE OF ALASKA (1961), is an exhaustive treatment In favor
of electronic recording. Compare FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 23, 224 (1963). There are,
however, some disadvantages, including the difficulty of recording statements spoken
simultaneously, the need for someone to operate the machine, and the need to
transcribe the recordings, since listening takes much longer than scanning a record.
For critical treatments, see generally PRoGRss REPORT OF TIE STANDING COMMITTEE
ON REPORTING AND RECORDING COURT PROCEEDINGs, 22d Ann. Jud. Conf. D.C. Cir., May
11, 1961; Rodebaugh, Sound Recording in Courts: Echoes front Anchorage and Wash.
ington, 50 A.B.A.J. 552 (1964); Rodebaugh, Sound Recording in the Courtroom: A Re.
appraisal, 47 A.B.A.J. 1185 (1961); Hunt, Electronic Necklaces vs. Court Reporters, 24
ALA. LAWYER 104 (1963); Yandell, A Recording Experiment, 124 JUsTIcE or Tmu PEACE
266 (1960). Congress, after balancing these considerations, see S. REP. No. 618, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965); H.R. RE'. No. 281, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), passed a bill which pro.
vides for verbatim recording of proceedings-including "all arraignments, pleas, and pro.
ceedings in connection with the imposition of sentence in criminal cases . . ."-"by
shorthand or by mechanical means which may be augmented by electronic sound record-
ing subject to regulations promulgated by the Judicial Conference .... " Pub. Law 89-163,
89th Cong., H.R. 3997, Sept. 2, 1965, 79 STAT. 619, amending 28 U.S.C. § 753(b). (Em.
phasis added.) The value of sound recording increases in technical areas. See Nissley,
Are Hearing Transcripts Adequate for Technical Arbitrations?, 52 A.B.A.J. 52 (1966).
89. Carroll v. Boles, 347 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1965). Nor need the clerk have certified the
transcript even though required by state law, where other evidence establishes its authen-
ticity. See Walton v. Peyton, 360 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1966).
90. 372 U.S. at 495; see Allison v. Holman, 326 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 957 (1964); Premier Poultry Co. v. Win. Bornstein & Sons, 61 A.2d 632, 633
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The standard set out in Draper governs the issue whether a state has
violated a prisoner's constitutional right to an adequate record. The
Townsend requirement of a complete record, on the other hand, is
not a constitutional rule, but a standard governing the federal courts
in deciding whether to hold fact-finding hearings. When a prisoner
proves under Draper that he was denied his constitutional right to a
full record because of an inadequate transcript substitute, the habeas
,'ourt must order him released; when a prisoner who has no constitu-
tional right to a record nevertheless shows that the state court record
purporting to resolve his federal claim is incomplete because of an
inadequate transcript substitute, the habeas court must hold a hearing
and must order the prisoner released only if he proves his underlying
federal claim. The standard enunciated in Draper for adequacy of a
transcript substitute does not necessarily govern the habeas corpus
situation, but the following hypothetical case should illustrate the
propriety of adopting the Draper standard.
A state prisoner asserts on appeal from his conviction that he was
denied equal protection by the state's failure to provide him with a
complete record on appeal, including a transcript of his trial. The state
appellate court affirms without opinion and certiorari is denied by the
Supreme Court. Later the prisoner applies for state post-conviction
relief. He claims that, instead of a transcript, the state provided him
with a statement of the evidence and proceedings which was based only
on the trial judge's recollection of the trial. The state argues, how-
ever, that, while a transcript was not prepared, an adequate substitute
was provided-namely, a narrative statement based upon notes of the
trial judge taken during the trial. If the state's version of the facts is
true, the prisoner has no valid claim. After a full hearing the state
court rules against the prisoner, who then applies for federal habeas
corpus. The state files the record of the state post-conviction proceed-
ing, which itself contains a narrative statement of the post-conviction
proceeding rather than a transcript; it is uncontested, however, that
the narrative statement of the post-conviction hearing is based upon
notes taken during the hearing, and would satisfy any equal protection
claim to an adequate transcript substitute on appeal from a conviction
or from a post-conviction proceeding.
It is one of the federal court's duties at this point to determine
whether the record of the state court resolution of the prisoner's claim
is complete enough to use as the basis for disposing of the claim with-
out a hearing. The purpose of the hypothetical case is to make clear
(D.C. Mfunic. Ct. App. 1948) (commenting on disadvantages of narrative statement based
on memory of proceedings and evidence).
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that the federal court has the power to grant a hearing to determine
whether the state trial court had based its narrative statement on notes
taken during the trial, because the record of the state post-conviction
proceeding is based on a narrative statement rather than a full tran-
script. It can do this despite the fact that the same narrative statement
would meet the constitutional standard of completeness governing the
issue whether a complete record had been provided on appeal. In fact,
this observation applies generally: the standards by which the adequacy
of state court records are judged when the issue is whether the prisoner
was denied his constitutional right to an adequate record do not bind
the district court on habeas when the issue is whether the record should
be accepted as a reliable basis for disposing of a federal claim. There
is a difference between granting a hearing and ordering a prisoner
released, and this difference in consequence may sometimes justify a
higher standard of completeness when only a hearing is at stake.
Exercise of this power to deem a constitutionally adequate trial
court record incomplete and to grant a hearing on the factual issues
that record purports to resolve is inappropriate, however, when the
issue is whether a transcript substitute is adequate. Draper in effect
tells the states they may constitutionally use certain transcript substi-
tutes, and the states will undoubtedly rely upon this statement of the
law. It would be incongruous, therefore, for the habeas courts to im-
pose some higher standard in deciding whether the transcript substitute
is sufficiently reliable to make a hearing unnecessary. Moreover, the
standard enunciated in Draper is as high as the Court could go without
precluding use of transcript substitutes. Draper requires that the substi-
tute "place before the appellate court an equivalent report of the
events at trial from which the appellant's contentions arise."'D The
habeas court should demand no more. For even in the special case
when a claim turns on whether certain words were said, if the transcript
substitute does not resolve the dispute, the habeas court would be
justified, if the issue were presented, in finding the substitute constitu-
tionally inadequate, since such a narrative statement would not be the
"equivalent" of a transcript in that particular case. If, therefore, a
prisoner who has no constitutional right to be given an adequate tran-
script (for example, if he is not indigent) asserts he is entitled to a
hearing on some other federal claim because the state court record
resolving his claim contains an inadequate substitute, the district court
should grant a hearing only if the transcript substitute fails to meet
the Draper standard.
91. 372 U.S. at 495.
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There are several fairly common situations in which the state court
record is incomplete, but in which the Draper standard should not
limit the federal habeas court. A transcript may be unavailable because
the court reporter has died or cannot be found and his notes cannot be
transcribed. The transcript or some other necessary part of the record
may have been destroyed pursuant to regular state practice.02 Finally,
a part of the transcript or record may be missing. The fact that these
deficiencies do not amount to a constitutional violation in themselves03
should not prevent the federal courts from granting hearings to negate
to the extent possible any prejudice caused to the applicant's other
claims.94
The absence of part or all of a transcript or record is different from
the matter of adequate transcript substitutes. On the issue of adequacy,
Draper establishes guidelines upon which state courts will rely. Incom-
pleteness caused by the death of a stenographer, or by loss or destruc-
tion of the record, however, is seldom the result of reliance upon a
federal standard. Consequently, in these and similar cases, the federal
habeas courts should not be limited in deciding whether to grant fact-
finding hearings by the standards governing the issue whether a per-
son has been denied his equal protection right to an adequate record.
Indeed, the only reason these sorts of defects may not always result
in constitutional deprivations is that they are not caused by con-
scious acts. The trial record of a rich man is as likely as that of an
indigent to be rendered inadequate by the death of a stenographer,
loss, or destruction. And although this factor may not be controlling in
all cases, it does provide a basis for finding no violation of equal pro-
tection. 5 Even so, however, it does not provide any basis for denying
state prisoners, rich or poor, the opportunity to convince the federal
courts of their versions of the facts.
92. Most states destroy their records after a few years. See Report of the Special Com-
mittee on Habeas Corpus to the Conference of Chief Justices, June 1953, in H.L RP.
No. 548, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 33 (1959). The federal courts are implicitly authorized
to do so as well. See H.R. 3997, 89th Cong., Sept. 2, 1965, 79 STAT. 619, amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 753(b), which requires preservation of shorthand notes and other original records for
not less than ten years.
93. Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963), held that neither equal protection nor
due process is violated where an indigent, presumed to have had counsel willing to
take an appeal and failing to do so, could not obtain on motion 15 years after his
conviction a transcript of his trial because the reporter had died and no one could read
his notes. Compare Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1955) (petition alleged that
attorney refused to represent defendant on appeal).
94. Thomaston v. Gladden, 326 F.2d 305, 307 (9th Cir. 1954). But see United States
ex reL. Kimble v. Keenan, 316 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1953), discussed in Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
78, 108 n.172 (1954).
95. See Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963).
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In light of the above discussion, the states can take a number of steps
to avoid federal habeas corpus hearings because the state record is
physically incomplete. A transcript or some adequate substitute (con-
cerning which the states are left with a great deal of flexibility) should
be prepared; the problems created when a stenographer dies and his
notes cannot be transcribed could be minimized by requiring stenog-
raphers to use stenographic machines which make readable symbols,
and by using electronic sound recording; records should be preserved
for longer periods of time-the burden of preserving records must be
balanced against the burden of reconstructing them, and against the
risk that prisoners may become entitled to release where there is some
substance to their claims and no record to disprove them exists;90
finally, care should be taken to keep records intact and complete by
safe storage and strict control over circulation.
States occasionally refuse to provide the federal courts with a com-
plete record. Often this is simply because insufficient funds have been
allocated for the purpose. If federal courts could order the record
completed at the expense of the federal government, fact-finding hear-
ings might often be avoided, perhaps with a considerable saving of
resources. The Comptroller General of the United States, however,
refused to make funds available for this purpose even for federal
prisoners.9 7 Criticism of this position 8 caused Congress to provide for
payment of transcript fees furnished in proceedings by indigent federal
prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.-9 The danger of extending this prac-
tice to state prisoners, however, is the possibility of enormous long-run
expense if the states let the federal courts pay the costs of preparing
records in all cases. It seems safe to assume that the states can afford to
prepare those parts of the records of indigent prisoners relevant to
their federal claims. Perhaps the best way to solve this problem, there-
fore, would be to require the states under the equal protection clause
to prepare records, to the extent they are able to do so on the basis of
available notes and materials, for indigent prisoners who raise substan-
tial questions in federal habeas corpus petitions.
96. See discussion in Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 154, 184-87 (1965).
97. See Decision B-154383, August 3, 1964.
98. See United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964); Poe v. United States, 229
F. Supp. 6 (D.C. 1964); cf. Taylor v. Pegelow, 335 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1964). See generally
Sokol, Availability of Transcripts for Federal Prisoners, 2 Aax. Cimu. L.Q. 68 (1964).
99. Pub. Law 89-167, 79 STAT. 647, 28 U.S.C. § 753(f), Sept. 2, 1965. Indigent habeas
corpus applicants are entitled without cost from "the clerk of any court of the United
States" to "certified copies of such documents or parts of the record on file in his office
as may be required by order of the judge before whom the application is pending." 28
U.S.C. § 2250 (1964).
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2. Finality of the Record. The degree of finality federal courts
should accord a physically complete record is important. A state which
compiles such a record has a substantial interest in its acceptance as
conclusive of the issues it resolves. Moreover, fact-finding hearings are a
burden on the federal courts and should be avoided where no substan-
tial issue is presented. One type of claim especially open to scrutiny is
that a state court record complete on its face does not accurately
represent what occurred. 00 Great weight is given contemporaneous
documents when they conflict with oral testimony,101 especially when
the document is a certified court record. Moreover, federal courts
should be reluctant to require states to defend the authenticity of
their records. To the extent such challenges are allowed, states will
undoubtedly feel compliance with Townsend is meaningless. There-
fore, the wholly unsupported assertion of a prisoner that a physically
complete record inaccurately recites what occurred should not result
in a hearing.
10 2
Generally, the record cannot be treated as final on claims based on
facts outside of it. But a hearing is not always necessary when facts out-
side the record are alleged. It is proper for the federal courts to decide
whether the facts alleged are insufficient to warrant a hearing because
100. The inaccuracy may itself be advanced as a due process violation. See Chessman v.
Teets, 350 U.S. 3 (1955) (per curiam), where an applicant alleged that his transcript on
appeal was prepared fraudulently by an uncle by marriage of the prosecuting attorney
after the original reporter died. A hearing was required to determine whether fraud
had occurred. The facts are more fully developed in Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156,
161-62 (1957).
101. Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 396 (1948): "Where
such testimony is in conflict with contemporaneous documents we can give it little
weight, particularly when the crucial issues involve mixed questions of law and fact."
102. United States ex rel. Combs v. Denno, 357 F.2d 809 (2d Cir. 1966). In
United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963). applicant
alleged his guilty plea was involuntary because of certain actions and promises of
the trial judge at a conference in chambers, which did not appear in the certified min-
utes of the conference. The applicant claimed, however, that no minutes were taken at
the conference, and that if minutes were taken they were not transcribed until six years
later by a stenographer who might have been different from the original reporter, thus
perhaps accounting for errors and inconsistencies. The applicant's version of the confer-
ence was sworn to by his trial attorney. The court ordered a hearing.
While the circumstances alleged are all legitimate considerations in determining
whether a hearing is appropriate, the court's decision is open to question. The minutes
themselves conclusively refuted the claim that no minutes were made, absent specific
allegations of fraud. The identity of the court reporter certainly could have been ascer-
tamined without a hearing. The attorney's affidavit was a seven-line form, generally used
to verify pleadings, and in this case was of doubtful significance since there was serious
doubt whether trial counsel had seen the verified state transcript at the time he signed
the affidavit. Id. at 317 (opinion of Friendly, J.). Compare Randel v. Beto, 354 F.2d 496
(5th Cir. 1965) (inadequate transcript substitute).
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inferences drawn from the content or from the very existence of a state
court record render the prisoner's allegations frivolous. The Supreme
Court has allowed very little latitude for drawing inferences of frivolity
in post-conviction cases involving federal prisoners, and there is no
reason to suppose the Court would adopt a contrary view in cases in-
volving state prisoners. 10 3 In the leading case of Machibroda v. United
States,04 a hearing was held necessary when a federal prisoner asserted
in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that he pleaded guilty because
of promises on three separate occasions of an Assistant United States
Attorney, "said to have been made upon the authority of the United
States Attorney and to be agreeable to the District Judge,"''10 and that,
when the petitioner threatened to advise his lawyer and the court of
what had transpired, the prosecutor assured him the sentence would
not exceed the agreed-upon maximum, and threatened him with adding
two unsettled robberies to his difficulties. Petitioner claimed to have
written two letters each to the sentencing court and to the Attorney
General concerning the prosecutor's misrepresentations. The district
court dismissed the application without hearing on the basis of the
prosecutor's affidavit in which he admitted speaking to petitioner once
and explaining the possibility of stricter treatment by the judge if
petitioner failed to talk, but in which he denied any promises or coer-
cion, noting that the court had never received either of the letters
referred to by the petitioner and that the petitioner had not com-
plained for two and a half years.
103. It seems safe to assume that the criteria for granting hearings in § 2255 proceed-
ings for federal prisoners will be the same as those applied in federal habeas corpus
proceedings for state prisoners. Section 2255 provides in part that, "unless the motion
and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to
no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United States attor-
ney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and
conclusions of law with respect thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964). (Emphasis added.) On
the other hand, § 2243 provides that, when disposing of applications for habeas corpus,
"the court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the matter as
law and justice require." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1964). This command seems just as imperative
as that contained in § 2255. The interests of federalism present in cases Involving state
prisoners operate to limit the granting of hearings in habeas corpus, but It seems Incon-
ceivable that the Court will attempt to develop two sets of criteria to handle these
difficult issues because of this single factor which, though important, hardly carries any
discernible guides for decision making. In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1963), a case under § 2255, the Court held that the Townsend criteria applied to federal
prisoners as one factor in deciding whether the ends of justice require a redetermination
of their claims on successive applications. See id. at 18, where the waiver standard enun-
ciated in Noia was applied.
104. 368 U.S. 487 (1962)
105. Id. at 489.
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In requiring a hearing the Court pointed out that the factual dis-
putes "related primarily to purported occurrences outside the court-
room and upon which the record could, therefore, cast no real light."100
Moreover, the circumstances alleged were not of a kind that the district
judge could resolve completely on the basis of his knowledge or rec-
ollection. Finally, this was not a case which simply involved the
prosecutor's word against the petitioner's:
The petitioner's motion and affidavit contain charges which are
detailed and specific. It is not unreasonable to suppose that many
of the material allegations can either be corroborated or disproved
by the visitors' records of the county jail where the petitioner was
confined, the mail records of the penitentiary to which he was sent,
and other such sources.
107
Another important case is Sanders v. United States,0" where one
issue before the Court was whether, on an earlier § 2255 motion by
petitioner, the district court had resolved the claim that counsel had
not effectively been waived and therefore that a plea of guilty had been
involuntary. The earlier § 2255 petition "stated only bald legal con-
clusions with no supporting factual allegations."10 3 In denying the ap-
plication the district judge reviewed the entire record. But the Court
pointed out:
The crucial allegation of the second motion was that petitioner's
alleged mental incompetency was the result of administration of
narcotic drugs during the period petitioner was held in the Sacra-
mento County Jail pending trial in the instant case. However
regular the proceedings at which he signed a waiver of indictment,
declined assistance of counsel, and pleaded guilty might appear
from the transcript, it still might be the case that petitioner did not
make an intelligent and understanding waiver of his constitutional
rights. ... For the facts on which petitioner's claim in his second
application is predicated are outside the record.110
Undoubtedly Machibroda and Sanders require a hearing in almost
106. Id. at 494-95.
107. Id. at 495.
108. 373 US. 1 (1963).
109. Id. at 19.
110. Id. at 20-21. There were indications, in addition, which supported petitioner's
claim. He had requested, before sentence, that the judge send him to a hospital "for
addiction cure," and the probation officer's report revealed petitioner had received medi-
cal treatment for withdrawal symptoms while in jail prior to sentencing. Id. at 20.
For a case in which the court concluded, on the basis of facts outside the record, that
a guilty plea was involuntary, see Kelly v. Warden, 230 F. Supp. 551, 555-57 (D. Md.
1964) (counsel testified he would not have recommended plea had he knowvn facts of
illegal arrest and detention).
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any case where the petition asserts facts outside the record. But these
two cases do not establish the proposition that "if charges of depriva-
tion of constitutional rights in obtaining the conviction are made which
cannot be conclusively established to be false from the record (and this
can rarely be done), a hearing must be held on such charges, no matter
how unbelievable or incredible the charges may appear on their
face." '' In the first place, charges incredible on their face may be dis-
missed without hearing." 2 Secondly, the Court does recognize certain
relevant factors which post-conviction judges may consider in deny-
ing relief without a hearing, such as whether the record throws any
light on the issues," 3 the trial court's recollection of the facts, 114 and
whether the petitioner's word is supported by other evidence.", More-
over, there are other factors, such as whether the allegations are hearsay,
the constitutional issue to which they are related, and the amount of
time the prisoner waited before making them, which courts have con-
sidered relevant in determining frivolity."; Some of these factors may
111. Jones v. Montana, 232 F. Supp. 771, 779 (D. Mont. 1964).
112. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293. 317 (1963).
113. Where the record is not necessarily inconsistent with the claim this factor cannot
be considered. See Holly v. Smyth, 280 F.2d 536, 542 (4th Cir. 1960), where a state court
order revealed that counsel was present at petitioner's trial and appeared and argued In
behalf of petitioner and his co-defendants. The court pointed out that the notation may
mean only that an attorney defending the co-defendants afforded some assistance to
petitioner, which may or may not have been enough to satisfy his constitutional right
to counsel. See also Edgerton v. North Carolina, 315 F.2d 676, 678 (4th Cir. 1963) (an
affidavit assumed to be a proper part of the record which alleged that petitioner submit-
ted a list of witnesses to the sheriff did not prove he knew the nature of the crimes
with which he was charged).
114. But see Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 386 (1966), ("While Robinson's demeanor
at trial might be relevant to the ultimate decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied
upon to dispense with a hearing on that very issue.'); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S.
1, 20 (1963) (trial court's recollection not "conclusive" on issue whether petitioner had
been incompetent because under the influence of narcotics).
115. Of course if the record reveals some support for the claim a hearing will prob-
ably be necessary. E.g., Pearce v. Cox, 354 F.2d 884, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1965). In Perez v.
New York, 228 F. Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), petitioner challenged a conviction upon
which his sentence as a recidivist was based on the ground that his plea to a lesser
offense was coerced because he was promised he would be allowed to go into the Army
if he pleaded guilty. The record revealed that all petitioner wanted was to go into the
Army, and that the court attendant said this to the judge.
116. See generally the admirable treatment in Note, Processing a Motion Attacking
Sentence Under Section 2255 of the Judicial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 788 (1963). A useful
discussion is found in United States ex rel. Weiss v. Fay, 232 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (Weinfeld, J.), where a hearing was denied. The only circumstance which sup-
ported petitioner's claim that the testimony of his accomplice, called by the prosecution,
was false was the fact that the accomplice was later allowed to plead guilty to a lesser
charge. This fact was not enough, the court held, to support the inference that perjured
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be illegitimate considerations; the point here is only that there are
cases in which charges may be deemed frivolous.
Despite the relevancy of these factors, however, and despite the fact
that Machibroda may be a "marginal case,""-- district courts are left
little discretion for denying hearings in cases alleging facts outside the
record on the basis of inferences drawn from the contents or existence
of a record. On the one hand, this practice avoids injustice in particular
cases; very little is left to speculation and probability. District courts
have, in fact, uncovered constitutional deprivations after being ordered
by circuit courts to resolve factual disputes raised in prisoners' peti-
tions.118 On the other hand, the practice involves a substantial ex-
penditure of judicial resources, and undoubtedly tends to increase
federal-state tension. Even if the practice is necessary, therefore, it
seems proper to consider possible steps to streamline the procedure
without significantly limiting protection. It should be emphasized, in
this respect, that giving substantial weight to state court records often
operates to the advantage of applicants, as where the respondent as-
serts facts outside the record.11
9
One method by which false claims might be deterred is for district
courts to punish prisoners for perjury after a hearing reveals their
claims were willfully false.' 0 This device suffers not only from the
general uncertainty concerning deterrence through criminal prosecu-
tion but also from the fact that long-term prisoners might be especially
unaffected by the threat of a little more time in jail. A more effective
device would be to require the petitioner to obtain an affidavit from
his state court attorney, and to prosecute or discipline the attorney if
the allegations are proved false-- 1 Attorneys are more likely to re-
testimony was used at the trial to the knowledge of the prosecution. In this case, two
other accomplices, who testified for petitioner, were also allowed to plead to a lesser
charge. In United States ex tel. Rambert v. New York, 358 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1936). peti-
tioner's claim that he was not represented by counsel mas refuted by his own earlier
claim that counsel had been ineffective.
117. 368 U.S. 487, 496 (196.
118. Pugh v. North Carolina, 238 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.C. 1965); Ward v. Page. 238
F. Supp. 431 (D. Okla. 1965); see Keene v. Holman, 232 F. Supp. 359 (M.D. Ala. 1954).
119. E.g., Carroll v. Boles, 347 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1965); Daniel v. United States, 274
F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 970 (1961). But a state should not be
denied a hearing "with respect to possibly decisive facts not admitted by it nor incon-
trovertibly proved by the record," where the state in effect moves to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. United States ex tel. Mitchell v.
Follette, 358 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1966).
120. See United States v. Roe, 213 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mo. 1963); Burleson v. United
States, 209 F. Supp. 464 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
121. In United States ex rel. Kenney v. Fay, 232 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (Wein.
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spond to the threat of punishment than prisoners, but the difficulty
of proving willful falsity, and of overcoming the reluctance of courts
to be strict with attorneys, limits the potential value of this remedy.
Of course, the more effectively either of these devices is used, the
greater will become the possibility that valid claims may be deterred.
Attorneys, especially, will be reluctant to take chances.
The most promising possibility for saving time and expense and for
avoiding the tension caused by full-dress hearings is to make the pre-
trial hearing a regular discovery device in habeas corpus proceedings.
There appears to be sufficient authority for some sort of pretrial
discovery hearing in habeas corpus proceedings, and the advantages of
such a practice for determining whether a claim is substantial enough
to warrant a full hearing seem patent.122 At present, however, few
cases are disposed of after pretrial proceedings.123 It may well be neces-
sary for Congress or the Court to take action making clear to district
courts the authority to use this device.
Ultimately, of course, the states could avoid all federal hearings when
facts outside the record are alleged by airing the factual allegations
made and resolving the disputes. The states can safely use pretrial
hearings to dispose of petitions presenting no substantial question; for
although the federal courts may feel bound to grant full-dress hearings
once any colorable claim is raised, there is no reason to suppose they
will reject findings of fact made after pretrial discovery which other-
feld, J.), the applicant asserted that his plea of guilty was given because of a broken
agreement between the court and his counsel that he would receive the same sentence
as two co-defendants. Counsel's affidavit in this case corroborated this allegation, and
the specific claim that, upon pronouncement of sentence, counsel protested that the
agreement was broken. The minutes of the sentencing contained no such objection, but
the court ordered a hearing on this and other grounds. If the claim were later shown
to have been false, some form of disciplinary action would be appropriate. See FED. R.
Crv. P. 11: "The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there Is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay . . . . For a wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action."
122. See generally DPAFr REPORT, COMMri-rEE ON Posr-CONvlcrIoN REMEDIES, ABA
Comm. on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, pp. 68-78 (1965); Carter, Pre.Trial
Suggestions for Section 2255 Cases Under Title 28 United States Code, 32 F.R.D. 391
(1963); Copenhaver v. Bennett, 355 F.2d 417, 421 (8th Cir. 1966).
123. Of 1,662 federal question habeas corpus cases terminated in fiscal 1963, only 4
were disposed of after pretrial; 1,581 were disposed of before pretrial, and 77 after trial.
ANN. REP. DIm. ADMIN. OFFImE U.S. CouRTs (1963) (table C-4). In fiscal 1964, 15 such
applications were disposed of after pretrial; 218 went to trial. Id. (1964). In fiscal 1965,
13 applications were disposed of after pretrial; 468 went to trial. Id. (1965). The same
tables reveal a similar ratio in disposition after pretrial of federal prisoner applications
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964).
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wise comply with the Townsend criteria. The pretrial hearing, how-
ever, should be used only to determine whether the petition presents
a substantial question. It should not be used to resolve substantial
questions, for the state fact-finding which results might then be de-
ficient because the prisoner was not given an opportunity to be present,
or for some other reason.
B. Resolution of Factual Disputes
Having once determined that the record is physically complete and
accurate, the district court must apply the Townsend standards if some
non-frivolous factual dispute has been raised. The first standard requires
a hearing if the record fails to show either expressly or by implication
that the state court has "actually reached and decided the issues of fact
tendered by the defendant."1 4 The practice of making findings of facts,
at least in civil cases, has by now been widely accepted.2-  Findings
make possible meaningful review by the habeas court,n0 and are rela-
tively easy for state courts to provide. But probably the most significant
service the requirement of making findings of fact performs is in the
check it places upon the trial judge's subjective reactions by compelling
him carefully to examine and rationalize his decision.127 Thus the posi-
tion that meaningful process has not been accorded by a state if no
findings have been made or are reasonably discernible does not rest
solely or even primarily upon the need for a meaningful federal review,
but upon the interest in securing reliable state court decisions.
124. 372 U.S. at 313-14.
125. See 5 Mfooaa, FEDERAL. PRAccE 52.01-52.03[l], at 2604-15 (2d ed. 1964).
126. See Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d 679, 6S0 (5th Cir. 1965); FRNK, IF MEN ,VEV
ANGELs 269 (1942):
If a trial judge, who tries a case without a jury, makes a finding of facts sup-
ported by substantial evidence, you then have some basis for determining whether his
decision is correct. If there are legal rules which, applied to those facts, logically
lead to his decision, then his decision is legally proper, othenvise it is erroneous.
(Emphasis in originaL)
The same reasoning and the same rule applies when federal court decisions are relewed.
See Minnesota ex rel. Holscher v. Tahash, 346 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1965). Cf. Kent v. United
States, 34 U.S.L. WEEn 4228, 4233 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1966): "Meaningful review requires that
the reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions."
127. Wright, The Nonjusy Trial-Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Opinions,
in PROCEmIGS OF THE SEMINARS FOR NmWLY Apponxiw Dhsmcr JuDoas (1963):
[r]his is the primary purpose of findings of fact and conclusions of law;. It makes
you analyze the evidence; it makes you put down your findings, and when you get to
this analysis, and when you get to writing out your findings, you may come to dif-
ferent conclusions on certain facts than the impression that you first entertained
when you heard the evidence ....
See FRANK, Cou'rs ON Tnmx 183 (1963); Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HAnv. L. Rn,. 921
(1948); Note, 61 HA.v. L. Rnv. 1434, 1437-88 (1948).
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If express findings have been provided, no hearing is required under
this Townsend standard. But all too often the federal courts are com-
pelled to ascertain whether findings can reasonably be implied. A con-
stitutional rule requiring express findings of fact would virtually
obviate this problem, but although the absence of express findings is
a shortcoming, sometimes even a defect requiring corrective action, it is
hardly serious enough to warrant constitutional correction. In many
cases findings can readily and safely be implied. When there is doubt
about whether a finding was made or what fact was found, there is no
firm basis on which the federal court can review the constitutional
claim, and there is also a chance that vindication of the claim involved
was adversely affected, since it is uncertain whether the state finder of
fact went through the process of analyzing the evidence. But unless
some additional element of unfairness is present, a habeas corpus hear-
ing at which the federal judge would go through this process and also
provide himself with a firm basis for deciding the constitutional claim
seems an adequate remedy. Federal courts should not, however, indulge
in speculation. If significant doubt exists over whether the state court
made a finding or over what its finding was, a hearing should be held.
A constitutional rule requiring express findings in all cases may be
inappropriate, but the liberal grant of hearings on this ground seems
proper for the additional reason that the states can readily remove all
doubts.
The first step in the process of implying findings is to determine
whether the state court actually passed on the merits of the claim as-
serted, or merely dismissed it on the basis of some procedural rule.
If the decision was not on the merits, no findings could have been
made. As an example of a situation in which it is normally proper to
assume the ruling was not on the merits, the Court in Townsend cited
denial of relief in a collateral proceeding after a hearing but without
opinion. 12 The fact that a state court judge may have decided a ques-
128. 372 U.S. at 314. In Jones v. Montana, 232 F. Supp. 771 (D. Mont. 1964), the
district court refused to reconstruct the facts and ordered a hearing where the state court
had denied by minute entry order a petition for collateral relief filed subsequent to
denial of petitioner's earlier application for federal habeas corpus on the ground of
failure to exhaust state remedies. In this respect, the decision was correct, especially
since the state court denial without findings or opinion came almost one year after
Noia and Townsend were decided.
Of course if there is some affirmative indication that the decision in a post-conviction
proceeding was not on the merits, the need for a hearing is even more conclusively
demonstrated. See United States ex rel. Thomas v. Pate, 351 F.2d 910 (7th Cir. 1965)
(prior federal habeas corpus hearing apparently denied for "lack of jurisdiction").
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tion on the merits is not enough in such a context.Y-D As an example
of a situation in which it is normally proper to assume the ruling was
on the merits, the Court in Townsend cited the state hearing which
occurs "in the course of the original trial-for example, on a motion to
suppress allegedly unlawful evidence. .. ."130 An in-between situation
is the motion for new trial. Here the trial is over, but often only
just over. Trial courts have wide discretion to deny new trials, and it
seems proper to assume that on such motions the state court did pass
on the merits, absent some evidence to the contrary. Sufficient doubt
about this assumption would seem to be raised when a significant
amount of time has passed since the trial;' 3 ' no ruling on the merits
can be assumed where the motion for new trial was made after the
state's statutory period for such motions had passed. Another possible
situation in which the question of whether a state court has passed on
the merits of a federal claim arises when a state court has given its
opinion on the merits of the claim later asserted in federal court al-
though the claim was not properly presented to the state court. State
courts must, of course, be free to comb the record for claims and dispose
of as many as they can discover. But in order to justify an assumption
by the habeas court that the state court has passed on the merits, there
must be a showing that claims not raised by a prisoner but ruled on
by the state courts received full consideration at some point in the state
process. Thus, it will not generally be enough for a state appellate
court simply to state that a claim never before considered is meritless." 2
Once the district judge determines that the state court ruled on the
merits he must then decide whether, in the particular case, it is permis-
sible for him to reconstruct resolutions of disputed facts. A fact can be
"reconstructed" if the view of the state trier is plain from his opinion
129. Townsend is therefore inconsistent with Judge Learned Hand's statement in
Schectman v. Foster, 172 F.2d 339, 342 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 92. (1950),
that, although the state judge in a coram nobis proceeding gave no reasons for his denial
of relief, the applicant failed to prove he was denied due process because the state judge
"may have understood that the deliberate use of perjured testimony required the con-
viction to be vacated.. .[and] may have decided that the evidence did not prove that
issue." (Emphasis added.)
130. 372 US. at 314.
131. See Coggins v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 130, 145-46 (Ist Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion of
Ford, J.), discussing the uncertainty involved in assuming the state judge decided a
motion for new trial on the merits.
132. Laddineo v. Tahash, 351 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1965). The court reasoned that, while
the state court's disposition may not be considered to have been on the merits for the
purpose of reconstructing facts, the state court's sua sponte rejection of the claim may
be treated as an exhaustion of state remedies on that issue.
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or from other indicia.133 Reconstruction is also often possible from
legal standards applied or assumed to have been applied at the state
hearing. There are three basic types of situations with which the habeas
judge may be faced in reconstructing facts from legal standards. First,
the state judge may have expressed at the hearing on the merits an
erroneous constitutional standard. Second, the record may reveal that
the state judge applied the correct standard. Finally, the record may
fail to reveal the standard applied at the state court hearing.
When it is clear that an erroneous constitutional standard was ap-
plied, reconstruction is impermissible. "[F]indings of fact may often be
(to what extent, in a particular case, cannot be known) influenced by
what the finder is looking for," and therefore "historical facts 'found'
in the perspective framed by an erroneous legal standard cannot plau-
sibly be expected to furnish the basis for correct conclusions if and
merely because a correct standard is later applied to them."' 4 The
need for a federal fact-finding hearing is obviated, however, by Rogers
v. Richmond, which requires that the applicant be released, subject to
corrective action by the state courts. The propriety of this disposition,
as opposed to a habeas corpus hearing, has already been discussed.'
The second situation with which the district judge is faced in
deciding whether it is appropriate to reconstruct findings of fact is
where the state judge expressed the correct constitutional standard.
Normally the habeas court may properly reconstruct facts in this
situation. Judge Frank recognized that this process was unsatisfactory,
but he conceded that if the trial judge, even without expressly finding
the facts, "announces the legal rules he applied, you have at least some
criterion for estimating the correctness of his decision for you can
surmise that he found facts which, coupled with those legal rules,
would logically yield that decision; and you can then see whether the
legal rules he employed are correct and whether there is substantial
evidence to support his surmised finding of facts."'' 3
Possibly because of the speculation involved in this process, the
Supreme Court has made an important exception to the rule that
reconstruction from a correct standard is permissible. A hearing may
still be required in cases presenting "mixed questions" in which law
and fact are interwoven to obtain a result, greatly increasing the
possibility of error. The Court in Townsend stated generally that,
133. 372 U.S. at 314.
134. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 547 (1961).
135. See text accompanying notes 52-57, supra.
136. FRANK, IF MEN WERE ANGELS 269 (1942).
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"unless the district judge [in a 'mixed question' case] can be reason-
ably certain that the state trier would have granted relief if he had
believed petitioner's allegations, he cannot be sure that the state trier in
denying relief disbelieved these allegations."137 What circumstances,
however, should make the district judge uncertain that the state trier
would have granted relief even if he believed the applicant's allega-
tions? Of course if no combination of the facts alleged would prove
a constitutional deprivation, the district judge may assume that the
state trier handled the "mixed question" properly. Even if error is
theoretically possible, the same assumption should normally control.
But when any combination of the facts alleged would constitute a
violation of federal right and when, in addition, the mixed question
involved "presents a difficult or novel problem for decision, any hypoth-
esis as to the relevant factual determinations of the state trier involves
the purest speculation."'138 Townsend was just such a case. The facts al-
leged by Townsend would have proved his confession was involuntarily
given. The Court assumed that a correct constitutional standard had
been applied, but ruled that a hearing was required because the mixed
question-the significance of the use of drugs prior to a confession-
"was novel and by no means without difficulty."' 3
The third and most troublesome type of situation in which the
district court is required to decide whether fact reconstruction is ap-
propriate is when the state trier articulated no standard in the state
court proceedings. The Court's general rule for such situations is that
"reconstruction is not possible if it is unclear whether the state finder
applied correct constitutional standards in disposing of the claim."
Under such circumstances "the decision of the state trier of fact may
rest upon an error of law rather than an adverse determination of the
facts, [so] a hearing is compelled to ascertain the facts."140 Indeed,
"when... the trial judge is silent as to both the facts and the legal
rules, ... the bases for appraising the correctness of his decision are
most obscure."' 41 If there is some possible combination of a set of facts
and a rule which would logically result in that decision, it would have
to be deemed correct unless some corrective action were taken.
Despite the dangers in reconstructing facts from a record which
contains neither findings nor a legal standard, the Court in Townsend
allows federal district judges, in light of "the coequal responsibilities
137. 372 U.S. at 315.
138. Ibid.
189. Id. at 321.
140. Id. at 814.
141. FRANK, op. cit. supra note 136.
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of state and federal judges in the administration of federal constitu-
tional law,"'142 to assume the correct standard was applied in the absence
of evidence sufficient to "create doubt."'43 Of course, no hard and fast
rule is available to determine whether "doubt" has been created. But
the area of difficulty can be narrowed, and some guidance in handling
this problem provided.
Generally speaking, this issue turns on two factors, which often are
both involved in the same case: (1) the nature of the standard which
the federal court must assume was applied in order to reconstruct a
finding; and (2) the possible indications in each particular case that a
correct or incorrect standard was applied.
If the correct standard is well settled, it is proper to assume it was
applied. For example, the law is settled that third-degree methods
necessarily produce a coerced confession. Thus the Court stated in
Townsend that if third-degree methods are alleged to have been used in
obtaining a confession and the state court refused, without findings
or opinion, to exclude the confession from evidence, the facts may be
assumed to have been found against the petitioner. Since the most
blatant denials of federal rights are the best settled, prisoners who
allege blatant denials of their rights will have the least chance of se-
curing hearings on disputed fact issues. This may seem incongruous
at first blush, but it is a realistic and logical rule. Of course, petitioners
can still obtain hearings on other grounds, such as an allegation that
the reconstructed findings are not fairly supported by the record or
were made in a proceeding not otherwise full and fair.
Another set of cases which can be disposed of with relative ease are
those in which the correct standard is novel or extremely difficult to
apply. Townsend itself was such a case, and establishes that, even if
the novel or difficult standard was articulated by the state court judge
in deciding the question, reconstruction of the facts is impossible so
long as any combination of alleged facts would have entitled the peti-
tioner to relief. 44 This follows a fortiori if it is unclear whether the
standard was applied.
The area of difficulty is further narrowed by the special rule which
precludes reconstruction of facts from an assumed standard in cases
involving waiver of the right to counsel. Whether someone has intel-
ligently and understandingly waived his right to counsel is a mixed
question of law and fact. But often the issue can turn on resolution of
historical facts. Especially significant is the presence or absence in the
142. 372 U.S. at 314-15.
143. Id. at 315 n.10.
144. See id. at 315.
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record of a statement to the accused by the trial court that he has a
right to counsel and, where proper, an offer to have counsel assigned.
Where no such statement appears in the record, Carnley v. Cochran
precludes reconstruction of this factual dispute from an assumption
that the proper standard of waiver was applied. The "fact" of whether
an offer was made is really a part of the rule: "The record must show,
or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an ac-
cused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected
the offer. Anything less is not waiver."'145
Where the record contains no colloquy, and no allegation made and
evidence offered to prove waiver, the petitioner is entitled to release. A
judgment of conviction in itself is not enough to entitle the state even
to a hearing on the issue.' 46 But it is clear that the state should be
afforded a hearing if it alleges waiver and offers a guilty plea, 4 7 a record
entry which is somewhat probative even though inadequate to place
the burden of proof upon the petitioner,48 or any other significant
indication that a waiver may have occurred.1 49 In order to place the
burden of proof upon the petitioner "the record-or a hearing, where
145. 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). The same standard has been adopted for judging aiver
of the privilege against self-incrimination during the post-arrest period. Miranda v.
Arizona, 34 U.S.L. W-%V 4521 (US. June 13, 1966).
146. It is in this respect that Carnley v. Cochran is inconsistent with Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938): "Where a defendant, ithout counsel, acquiesces in
a trial resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the e.x:traordinary remedy
of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not com-
petently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to counsel." The disparity is
perfectly understandable, since it was not until Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), that
it became established that a request for counsel was unnecessary.
147. E.g., Rice v. Olson, supra note 146; Wilson v. Harris, 351 F.2d 840 (9th Cir.
1965); Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1965); Lovato v. Cox, 344 F.2d 916 (10th
Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Brown v. Fay, 242 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
148. The court in Hayes v. Holman, 346 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1965), held the "mere
statement in the record that the petitioner did not have counsel and had 'announced
[he was] ready for trial without an attorney,' is not sufficient to permit the drawing of
an inference that the right to counsel was intelligently and understandingly waived."
But the court correctly ordered a hearing on the question, rather than granting peti-
tioner release.
In United States ex rel. Taylor v. Reincke, 225 F. Supp. 985, 988 (D. Conn. 1964), the
state alleged that petitioner had waived his right to counsel on appeal, citing the state-
ment in the state court's memorandum that petitioner's lawyer went to him in prison
"for the specific purpose of telling the petitioner that he was going to withdraw- the
appeal . . . . The petitioner consented to his withdrawal .... " The court properly
ordered a hearing to find the facts and resolve the waiver claim.
149. See United States ex rel. Brown v. Fay, 242 F. Supp. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (Wein-
feld, J.) (hearing ordered on issue of waiver where rubber stamped entry on judgment
roll indicating acquiescence to proceed without counsel was incomplete, and where
guilty plea was advanced). Compare Jones v. Montana, 235 F. Supp. 673. 678 (D. Mont.
1964) (plea held involuntary without hearing despite affidavit of trial judge, since affi-
davit contradicted by record).
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required--" must reveal "his affirmative acquiescence."' 50 Thus even
where a hearing is required, no special burden rests upon the petitioner
to disprove waiver, unless the state somehow proves counsel was offered
and declined. 15'
Unfortunately, most cases presenting the issue whether a factual
dispute can be resolved by reconstruction from an assumed standard
probably fit within none of the three reasonably manageable categories
discussed above. Even within this final group of cases, however, the
nature of the standard which the federal court must assume was applied
is highly significant. There are cases where, although it may have been
possible to reconstruct the facts had the state court made clear its
awareness of the correct standard (unlike Townsend where this was
impossible), reconstruction is impossibe because the standard or its
application are sufficiently difficult to preclude a safe assumption that
the standard was applied. An example should illustrate the point.
When the petitioner's claims that he was of unsound mind and unas-
sisted by counsel were dismissed in Massey v. Moore without hearing
as "without merit," the Court felt itself left "in doubt." The ruling,
wrote the Court, "may mean that the evidence to support the finding
[expressly made in an earlier habeas proceeding] that petitioner was
competent to stand trial with a lawyer was also sufficient to sustain the
conclusion that he was competent to stand trial without a lawyer. It
may mean that in the view of the District Court the two issues are the
same... [But] one might not be insane in the sense of being incapable
of standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without benefit
of counsel."'152 Had the district judge in this case made clear he was
applying the correct standard, it would have been proper to imply
resolutions of disputed fact issues. But the question was subtle, and it
was therefore too likely that the district court overlooked the issue.
That the standard is difficult should not normally be enough to create
doubt.15 3 But when there is any reason to suspect error, such as the fact
150. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1962). Is it possible to say petitioner
affirmatively acquiesced where acquiescence came after he had already pleaded guilty
to the trial judge, Sandoval v. Tinsley, 338 F.2d 48 (10th Cir. 1964), or earlier to a justice
of the peace, Lovato v. Cox, 344 F.2d 916 (10th Cir. 1965)?
151. See United States ex rel. Wagner v. Myers, 234 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
where the petitioner's allegation that he was without counsel at his sentencing was ac-
corded controlling weight after a hearing, where the record failed to disprove his 0ile.
gation, and the state was unable in any other way to controvert his testimony.
152. 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
153. See Lovedahl v. North Carolina, 242 F. Supp. 938, 946-47 (E.D.N.C. 1965) (assum.
ing proper test of insanity applied). Compare Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929, 932-34
(4th Cir. 1963) (refused to assume application of correct standard governing prejudice
due to out-of-court statements made to jurors).
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that the standard involved is especially complicated,15 or was not
reasonably well settled at the time the state court acted,1r it is improper
to assume it was applied. There is no reason to become too involved in
solving this question. Any significant possibility of error should pre-
dude reconstruction.
In most cases, district courts will have more than the nature of the
standard involved to assist them in deciding whether to assume the
correct standard was applied. There will often be some statement of a
standard at some stage in the state court proceedings. The probative
value of these statements will depend upon a number of things, in-
cluding the clarity of the statement, the court which made the state-
ment, and the context in which it was made. If the statement is ambig-
uous to the point that it can be read to support either the proposition
that the correct standard was applied or that it was not, the statement
has little if any value.ri0 If the statement has any value on its face, its
ultimate significance will depend upon who made it. Statements made
by the judge who decided the federal issue are undoubtedly most
probative, other considerations aside, of what he had in mind. State-
ments by other state judges indicating an awareness or unawareness of
the correct standard might be probative, since such statements will
sometimes reflect a general misapprehension by that state's judges of
the correct standard, or at least might indicate that the standard is suffi-
ciently novel or difficult so that its application should not readily be
assumed. 57 These possibilities become even stronger when a statement
indicating error was made by a state's highest court.'15 Finally, the
154. See Cordova v. Cox, 351 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1965) (voluntariness of guilty plea).
155. See Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929, 931 (4th Cir. 1963) (whether meeting in
chambers where it is agreed that the jury need not be sequestered is part of trial,
requiring defendant's presence); United States ex rel. Sileo v. Martin, 269 F.2d 586, 590-91
(2d Cir. 1959) (scope of right to counsel at time of plea unclear in 1956).
156. A fine example is the statement made by the state trial judge in Coggins v.
O'Brien, 188 F.2d 130 (1st Cir. 1951). Petitioner claimed the prosecution had knowingly
used perjured testimony. The state court dismissed the claim without findings or opinion.
The issue was whether it could be assumed that the state judge had applied the proper
standard-that any knowing use of perjured testimony results in a violation of due
process-or had denied relief on the ground that, even if perjured testimony had know-
ingly been used, the testimony had not been a material factor in securing the conviction.
Chief Judge Magruder (concurring) found significant the state judge's statement that
"if I found as a fact he was convicted upon perjured testimony, I would set aside the
verdict without the slightest hesitation." Judge Ford, in dissent, emphasized "convicted,"
thereby pointing up the obvious ambiguity.
157. But see Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1, 4 n.1 (9th Cir. 1965): "We are con-
cerned with the fact finding process of the trial judge, not with the reasoning of the
appellate tribunal." Are the two concerns necessarily inconsistent?
158. See Paige v. Potts, 354 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1965) (doubt over whether correct
probable cause standard applied). Both the majority and concurring opinions in Town.
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significance of a statement will depend upon the context in which it
was made. Generally, a statement of a standard which would be
erroneous if used in deciding a federal claim made in a context where
that standard is proper should prove nothing. Thus if a trial judge
properly instructs a jury on the credibility of a confession, this should
not have any bearing on whether that judge, or any other judge150
applied the same reliability standard instead of the proper voluntari-
ness standard in ruling on the confession's admissibility. 160 If the later
statement includes indications that the state judge was aware of the
proper standard, it should be assumed that he applied it in passing on
admissibility. 016 On the other hand, the later statement may indicate
an erroneous constitutional standard was applied in passing on the
federal issue. 62 If the federal court actually finds an erroneous constitu-
tional standard was applied, the prisoner must be ordered released
subject to appropriate corrective action in the state courts; if only a
doubt is created the federal court must find the facts under the proper
standard and resolve the claim.
Other indications of whether a correct or incorrect standard was
applied, while generally not as probative as statements, might often be
useful. Any number and variety of indicia may reveal themselves. The
state court opinion may indicate that the federal issue was avoided,0 3
or disposed of as a matter of discretion where discretion has no role.
1 4
The state involved may have a history of error in handling the question
send treated the Illinois Supreme Court's articulation of a "coherency" standard as
significant in determining whether there was doubt that the trial court applied the
"voluntariness" standard. 372 U.S. at 320, 323.
159. See United States ex rel. Witherspoon v. Ogilvie, 337 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1964),
where the judge who had ruled on the motion to suppress had died and been replaced
by a new judge who made the reliability instruction.
160. Id. at 430.
161. This was Justice Stewart's position in Townsend v. San, 372 U.S. 293, $29,31
(1968) (dissenting opinion).
162. In Rogers v. Richmond, 865 U.S. 534, 542 (1961), Justice Frankfurter treated as
significant in determining whether an erroneous standard had been applied the state
trial court's instruction to the jury, which contained statements of the reliability standard.
In Rogers, however, the state judge purported to be instructing the jury in accordance
with the voluntariness standard, rather than the reliability standard. Moreover, the
judge had articulated the same erroneous principle in one of his findings, id. at 541, the
state supreme court had done so on appeal, id. at 542-43, and Justice Frankfurter found
other Connecticut cases indicating that the state's courts had generally taken probable
truth or falsity into account in judging the admissibility of confessions, id. at 543 n.l.
165. See Townsend v. Bomar, 331 F.2d 19, 21 (6th Cir. 1964), where a federal judge
appeared to avoid the issue of whether defendants were given sufficient time to prepare,
stating only that defendants had competent counsel and were accorded a "fair trial."
164. See Coggins v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 130, 148-49 (1st Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
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presented, 65 or may have followed a practice generally which, had it
been followed in the case under consideration, would have raised at
least a doubt of error.166 Some federal judges have centered on what the
state argued as a clue to what the state court decided. 6- Others have
commented on the caliber of the state judge involved. 1 s All these
factors, and countless others, may legitimately create or eliminate doubt
as to whether the proper standard was applied.
One final issue. The question will probably arise in future cases as
to whether it is proper, where reconstruction of the facts is otherwise
impossible under Townsend, for the federal court to examine the
evidence on both sides of the factual dispute to determine in which way
the state judge resolved it. It may reasonably be argued that the evi-
dence should be examined to determine whether there is any significant
likelihood that the state judge would have found the facts for the peti-
tioner if he had applied the correct standard of law.6 9 If doubt that the
correct standard was applied exists, 170 it seems questionable, however,
for a federal judge to attempt to speculate on the basis of the cold
record as to what the state judge concluded. It is impossible to estimate
the effect of having an erroneous standard in mind, even for the trial
judge himself, let alone for a reviewing court. Townsend at least
provides some objective guide to the ascertainment of error by direct-
ing the attention of habeas courts principally to indicia of deficient
hearings rather than to the correctness of particular findings. The
latter approach is far too speculative and would tend to undermine
state court fact finding. This does not mean, of course, that the state
court's comments upon the evidence should not be considered in de-
termining whether an express finding of fact was made. It is the process
of evidence evaluation which must be avoided.
165. United States ex rel. Smith v. Jackson, 234 F.2d 742, 745 (2d Cir. 1956). Compare
Paige v. Potts, 354 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1964) (hearing ordered where state decision had
sometimes expressed correct and sometimes incorrect standard).
166. Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1903).
167. Cunningham v. Heinze, 352 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1965).
168. Id. at 7 (dissenting opinion) ("This was an experienced trial judge, a former
professor of constitutional law."); Coggins v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 130, 142 (1st Cir. 1951)
(concurring opinion of Magruder, C.J.); ef. 5 MfooPR, op. cit. supra note 125, 52.03[l],
at 2616.
169. Chief Judge Mlagruder did precisely this in Coggins v. O'Brien, supra note 168.
reasoning that "the only foundation for Coggins' claim" was undermined because it was
"most likely" that the state judge disbelieved Coggins' witness.
170. It cannot persuasively be argued that the likelihood of a finding against the
petitioner should be ascertained because it will throw light on whether the correct
standard was applied. All that this process could possibly show is that it made no
difference whether or not the correct standard was applied.
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In conclusion it should be noted that state courts wishing to avoid
federal fact-finding hearings on this ground may do so simply by articu-
lating the relevant standard of law and making express findings of fact
when they decide federal claims involving personal liberty. Most courts
do as much in resolving run-of-the-mill civil litigation.
C. Determinations Not Fairly Supported by the Record
Once the district court concludes that the state court has made
findings, either express or implied, it must still grant a hearing if fac-
tual determinations are not "fairly supported by the record as a
whole . -"171 This significant command in Townsend that federal
courts engage in the delicate task of evaluating the evidence upon
which the state court relied is left almost entirely unexplained, and
the explanation provided raises more questions than it settles. Since
the significance of the state court fact-finding role depends directly
upon the scope of review over factual determinations which federal
courts exercise, a more complete analysis of the problem seems essential.
The Townsend Court's treatment of the problem can thus be ac-
curately summarized: The duty of the federal habeas court "is no less
exacting" than that of the Supreme Court on direct review, which is
carefully to scrutinize the state court record and to reject all determina-
tions not "fairly supported" by the record.172 The careful scrutiny
referred to by the Court is apparently the established practice of re-
viewing mixed questions of law and fact. The two cases cited by the
Court are instances of this practice, which is a review of the application
of a legal standard rather than a review of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence.173 As to what it meant by "fairly supported," the Court cited
cases which stand for the proposition that findings supported by no
probative evidence cannot be accepted as the basis for constitutional
determinations. 174 These cases do not establish a scope of review for
judging findings based on conflicting evidence; rather they deal with
the legal question whether there is such an absence of evidence that
due process is violated.17
It is an understatement to say that the habeas court's duty "is no less
exacting" than the review exercised by the Court on direct review over
171. 372 U.S. at 313.
172. Id. at 316.
173. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208-09 (1960); Moore v, Michigan, 355
U.S. 155 (1957). The Court in Blackburn found the evidence on one side of the Issue "In
such hopeless internal conflict that it raises no genuine issue of fact."
174. Blackburn v. Alabama, supra note 173; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Other
leading cases are Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Thompson v. City of Louis.
ville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
175. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 402 (1945).
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mixed questions and over the issue whether there is any evidence sup-
porting a state's finding of fact. Both of these issues present questions of
law, and if the state court errs in either respect it has committed a viola-
tion of due process. If the role of the habeas court were limited to the
functions of the Court on direct review, there would never be any need
for a fact-finding hearing on this ground. So if the habeas fact-finding
hearing is to perform any function in the review of the sufficiency of
evidence, the habeas court must have a greater obligation than the Su-
preme Court on direct review.176 And it does. The habeas court is re-
quired, for example, to review the record "as a whole," i.e., both the
disputed and the undisputed portions, 77 rather than only the undisputed
portions of the record, which is the practice on direct review. This differ-
ence is obviously based on the power of the district court to grant
hearings to resolve disputes which the state courts have failed to
resolve.178 The "fairly supported" formulation, therefore, must mean
more than merely a review to determine whether any evidence supports
a finding. But how much more? There are several familiar standards of
review which could be adopted; which one is appropriate will depend
upon the purposes of each standard, and the characteristics of habeas
review which operate in favor of one standard or the other.
Since it is the general practice of state and federal courts, sometimes
constitutionally required, to treat constitutional issues separately from
the issue of guilt, federal district courts in habeas proceedings almost
invariably deal with findings of state judges rather than of state juries.170
If the federal court is ever properly presented with jury findings,
inferred from a general verdict, 80 the findings should be treated the
same as judge-made findings. Townsend draws no distinction between
176. For the purpose of this analysis, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). is treated
as an anomaly. In Norris the Court actually engaged in evidence evaluation, and rejected
the testimony of state officials as a basis for a finding of fact that Negroes had not been
intentionally excluded from juries, because of the strong case made for diecrimination
by the uncontroverted facts.
177. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
178. On the importance of reviewing the evidence on the whole record, see Jaffe, Ad-
ministrative Procedure Re-examined: The Benjamin Report, 56 Hiuv. L. REv. 704, 733
(1943).
179. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-221 (1953); People v. Adamson, 34 Cal. 2d 320, 210 P._d
13 (1949); People v. Langan, 303 N.Y. 474, 481, 104 N.E.2d 861 (1952). But see, e.g., Adler
v. State, 35 Ark. 517 (1880).
180. For example, the states may properly use a special jury to pass on the issue of
sanity. If a correct standard is given to the jury, findings of fact may arguably be found
implied in the general conclusion. See 38 IW. REv. STAT. §§ 592-93 (1963). It may be,
however, that federal claims should not be resolved on the basis of findings inferred from
a jury's general conclusion. The bill recommended by the Judicial Conference Committee
on Habeas Corpus would require some written indication of the jury's determination.
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jury and judge-made findings, and it seems fair to afford all petitioners
the same scope of review although one state may give a particular issue
to a jury while another gives the same issue to a judge.
The question remains, however, whether this uniform scope of
review for judge and jury findings should be the narrower review nor-
mally applied to jury verdicts or the broader review generally associated
with judge-made findings. Nothing in principle would appear to pre-
clude application of the scope of review of jury verdicts to cases in-
volving judge-made findings, but that scope of review seems too limited
for habeas corpus. The jury is normally deferred to because of its role
as representative of the community, a reason which is inapplicable
when a judge reviews another judge.' 8 ' Moreover, the standard of
review for jury verdicts is designed for appellate courts, which do not
possess the unique power of federal district courts to hear evidence and
evaluate demeanor. Thus all findings should more properly be reviewed
in habeas corpus by a standard normally applied to judge-made find-
ings. The sixth and seventh amendments do not preclude this approach;
the Constitution guarantees the sanctity of jury verdicts, but it does
not similarly protect a jury's findings when a state voluntarily decides
to give its juries the task of resolving some federal question. 82
There are at least three reasonably distinguishable scopes of review
which could be applied, other than the very limited review generally
applied to jury verdicts: the substantial evidence test, the clearly errone-
ous rule, or some scope of review even broader than the clearly errone-
ous rule. The substantial evidence rule was adopted in lieu of the
clearly erroneous test in order to narrow the review of findings by
administrative agencies. 8 3 While the distinction is difficult to articulate,
there does seem to be a material difference between "clearly erroneous"
and "substantial evidence." In reviewing administrative findings courts
presume the findings are correct because they are the product of fact
181. Stem, Review of Findings of Administrators, Judges and Juries: A Comparative
Analysis, 58 HARv. L. REv. 70, 81-82 (1944).
182. Of course, before engaging in the process of determining whether to grant a
hearing because a jury finding is not clear or not supported, the federal court should
consider whether the interests of having the state courts decide federal issues in the first
instance and of affording petitioners the full possibility of greater rights under state law
than they would be entitled to under federal law do not make the case appropriate for
a constitutional rule rather than a federal hearing.
183. Its use often is implied from statutes making administrative findings "final," but
"even in the absence of special statutory provisions . . . , the very creation of a non-
judicial agency to decide a particular type of case manifests a legislative intention that
the administrative judgment be adopted unless contrary to law." Stem, supra note 181,
at 83.
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finders possessing special expertise, and reject such findings only when
convinced they are unfair, rather than incorrect-to use Professor
Jaffe's phrase, when the findings appear to be "tie product of a precon-
ception."'1 4 On the other hand, "the trial judge's finding bears no
similar stamp of expertness relative to the reviewing judge, and may
be thought of as clearly erroneous though it does not offend in the
sense of being wilful.8sS
Substantial interests militate for a narrow scope of review of state
fact finding. The fact-finding role of the state courts in constitutional
adjudication is the last area in which the judgment of state judges is
generally accepted. Not only do considerations of federalism operate
against any dilution of this role, but other, more concrete considera-
tions are involved. Finding the facts years after the event is even more
difficult than finding facts after normal delays in the judicial process.
Even where all evidence has been preserved, there is a substantial
interest in preserving resources by avoiding relitigation. Finally, the
substantial evidence test would make the district court's role easier to
handle. The federal court under this standard can avoid evidence
evaluation almost entirely. Rather than exercising its own judgment
on the correctness of the state court's finding, the district court would
limit itself to determining, in effect, whether the state court fairly
exercised its judgment.
For a number of reasons, however, the substantial evidence test seems
inappropriate. State judges are certainly no more expert at deciding
issues of fact than federal district judges. While state judges have the
advantage of hearing the evidence at a much earlier point in time, this
superiority of position could be accorded adequate recognition by the
district court in exercising its judgment over whether a hearing would
serve any useful purpose and in allocating the burden of proof at hear-
ings. Moreover, the issues dealt with in federal habeas corpus all involve
constitutional rights. Always at stake is a man's liberty. This is not so
in administrative proceedings. Finally, the interest in preserving the
fact-finding role of the state courts would not be undermined by use
of the clearly erroneous standard. That standard is used on appeal in all
federal non-jury civil cases,180 and in most non-jury criminal cases where
a constitutional issue has been resolved. 87 The test is apparently narrow
184. Jaffe, Judicial Review: "Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record," 64 HAnv.
L. REv. 1233, 1245 (1951).
185. Id. at 1245-46; Stern, supra note 181, at 82.
186. FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a).
187. See discussion and authorities cited in Jackson v. United States, 353 F.2d 862,
865-67 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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enough to accord trial court findings in these cases sufficient significance.
The role of the federal habeas court would be too limited if it had to
accept a finding underlying resolution of a federal right although "on
the entire evidence [it] is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed."' s8
An argument can be made, in fact, for a scope of review even broader
than the clearly erroneous test. The habeas court, as we have seen,
possesses the power to hear testimony and thereby to judge credibility.
When time has not affected the evidence, therefore, the habeas court is
in just as good a position as the state court to make findings. It is
therefore arguable that federal judges, who are generally of high caliber
and especially sensitive to arguments concerning federal rights, 189
should exercise their judgment to the full in resolving factual disputes.
This is especially so since the disposition in habeas is strikingly dif.
ferent from that on appeal. On appeal, when a finding is rejected, the
conviction usually falls, and a new trial is generally required. On
habeas, rejection of a finding leads only to a hearing, after which the
prisoner will be afforded relief only if the federal court concludes that
his federal rights were violated.
The effect of these arguments would be to compel the complete
relitigation of large numbers of state court adjudications of federal
rights, would leave state court judgments with little if any significance,
and might cause states to give up post-conviction litigation altogether.
The clearly erroneous test recognizes the essentially speculative process
that reviewing facts really is, by allowing rejection of a finding only
when error seems clear. The power habeas courts have to hear testimony
and judge demeanor is useful, but seldom enables the federal court to
recreate the evidence which was before the state court. Time takes its
toll, and probably in enough cases so that this consideration should be
weighed in the adoption of a scope of review, rather than on a case-by-
case basis. Moreover, the clearly erroneous standard is not based solely
on a trial court's superior opportunity to weigh demeanor testimony.
The standard applies whether or not there were conflicts in testimony,
and simply becomes narrower when credibility is involved. 100 That a
188. This is the classic formulation of the clearly erroneous test, found in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). Use of the clearly erroneous
standard by habeas courts was proposed in Note, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1253, 1262 (1963).
189. See note 14 supra.
190. Judge Frank's position in Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539-40 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950), that appellate courts may ignore trial court findings of fact
to the extent they are based upon written evidence, has been widely rejected. See dis.
cussion in 2B BARRON &- HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1132 (Wright ed.
1961).
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hearing rather than outright reversal is the procedural consequence of
the rejection of a finding of fact in a habeas corpus proceeding does not
lessen the expenditure of resources. Once a hearing is granted, the
whole federal issue may have to be tried anew. It seems likely, in fact,
that the expenditure of resources by holding hearings on this ground is
less justifiable than on any other, since the issue of sufficiency of the
evidence will already have been canvassed by state appellate courts.
Finally, if federal habeas courts review state findings of fact with a
standard broader than "clearly erroneous," it will be necessary for state
appellate courts who wish to avoid federal fact-finding hearings on this
ground to apply a similarly broad standard in reviewing state trial
court findings. This, in effect, would require more from such state
appellate courts than is required of federal appellate courts, since the
latter generally apply the clearly erroneous test in reviewing federal
trial court findings.
Application of the clearly erroneous standard entails evidence eval-
uation. A number of generalizations and some lesser used techniques
are available to assist in this task. Some are useful. Others are of ques-
tionable value. But the generalizations give nothing more than guid-
ance, and all the valid insights into evidence evaluation fail to make
the process even vaguely scientific.
One universally accepted generalization is that reviewing courts defer
to findings based upon credibility. But we know that demeanor evi-
dence may well deceive as often as it aids the trial judge.10' "[T]he
will to make a finding regardless of the evidence, or from evidence
which permits nothing better than a guess, may be as much manifested
by rulings on credibility as on any other phase of the case."' 02 The plain
fact is that reviewing courts do test the credibility of witnesses, by refer-
ence to such factors as corroboration, interest in the outcome, reputa-
tion, degree of recall, internal consistency of the testimony, the likeli-
hood of the story in light of common experience and knowledge, and
whether the witness behaved in a manner strongly at variance with the
way in which we would expect a similarly situated person to behave.'03
Neither is the generalization that documentary evidence is somehow
It should be noted, however, that the standard does not apply in reviewing questions
of law. There is still some confusion on this in the federal courts. See. e.g., Stack v.
Bomar, 354 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1965); Shawan v. Cox, 350 F.2d 909, 912 (10th Cir. 1965).
191. See W suA IS, THE PROOF OF GurLT 91-92 (3d ed. 1963).
192. Jaffe, supra note 184, at 1244-45.
193. See the discussion of these factors and the doctrine of inherent incredibility in
Jackson v. United States, 353 F.2d 862, 867-68 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Soblen. 203
F. Supp. 542, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), af'd, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944
(1962).
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more valuable than testimony very helpful. How is a usable comparison
to be made when the value of the documentary evidence and of the
conflicting testimony will vary from case to case?104 In fact, the distinc-
tion made between testing findings of "basic fact," and "inferences"
from facts or documents, is itself illusory. "[A] fact finding involves
a continuous chain of inference so that the finding of basic facts itself
is the drawing of an inference."'u 5
This is not to say that courts should throw up their hands in
despair. The generalizations above are often helpful. And while evi-
dence evaluation may never be a science, we can still learn a great
deal about the value of various types of evidence.190 In fact, there
is a great need, because of the amorphous nature of fact-finding review,
for courts to isolate and weigh significant errors and circumstances.
Thus, where evidence is uncontroverted its significance is increased and
it deserves consideration;0 7 where a witness was inaccurate or lied in
one instance, his testimony as to other issues should be more closely
scrutinized; 08 where the trial court disregarded significant evidence,"0
failed to focus on the precise issue in the case,200 uncritically accepted
194. Compare, e.g., the following cases with each other: United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395-96 (1948) (contemporaneous documents in direct conflict
with oral evidence); Carroll v. Boles, 347 F.2d 96, 98 (4th Cir. 1965) (statement of court
proceedings apparently intended to be complete, fact alleged to have occurred absent
from statement); Luton v. Texas, 310 F.2d 445, 446 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S.
923 (1963) (documentary testimony equivocal); Jones v. Montana, 235 F. Supp. 673, 677-78
(D. Mont. 1964) (affidavit conflicts with the trial court record).
195. Jaffe, supra note 184, at 1242; see Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U.
CHI. L. REv. 233, 239 (1937).
196. See generally FRANK, CouRTs ON TRIAL 14-36 (1963); STEHIEN, INTRODUCTION TO
THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT (1872), reprinted in part in Cahn, Fact-Shepticism: An Unex-
pected Chapter, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1025, 1035 (1963); WALL, EYE-WTNESS IDENTIFICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES (1965); WILLAIS, op. cit. supra note 191, at 86, 138; Kubie, Implications
for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 59 (1959).
For example, the value of expert testimony could be appraised much more systematically
than now. See generally Frank, The Lawyer's Role in Modern Society, 4 J. Pun. L. 8,
20-21 (1955); Beuscher, The Use of Experts by the Courts, 54 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1941).
In Snider v. Peyton, 356 F.2d 626, 628 (4th Cir. 1966), a hearing was ordered where two
experts who had found petitioner sane had failed to reveal the basis for their conclusion.
Another expert, who had seen petitioner often, had concluded he was insane.
197. Compare Cooper v. Denno, 129 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 221 F.2d 626 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 968 (1955), where the court dealt with a significant Item of
uncontroverted evidence, with Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964), where
insufficient consideration was given by the majority to some uncontroverted documentary
evidence.
198. E.g., McClure v. Boles, 233 F. Supp. 928, 930 (N.DAV. Va. 1964).
199. See Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964).
200. See Chessman v. Teets, 354 U.S. 156, 163 (1957); Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764.
772 (5th Cir. 1965).
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the prosecutor's proposed findings of fact,201 or otherwise cast doubt
upon the usefulness of his findings,20 2 the reviewing court should be on
its guard. The task is unquestionably difficult, and there is a danger
that courts will be unduly mechanical if they look for specific indicia
of error. But by concentrating on searching for and analyzing specific
strengths or failings in the state court's process of evidence evaluation,
the federal court's task at least becomes manageable..
2 0 3
If the analysis above is correct, state courts wishing to avoid federal
fact-finding hearings on this ground should review the findings of state
trial courts by a standard no narrower than "clearly erroneous." It
seems doubtful that any broader standard will be applied by the federal
courts. Of course, "clearly erroneous" is no sure guide, and therefore
its application will be no real assurance that federal courts will accept
findings in particular cases. Realistically speaking, however, the federal
courts are not eager to reject state court findings, and they seldom will
do so on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence when a state re-
viewing court has applied the correct scope of review, and especially
when it has done so in an opinion analyzing any difficulties which may
be involved.
D. Defects in the Fact-Finding Process
Even if the district court concludes that the facts underlying a federal
claim were resolved and are fairly supported, a hearing must be held
when any defect in the state fact-finding process is "grave enough to
deprive the state evidentiary hearing of its adequacy as a means of
finally determining facts upon which constitutional rights depend." 2°
The Court in Townsend indicates two types of failings: (1) where
"the state trial judge has made serious procedural errors"; and (2)
when the state "fact-finding procedure... was not adequate for reach-
ing reasonably correct results."205 It can readily be seen how failings
of this sort will often violate the Constitution in themselves, and pro-
vide the basis for an order directing the applicant's release, subject to
201. See Stem, supra note 181, at 83 n.57.
202. Reliance (on "non-negating" testimony) as in United States ex YeL. Darcy v.
Handy, 224 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1955), aF'd, 351 U.S. 454 (1956). is always a questionable
practice. Testimony such as "I don't remember" seldom provides much support for a
finding. See discussion id. at 514-15 (dissenting opinion). Another example is United
States ex rel. Conroy v. Pate, 240 F. Supp. 237 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
203. Countless other factors relevant in reviewing sufficiency of the evidence have been
isolated. See, e.g., Professor Moore's contention that the caliber of the trial judge should
be considered. 5 MooRE, FmE ArL PRAcricE S 52.03[I], at 2616 (2d ed. 1964).
204. 372 US. at 316.
205. Ibid.
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state corrective action. There are times, however, when a declaration
of constitutional invalidity may be inappropriate to correct the defect
involved; it is at these times that a fact-finding hearing must be granted
under this standard.
1. Serious Procedural Error. As an example of a serious procedural
error, the Townsend opinion cites incorrect allocation by a state court
of the burden of proof.206 There are two situations in which this type
of error may occur. The state may have improperly placed upon the
defendant the burden of proof on a specific issue relating to a federal
claim, or the state trier of fact may have applied a burden for proof
of facts generally which is different from the burden applied in federal
habeas corpus proceedings. An example of the first situation is where
the defendant was improperly required by the state court to prove he
did not consent to an otherwise illegal search and seizure; the burden
on this issue should be placed upon the state to prove the defendant did
consent.207 The proper corrective action on habeas where it is clear
that the burden of proof was improperly allocated to the defendant on
a constitutional issue is to order his release, subject to state corrective
action. The unfairness caused by this defect, in terms of its effect upon
vindication of the basic proposition involved, is hardly less great than
that caused by application of an erroneous constitutional standard. "In
all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of proof lies
may be decisive of the outcome." 208 The burden of proof, in fact, is
actually a part of the relevant standard of law. A constitutional declara-
tion requiring states to correct this defect and to avoid it in the future
therefore seems the proper corrective device.209 Just as in cases where
it is unclear whether the correct or incorrect constitutional standard
was applied, however, a constitutional rule would be inappropriate
where it is unclear whether the state improperly applied a burden of
proof in adjudicating some federal claim; the proper corrective action
206. Ibid.
207. E.g., Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1965); Montana v. Tomich,
332 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1964).
208. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (improper placing of burden of proof
and persuasion affecting free speech violates due process).
209. See Harris v. Boles, 349 F.2d 607, 609-10 (4th Cir. 1965) (release ordered where
burden of proof on waiver of counsel improperly allocated). Improper allocation of the
burden of proof on waiver will be a ground for release only where, as a part of the
right involved, definite rules have been established which must be complied with for an
effective waiver. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962), did this with respect to the
right to counsel. See note 257, infra. If the state court places an unnecessary burden
upon the state, neither party has any claim to a hearing. Noble v. Sigler, 851 F.2d 673
(8th Cir. 1965) (competency).
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in this type of case is to find the facts at a hearing in which the burden
of proof is properly allocated.210
The second type of situation involving improper allocations of
the burden of proof is where the state imposes upon defendants in
hearings on federal claims a burden with respect to the proof of
historical facts in general which differs from that applied in federal
habeas corpus hearings. It seems possible and appropriate to make this
defect one of constitutional dimension where the hearing is constitu-
tionally required,211 in order to make sure the required hearing is
meaningful. But a state may apply a burden of proof which differs
from that applied in habeas corpus at a proceeding which itself is not
constitutionally required. Thus a state may impose upon all applicants
at its post-conviction hearings a requirement that their factual allega-
tions be proved by "dear and convincing evidence"; the burden im-
posed in federal habeas corpus is that allegations be proved by a "pre-
ponderance of evidence." 212 There is at present no constitutional right
to a post-conviction hearing on federal claims. Nor is uniform applica-
tion of a burden of proof different from that applied in federal courts
a violation of equal protection. Unless states are required to provide
adequate post-conviction hearings, therefore, this procedural "error"
should result only in a federal fact-finding hearing.
213
2. Inadequate Fact-Finding Procedures. Fact-finding procedures
which should most often result in federal hearings are those which
affect development of the relevant facts in particular cases, and con-
cerning which it would be difficult to formulate general rules. A state
210. Thus in Hubbard v. Tinsley, 336 F.2d 854, 855 (10th Cir. 1964). the court ordered
a hearing because it felt the state court had indicated an erroneous allocation of the
burden of proof by its statement in denying defendant's motion to suppress "that the
evidence at this hearing is insufficient to sustain the motion .... "
211. E.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (competenc)), Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964) (voluntariness of confession).
212. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
213. See United States ex rel. Brennan v. Fay, 353 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1965) (concluding
that the relevant state court was applying the "preponderance" standard). A possible
rationale for a contitutional rule even where there is no constitutional right to a post-
conviction review is the reasoning in United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F.2d 540.
544 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 344 U.S. 561 (1953), that persons are entitled to "procedural" due
process with respect to state-created "substantive" rights. Even if it is assumed that the
right to post-conviction review is "substantive," the burden of proof applied by the state
should have to be demonstrably narrower than that applied in the federal courts to
justify constitutional proscription. The Supreme Court has at times exercised a fairly
broad review over the adequacy of post-conviction procedures voluntarily provided by
the state courts. See, e.g., Pennsylvania ex reL. Herman v. Claudy, 350 US. 116 (1956).
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court's refusal to hear certain evidence,21 4 or to examine a certain part
of the record,215 or otherwise to assist the defendant in obtaining evi-
dence,218 may or may not have sufficient general significance to warrant
constitutional correction. The federal courts can avoid ordering persons
released on the ground that certain evidence pertaining to a federal
claim was not heard because of some defective fact-finding procedure,
and at the same time avoid injustice in the particular case, by granting
a hearing to determine whether the undeveloped evidence proves some
underlying claim. Once again, the extent to which inadequate fact-
finding procedures could be declared constitutionally defective will
depend at least in part upon whether the state court proceeding at
which the defect occurred was itself constitutionally required. For
example, a defect at a constitutionally required competency hearing
might warrant constitutional correction, while the same defect at a
post-conviction hearing, presently not constitutionally required, might
properly be corrected through federal fact-finding.
State courts wishing to avoid federal hearings on the basis of this
Townsend standard should make clear they have allocated correctly
the burden of proof on all federal claims. They should impose upon
defendants at post-conviction proceedings a burden of proving the facts
underlying federal claims no greater than the "preponderance of evi-
dence" standard applied at federal habeas corpus hearings. Finally,
they should strive to avoid practices and procedures which tend to
prevent full and fair development of the evidence underlying federal
claims. Few cases have been decided on the basis of this standard.
Further litigation should reveal more clearly to state and federal courts
the types of procedures used in deciding federal claims which, although
constitutionally valid, are so unreliable that their use requires federal
hearings.
E. Newly Discovered Evidence
Townsend requires a hearing when evidence relating to a constitu-
tional claim is alleged "which could not reasonably have been presented
to the state trier of facts . . . ." The existence of newly discovered evi-
dence relating to the petitioner's guilt is, however, not a ground for
214. See Chavez v. Dickson, 280 F.2d 727, 737 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
934 (1961) (court refused to hear tapes and compare them with transcription).
215. McCloskey v. Boslow, 349 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1965).
216. E.g., United States ex rel. Drew v. Myers, 327 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1964) (refused to
grant continuance). Compare Pate v. Robinson, 34 U.S.L. WInt 4185 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1966)
(refused to assist in obtaining expert testimony by granting continuance).
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relief, and a hearing need not be held where the allegation is frivolous
or incredible.?2
7
Probably all jurisdictions, state and federal, have provisions allowing
courts to grant new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
Virtually all these provisions have time limitations,218 but these limita-
tions do not apply in collateral attacks in the federal courts when con-
stitutional rights are at stake. The motion to vacate apparently is avail-
able to federal prisoners at any time after final judgment to hear newly
discovered evidence relating to constitutional rights.219 The remedy
is not, however, a new trial. A hearing is held, and if a violation of the
Constitution is discovered, the petitioner is ordered released, subject
to corrective action. It is up to the prosecuting authorities whether or
not a new trial will be held.
The type of case which will require a hearing under this standard
is where, for example, an accomplice recants his testimony that he and
his co-defendant were not mistreated before a confession was ob-
tained, °0 or where evidence relating to defendant's competency to
stand trial or to any other federal right could not have been dis-
covered.21 It is arguable that evidence relating to a defendant's sanity
at the time of the offense should not be cognizable; such evidence goes
to guilt, since an insane man cannot be guilty, and habeas is unavailable
to hear new evidence relating to guilt. 221 But federal habeas corpus
lies to hear alleged violations of constitutional rights, and if there is
a right not to be convicted if insane at the time of the acts charged,
habeas should be available. The same reasoning applies when the
prosecution deliberately suppresses evidence or fails to meet its duty
217. 372 US. at 317.
218. See generally the collection of information on state practice in Note, 40 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 154, 177-82 (1964). FED. R. CRIt. P. 33 provides: "A motion for a new trial based
on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within two
years after final judgment ... " Of course, jurisdictions have different standards and re-
quirements. For a broad view of what may be "newly discovered," see Delbridge v. United
States, 262 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
219. See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963). A possible exception to this is
the availability of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964) to hear allegations of illegal search and seizure.
See generally Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 378 (1964). But see United States v. Sutton, 321 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1963); Gaitan
v. United States, 317 F.2d 494 (10th Cir. 1963).
220. United States ex reL. Goins v. Sigler, 224 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 340
F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1964). The district court held a hearing and concluded that the accom-
prce's testimony aas unacceptable.
221. See Hazel v. Warden, 206 F. Supp. 142, 146-47 (D. Md. 1962) (petitioner told to
exhaust state remedies).
222. See Jones v. Montana, 231 F. Supp. 531, 533 (D. Mont. 1964).
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to disclose evidence. Even though the evidence suppressed or withheld
goes to guilt, habeas lies since due process is violated when evidence is
suppressed or wrongfully withheld.23
States should generally have no difficulty avoiding federal hearings
on this ground. The new evidence involved must always be sufficient,
if assumed to be true or convincing, to prove a federal claim. This in
principle satisfies the common requirements imposed by state courts
that evidence relied on be material to the issues involved and of such
a nature that its presentation would probably change the result at a
new trial. Furthermore, any allegation of evidence which is frivolous,
incredible, or which could reasonably have been presented need not be
heard under this standard.2 2 4 The only significant change necessary
will be to make some state remedy available without regard to the
amount of time passed since trial.
F. Inadequate Development of the Facts Relating to Constitutional
Claims
The Court in Townsend departed, however, from "the conventional
notion of the kind of newly discovered evidence which will permit the
reopening of a judgment. .. " finding it "in some respects too limited
to provide complete guidance to the federal district judge on habeas." 225
Specifically, the Court held: "If, for any reason not attributable to the
inexcusable neglect of petitioner .... evidence crucial to the adequate
consideration of the constitutional claim was not developed at the
223. See discussion and authorities cited in Levin v. Katzenbach, No. 19,590, D.C. Cir.,
May 19, 1966.
The Court's statement that the existence of newly discovered evidence relating to guilt
is not cognizable in habeas does not mean that the issue of guilt or innocence Is Itself
irrelevant when federal rights are being litigated. If there is no probative evidence of
guilt, a conviction cannot stand. E.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 868 U.S. 157 (1961). If the
burden of proof on the issue of guilt is improperly placed through presumptions or other
rules, due process is violated. E.g., Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 468 (1948); see Rhay v.
Browder, 842 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1965). It is arguably a violation of due process If the
state refuses to vacate a conviction entirely based upon evidence later shown to be un-
true, though not necessarily suppressed or withheld. In effect, there is no probative evi-
dence left supporting such convictions. A court recently handled this problem by allow-
ing a defendant who had an ironclad alibi but who pleaded guilty to challenge his con-
viction on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Quarles v. Balkcom, 854 F.2d 985
(5th Cir. 1966). This rule presumably will not protect defendants in cases where It can
be shown that counsel did everything he could or perhaps even that counsel took rea-
sonable steps to discover the true facts. What real relevance does this have if a man Is
incontestably innocent-that is, if there is no probative evidence of his guilt?
224. But petitions should be liberally construed. See Near v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d
929, 93884 (4th Cir. 1963), a good case on this point, and the comments of Sobeloff, C.J.,
in United States v. Glass, 817 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1968).
225. 872 U.S. at 817.
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state hearing, a federal hearing is compelled."220 It clearly seems un-
necessary to prove under this standard that the evidence involved
could not reasonably have been presented at the original trial or hear-
ing,227 but there are important restrictions to relief. The evidence
alleged must pertain to a constitutional claim, it must be "crucial" to
the claim's adequate consideration, and the habeas applicant's failure
to present the evidence must not be attributable to his "inexcusable
neglect."
The first restriction follows from the scope of habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion over state prisoners, which is limited to deprivations of their
federal rights. The second restriction-whether the evidence alleged
is "crucial" to the claim's adequate consideration-will depend upon
the facts of each case. Of course, evidence is crucial if it would neces-
sarily or even probably have required a different result on the federal
issue if presented. Thus a coerced confession claim has probably been
inadequately developed if the defendant failed to introduce evidence
relating to the nature and effects of the drugs with which he was in-
jected prior to the confession.2 8 A claim of illegal search and seizure
has been inadequately developed if it is unclear whether the consent
of a third person, relied upon by the government to legalize the search,
could bind defendant or was voluntarily given. - 0 Many cases will
present closer questions. In Townsend the Court held, in effect, that
petitioner's claim of coerced confession was inadequately developed
because the drug administered to defendant, the nature and effect of
which were made clear, was never characterized as "truth serum."
The Court found this characterization "crucially informative" under
the circumstances, one "which would have enabled the judge and jury,
mere laymen, intelligently to grasp the nature of the substance under
inquiry.... ."20 Apparently the Court intends that district judges should
treat as crucial any evidence which might reasonably have affected the
outcome.
226. Ibid.
227. See Peters v. Dillon, 227 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Colo. 1964) (petitioner granted
hearing on evidence relating to same search and seizure developed by others who prop-
erly raised claim), aff'd after hearing, 341 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1965). But see United States
ex rel. McNerlin v. Denno, 324 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1963). vacated on other grounds, 378
U.S. 575 (1964).
228. See Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1962), rcu'd on other grounds, 378
U.S. 368 (1964).
229. See Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 77 (9th Cir. 1965).
230. 372 US. at 321-22. Compare United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney. 319 F.2d 622
(3d Cir. 1963), where the court distinguished between the words "grabbed" and "struggle,"
and found that the failure of the prosecution's witness to use the latter word was a sup-
pression of material evidence.
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The final and most difficult limitation to apply is that the inadequate
development must not be attributable to petitioner's "inexcusable
neglect." The Court equates "inexcusable neglect" with the "deliberate
by-passing of state procedures," as defined in Fay v. Noia. The con-
trolling standard of waiver adopted in Noia is that articulated in
Johnson v. Zerbst: "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of
a known right or privilege." 231 In Noia the Court expanded on the
definition:
If a habeas applicant, after consultation with competent counsel
or otherwise, understandingly and knowingly forewent the privi-
lege of seeking to vindicate his federal claims in the state courts,
whether for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly
be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures, then
it is open to the federal court on habeas to deny him all relief if
the state courts refused to entertain his federal claims on the
merits-though of course only after the federal court has satisfied
itself, by holding a hearing or by some other means, of the facts
bearing upon the applicant's default. Cf. Price v. Johnston, 334
U.S. 266, 291. At all events we wish it clearly understood that the
standard here put forth depends on the considered choice of the
petitioner. Cf. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-517; Moore
v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 162-165. A choice made by counsel not
participated in by the petitioner does not automatically bar
relieL.32
The Noia pronouncement in no way changes the test normally ap-
plied when it is alleged that a defendant affirmatively waived a right.
What it does change is the validity of the practice of inferring waivers
of federal rights from procedural defaults. Since state law governs the
availability and methods of using state procedures, federal courts prior
to Noia were allowing state rules to determine the federal question of
waiver of federal rights by accepting state default rulings as conclusive.
Thus, the federal courts would treat as waived a petitioner's claim of
coerced confession, because the state had ruled he had waived that
right by failing to appeal. Of course, what petitioner may well have
waived under Zerbst was his right to an appeal. It took an extra leap
to conclude he had also waived his right to claim he was convicted on
the basis of a coerced confession.233
231. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
232. 872 U.S. at 439. (Footnote omitted.)
233. See discussion in Note, 89 N.Y.U.L. REv. 78, 83-86 (1964).
The consequences of a failure to appeal will vary with the circumstances. State prisoners
have no constitutional right to an appeal. The right of federal prisoners to an appeal Is
granted under the supervisory power. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962). If
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Noia makes the standard for waiver of federal rights one of federal
law, and disallows the added inference in many cases. But it allows
district courts to depart from the Zerbst formula to infer waivers of at
least some federal rights from understanding and knowing surrenders
of the privilege of asserting those rights in the state courts. The sur-
render may be "for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can
fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures...."
This deliberate bypassing test is usually applied, as in Noia, to deter-
mine whether the habeas applicant's petition should be considered on
the merits. If the prisoner's failure properly to present a claim in the
state courts amounts to a deliberate by-passing of state procedures,
Noia allows district judges to refuse to hear the claim. We are here
concerned with the test only to the extent that a state prisoner who,
although he has properly presented his claim in the state courts,
alleges and seeks to present at a federal fact-finding hearing evidence,
crucial to the adequate consideration of the federal claim, which he did
not present in his state court proceedings in accordance with state
procedures. Under Townsend, if the prisoner's failure properly to
develop evidence crucial to consideration of his federal claim amounts
to a deliberate bypassing of state procedures, district judges may refuse
to hear the evidence. As there is at present no adequate discussion of
deliberate bypassing, it is necessary here to discuss the test generally.
This is difficult so soon after Noia and Townsend, but it should be
helpful to identify some of the issues and to outline a process for
determining whether the right to present a claim or to develop crucial
evidence underlying a claim should be deemed forfeited because of a
deliberate bypass.
A recent decision requires us to deal, at the outset, with the prob-
lem whether the federal courts can find a deliberate bypass of state
procedures although the state court refused to impose a forfeiture of
state remedies. The Ninth Circuit has held that a state's willingness
to pass upon a claim does not prevent a federal court from finding a
a state prisoner proves a denial of equal protection or due process related to his appeal,
however, the federal courts will grant relief. Whether state or federal prisoners are in-
volved, it would appear that any constitutional claims are not automatically lost by a
failure to appeal. See Nash v. United States, 342 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1965) (dictum):
"[W]e see no persuasive reason why collateral attack should be more liberal for the state
prisoner than for the federal prisoner. On the contrary, considerations of federalism and
the policy against incursion by the federal courts on the sanctity of the judgments of
another judicial system are not present in the instant case." The failure to appeal must
be a deliberate bypass in order for post-conviction courts permissibly to infer a waiver
of the underlying constitutional rights. E.g., Dodd v. United States, 321 F.2d 240, 246
(9th Cir. 1963). Even then, under Noia, the court has power to rule on the merits.
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
deliberate bypass, since "the deliberate bypassing or waiver rule is not
procedural; it is based upon a conscious choice, by the petitioner's
counsel, when confronted with a procedural rule, rather than upon the
rule itself."2s4 The court's position is that, since the waiver standard is
federal, the state's decision does not bind federal courts whether that
decision imposes or fails to impose a waiver. Logically, this reasoning
is unassailable. And it may well be true that, where the habeas appli-
cant actually waived some federal right under the Johnson v. Zerbst
formula, federal courts should insist upon the waiver although the
state court does not. But the deliberate bypass rule allows district
courts to impose waivers of federal rights by inference from procedural
defaults only in order to vindicate substantial interests preserved by
state procedural rules imposing forfeitures of remedies. It makes no
sense in light of this purpose to insist upon the imposition of a for-
feiture because of noncompliance with a state rule when the state it-
self demonstrates that strict compliance with the rule involved is not
necessary, at least in the particular case, to vindicate the interests the
rule is designed to serve. A state's judgment that "a suitor's conduct in
relation" to some state procedure should not "disentitle him to the
relief he seeks," 235 should be final.
When a state does impose a forfeiture because of noncompliance
with a procedural rule, a deliberate bypass should be found only if
the default was connected with a procedural rule which serves a valid
state interest. The Court in Henry v. Mississippi28O ruled on direct
review that "in every case we must inquire whether the enforcement
of a procedural forfeiture serves ... a [legitimate] state interest. If it
does not, the state procedural rule ought not be permitted [on the
adequate non-federal ground principle] to bar vindication of important
federal rights.12 7 If a forfeiture ruling is insufficient to preclude direct
review, it follows that habeas should also be available. A forfeiture
should not be imposed to protect the state interest in orderly proce-
dure on the basis of noncompliance with a rule which serves no legiti-
mate state interest. The Court indicated, in fact, by its disposition in
234. Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 82 (9th Cir. 1965).
235. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). In fact, Nola holds that the district courts
have discretion to "deny relief to an applicant who has deliberately bypassed the orderly
procedure of the state courts and in so doing has forfeited his state court remedies." Ibid.
(Emphasis added.)
236. 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
237. Id. at 447-48. See generally Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 CoLUM. L.
REv. 943 (1965); Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Pro.
posals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. RFv. 187.
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Henry, that habeas will sometimes be available on the ground that no
bypass has occurred, although the state ruling constitutes an adequate
non-federal ground precluding direct review.38
The first thing a district court should determine, therefore, is
whether the state procedural rule upon which the forfeiture is based
serves a valid state interest. Valid state interests are served by any rule
reasonably calculated to increase efficiency, conserve resources, protect
rights or advance any other rational end.239 Some indication of the
types of rules which do not serve legitimate interests is available in
cases where the Court has found state procedural grounds "inadequate"
on direct review. Those decisions establish that meaningless and dis-
criminatory rituals need not be followed; in fact, in Noia they were
read as establishing the broader proposition that the Court "has some-
times refused to defer to state procedural grounds only because they
made burdensome the vindication of federal rights."' ' 0 Finally, even if
the forfeiture ruling would normally be an adequate ground, where
the state has retained the power to disregard the default the Court has
inquired into whether the state court's refusal to exercise this power
amounts to "an avoidance of the federal right. ' 2 4' The district courts
should do likewise.
If the rule involved serves a valid state interest, the habeas court
must inquire, as the Supreme Court does on direct review, whether
the interest has been substantially served in the particular case. That
is, the state may be demanding too high a price for orderly procedure
238. The Court remanded for the state to consider whether Henry had waived his
rights. The state could in any event impose a forfeiture of all state remedies. But the
forfeiture ruling would bind the Supreme Court on direct review only if the forfeiture
vindicated a valid state interest which had not been substantially served. And it would
bind the habeas court only if, in addition, the forfeiture resulted from deliberate choice.
As we have seen, one of the roles of the district courts on habeas is to assure vindica-
tion of the Supreme Court's decisions as to the scope of the fourteenth amendment in
the great mass of state court cases the Court has no time to review. This role would
be undermined if the district courts could refuse to hear federal claims or evidence un-
derlying federal claims because of defaults based on procedural rules which would not
preclude Supreme Court review on direct review. The burden of assuring vindication of
federal claims in such cases would be shifted back to the Supreme Court.
259. In Noia, the Court assumed that the rule that claims cognizable but not asserted
on appeal may not be asserted subsequently in post-conviction proceedings serves valid
interests, presumably in getting all claims settled quickly and simultaneously. In Henry,
the Court specifically found that the rule requiring contemporaneous objection to the
admission of evidence serves the valid state interest in avoiding new trials on the ground
of improperly admitted evidence.
240. 372 U.S. at 432. See generally Note, The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the
Supreme Court, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1375 (1961).
241. Williams v. Georgia, 349 US. 375, 383 (1955).
1966]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
by its imposition of a forfeiture of state court remedies. If so, the
ruling would not constitute an adequate non-federal procedural ground
on direct review, and should not be used by the habeas court as a basis
for a bypass ruling.
There is a danger that federal courts will substitute their judgment
in matters which intimately concern the states in examining whether the
purpose of a state rule has been "substantially" served. The Court's sug-
gestions in Henry exemplify the problem. There, defense counsel failed
to object to the admission of certain evidence. In a motion to dismiss
after the state's case had been presented, however, counsel included in
a most perfunctory manner a claim that evidence introduced was un-
lawfully secured.24 2 Yet the Court suggested that this statement may
have satisfied the interest served by the contemporaneous-objection rule
by giving "the court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using
the tainted evidence" and thereby avoiding reversal and new trial.2 43
As Justice Harlan points out in dissent, the Court's suggestion indicates
far too narrow a view of the state interests being served. A truly con-
temporaneous objection, he points out, "must necessarily be directed
to the single question of admissibility; the judge must inevitably focus
on it. ... Usually the proper timing of an objection will force an
elaboration of it."244 This in turn increases the likelihood of correct
decisions. Furthermore, a timely objection enables the state to proceed
on the basis of other evidence,245 or to order the prosecution dismissed.
There is, finally, a chance if noncontemporaneous objections are too
broadly treated as substantially serving the state's interests that de-
fendants or their counsel will intentionally put off objecting to evi-
dence when some tactical advantage may accrue as a result. In Henry
the Court recognized this possibility. 24 Such a tactical decision would,
of course, constitute a deliberate bypass. But since, as we shall see, the
burden of proving a tactical decision may often be upon the state,
the possibility exists that defendants will be less effectively deterred.
Our point here is not that this possibility of deliberate avoidance
242. Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion, quotes counsel's statement in full, 879
U.S. at 459-60.
243. Id. at 448.
244. Id. at 462.
245. See United States ex rel. Reid v. Richmond, 295 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 868 U.S. 948 (1961).
246. There was a chance that the testimony, later objected to as inadmissible, could
provide a basis for impeachment of the prosecution's witnesses. 379 U.S. at 451. If the
defendant's calculation is correct, he not only would retain a possible remedy in habeas
corpus, but he also would not be precluded by the adequate state ground doctrine from
seeking direct review in the Supreme Court.
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should govern rule-making in all cases. It is just that the danger is
substantially increased if too rigid a view is taken of what constitutes
a valid state interest, and too flexible a position is taken on how those
interests may be substantially served. The suggestions in Henry,
therefore, that only one interest-that of avoiding retrials-is in-
volved, and that this interest could have been substantially served by
a vague noncontemporaneous objection, should be treated as nothing
more than suggestions, used by the Court to explain its view of the
scope of the adequate state ground doctrine as it applies to procedural
rules. Any reasonable advancement of a rational purpose should be
sufficient to demonstrate a state interest. And only when all conceivable
valid state interests have been substantially served does it seem proper
to conclude that a state procedural rule was enforced "for its own
sake."24
7
Even though a state forfeiture ruling would constitute an adequate
procedural ground, thereby barring direct review, habeas corpus is
still available to prisoners who have not deliberately bypassed, under
the theory that the federal court in habeas acts upon the body of the
petitioner rather than upon the validity of the state rule. The Court
247. Id. at 449. Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), is a dear case in which the
objections of counsel served all conceivable legitimate state interests. In Rhay v. Browder.
.42 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1965), counsel properly objected to a charge on the ground that
it assumed the existence of a fact in dispute. On appeal counsel argued that this im-
proper assumption shifted the burden of proof of innocence. It may be that a timely
objection which should apprise the trial court of an issue later made explicit should be
treated as substantially serving the valid state interests involved. The Ninth Circuit found
a deliberate bypass, holding that the rule demands "painstaking compliance," but went
on to rule on the merits of the claim. See also Dupes v. Johnson, 353 F.2d 103, 105 (6th
Cir. 1965) (coerced confession).
In United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965), one co-defen-
dant was given federal relief because the state court had rejected his explicit request that
he be allowed to conduct his own defense if the court persisted in refusing to assign him
a new lawyer. The other co-defendant had expressed great dissatisfaction with his lawyer,
but he did not "unequivocally," United States ex rel. DiBlasi v. McMann, 236 F. Supp.
592, 593 (N.D.N.Y. 1964), request that he be allowed to defend himself. He claimed on
habeas that, once the judge most emphatically denied his co-defendant's request, he felt
his request would be pointless. The Second Circuit ruled he had waived, although the
circumstances here are such that any interests that might have been served by an explicit
request were served by the request which was turned down. The Second Circuit, in ap-
proving the rule that defendants "unmistakably" commit themselves to conducting their
own defense, relied almost exclusively upon the interest in avoiding subsequent daims.
But how likely is it that defendants will read the court's opinion and become aware of
this rule? And how consistent is the ruling that a defendant must unequivocally raise a
point explicitly rejected by his trial judge with the Second Circuit's view that counsel
cannot be expected to object when the lav is dearly against him? See, e.g., United States
ex rel. West v. LaVallee, 335 F.2d 230, 231 (2d Cir. 1964).
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in Noia rejected the argument that the interests of federalism required
deference to state procedural rulings which constitute adequate state
grounds, reasoning that defendants have a substantial interest in not
forfeiting state remedies and direct review and that "those consequences
should be sufficient to vindicate the State's valid interest in orderly
procedure."
248
There are a number of situations in which action apparently tactical
or otherwise deliberate cannot provide the basis for bypass rulings.
If counsel who made or recommended the action which led to the
default was ineffective, the applicant has a basis for relief in that fact
alone, so a bypass ruling clearly would be improper.240 The claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel has been broadened in recent years.
While strategic mistakes generally provide no ground for relief, recent
cases imply or require that counsel investigate at least superficially,
2 0
and that he have some sound basis for his decision. 2r' These decisions
tend to guarantee tactical choices by counsel as a part of due process
on at least all fundamental issues; but they are exceptional, and most
courts will refuse to find ineffective assistance where counsel was un-
aware of the law and facts relevant to the case. A bypass ruling is
likewise improper where the defendant is unrepresented, if he lacked
capacity to make a deliberate decision.25 2 There are times when a
defendant may be competent to stand trial, but only with the assis-
tance of counsel.25 3 When such a defendant rejects the assistance of
counsel, as he apparently has the right to do,254 the court should either
inform the defendant of all his alternatives or should appoint counsel
to advise him. Otherwise no effective forfeiture ruling seems possible.
248. 372 U.S. at 433.
249. See id. at 439, where the standard enunciated for bypassing contemplates a know-
ing surrender of a procedural right "after consultation with competent counsel or other-
wise .... " (Emphasis added.)
250. Quarles v. Balkcom, 354 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1966); Brubaker v. Dickson, 810 F.2d
30 (9th Cir. 1962).
251. Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173 (D.C. 1964), afj'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir.
1965); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963); see Sims
v. Balkcom, 220 Ga. 7, 136 S.E.2d 766 (1964) (counsel must move for new trial when no
danger involved). See generally Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent
Defendant, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1434 (1965); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L.
REv. 1531 (1963).
252. Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934, 937 (4th Cir. 1963) (appeal), see Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485-86 (1954).
253. See Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105, 108 (1954).
254. United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1965): see Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942). In federal prosecutions the
right is secured by statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964).
[Vol. 75,895
HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
Finally, rights which cannot be waived cannot be forfeited by proce-
dural default. 5
5
When a bypass ruling is possible, it will be necessary for the district
court to determine whether the forfeiture imposed by the state courts
followed from a tactical choice or other deliberate action. Henry indi-
cates that the burden is on the state to make at least some showing to
justify the forfeiture.s 6 Since it will usually be unclear from the record
whether a truly deliberate choice was made, state rules reasonably de-
signed and applied to serve valid interests might be given less than
appropriate weight if the showing required is too great, and defendants
might often actually bypass with impunity. Of course, a bypass ruling
is proper where it can be demonstrated that a defendant, (1) aware of
the federal right at stake and (2) of the forfeiture rule involved, (3)
intentionally failed to comply with the rule. But this seldom occurs.
The question in particular cases will be whether there is enough proof
to permit the federal court to assume the existence of each of these
elements. The state is assisted in its burden of proof on waiver issues,
however, by a number of rules and assumptions which have the effect
of allowing district courts to accept state forfeiture rulings in all but
the cases where there is significant doubt that a deliberate course of
action was followed.
255. Non-waivable rights would appear to include the right to a competent tribunal,
and the right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. The Court has
strongly suggested that the right to a hearing on competency to stand trial once "some"
evidence of incompetency is introduced is not forfeited by a failure expressly to raie the
claim in accordance with state rules. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966). Contra.
Noble v. Sigler, 351 F.2d 673, 676 (8th Cir. 1965). Similar defaults with respect to the
right not to be convicted if insane at the time of the offense, if there is such a right.
probably also will not be binding. See Hampton v. Tinsley, 240 F. Supp. 213, 218 (D.
Colo. 1965).
256. The Court pointed out that the state court ruling that petitioner was "estopped"
from raising an illegally-seized-evidence claim because his counsel had brought up the
matter to which the alleged illegally seized evidence related "amounts to a holding that
petitioner waived his federal right. In the absence of a showing that this was prompted
by litigation strategy, the present record is insufficient to support such a holding." 379
U.S. at 451 n.7. (Emphasis added.) See Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1963):
"Mhe burden is on the Government to plead abuse of the writ." (Emphasis added.) This
it must do under Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 292 (1948). "with clarity and partic-
ularity."
The state's burden would often be impossible to discharge if habeas applicants could
prevent their attorneys from testifying to confidential communications. The attorney-
client privilege was held waived in Henderson v. Heinze, 349 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1963).
where the habeas applicant sought federal review despite a procedural default in the
state courts. Accord, United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Follette, 358 F.2d 922. 928 (2d Cir.
1966) (dictum, citing 8 WAIGNoE, EVIDENCE § 2327, at 636, 638 & nA (McNaughton rev.
1961)); Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 1204, 1207 (1965).
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The record often reveals that the habeas applicant was informed of
the right he is said to have forfeited. Usually, the applicant will have
been represented, and it is proper to assume counsel informed him of
his rights, absent a non-frivolous allegation to the contrary, which
would then require a hearing. This is not true, however, when waiver
of the right involved can only be effectively demonstrated by a showing
of record that the applicant knew what was at stake,2- T when counsel
could not have known, because of the existing law or otherwise, that
a possible claim existed,25s and when representation has ceased.
259
Where defendant is unrepresented great difficulties arise unless the
state court either informs him of his rights or appoints counsel to
257. The "right to counsel" is not dependent upon a request. Carnley v. Cochran, 869
U.S. 506, 513 (1962), requires a colloquy at which defendant is told of his right. See Davis
v. Holman, 354 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1965) (waiver of counsel at arraignment does not shift
to defendant burden of requesting counsel later when not guilty plea withdrawn and
guilty plea entered); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (waiver of
right to own counsel when representation of co-defendant may be prejudicial must be
informed); Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (right to be present at
trial).
Judge Friendly has cautioned against "treating the 'right to counsel,' 'waiver,' or any
other concept of law as a Platonic reality without considering the context at hand."
Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 837 (5th Cir. 1965) (concurring opinion). He argues, In
effect, that once the issue is moved back in time beyond the beginning of the criminal
prosecution, there is room for reasonable compromise. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights
as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. RIv. 929, 942 n.70 (1965). Miranda v.
Arizona, 34 U.S.L. W, K 4521 (U.S. June 13, 1966), applies the Carnley requirement to
the right against self-incrimination, and to the right to counsel as a necessary protection
of the right against self-incrimination, from the time a person is "deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant way." Id. at 4523.
258. Thus courts have ruled with apparent unanimity that defendants to whom Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), has been held to apply because their appellate processes
were incomplete when Mapp was decided, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965),
should not be precluded from raising or developing illegal search and seizure claims In
habeas corpus if raised in the state courts at the first available opportunity. E.g., Peters
v. Dillon, 227 F. Supp. 487 (D. Colo. 1964), aff'd after hearing, 341 F.2d 337, 339 (10th
Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. West v. LaVallee, 335 F.2d 230, 231 (2d Cir. 1964); United
States ex rel. Dalton v. Myers, 227 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (failed to raise point on
amended motion for new trial, but raised on appeal). Compare Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 182 (1947):
If defendants who accept the judgment of conviction and do not appeal can later
renew their attack on the judgment by habeas corpus, litigation in these criminal
cases will be interminable. Wise judicial administration of the federal courts counsels
against such course, at least where the error does not trench on any constitutional
rights of defendants nor involve the jurisdiction of the trial court. (Emphasis added.)
259. Compare Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 423 (1963) (allowing presumption In
absence of transcript that counsel at trial protected defendant's rights on appeal), with
Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1965) (presumption rebutted); and Polsky in
The Problem of Adequate Representation of Indigent and Other Defendants in Criminal
Cases, panel discussion at the Judicial Conference on the Second Judicial Circuit, 36
F.R.D. 129, 153-54 (1964).
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advise him. The importance of constitutional rights is such that,
even where a defendant chooses to be unrepresented despite ade-
quate warning of the dangers involved, any doubts about whether he
knew his rights should be resolved in his favor 0 An apparent ex-
ception to this general rule is where the right at stake is "personal"
and deemed waived if not asserted.2 1' This rule of forfeiture presum-
ably is based upon an assumption that defendants know of these rights,
which may well fail to withstand reexamination in light of Noia.
The state courts seldom expressly inform defendants and their coun-
sel of state rules of forfeiture. Nor do the federal courts, for that
matter. Competent counsel, qualified to practice before the local
courts, are presumed to be aware of all elementary rules of practice,
such as the duty to object contemporaneously to the admission of evi-
dence or to an erroneous charge..2 2 There is no authority indicating
that counsel is under an obligation to inform his client of these rules,
and in practice counsel seldom does so. When a rule is uncommon or
when the defendant is unrepresented, however, the trial court should
eliminate all doubt by informing counsel or defendant of the rule.
Any significant doubt should prevent a bypass ruling.-2  On the other
hand, habeas courts should consider indications other than an an-
nouncement by the state judge that the defense was aware of the rele-
vant rule. Thus if one piece of evidence is objected to but not another,
or a claim to one type of hearing made but no claim made to another
related type of hearing 640 it should be assumed that the defense was
aware of the duty to object or to claim hearings, if not of the conse-
quences of a failure to do so.
260. Cf. ED. R. CIUM. P. 37(a)(2): "When a court after trial imposes sentence upon
a defendant not represented by counsel, the defendant shall be advised of his right to
appeal and if he so requests, the clerk shall prepare and file forthwith a notice of appeal
on behalf of the defendant."
261. E.g., United States ex reL Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1963)
(right to represent sell); United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cerL denied,
358 U.S. 880 (1958) (right to speedy trial).
262. See United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 1963), where the court
found a bypass in a § 2255 proceeding because of counsel's failure to object to an instruc-
tion or to suggest one of his own.
263. See, e.g., Hunt v. IWarden, 335 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1964), where the court
reversed a bypass ruling because the unrepresented petitioner, in failing to appeal to the
highest state court as the federal district court had earlier directed, had been acting under
a misapprehension as to his rights. The petitioner claimed to be following Fay v. Noia,
"whereas you can pass State Courts." Compare Gordon v. Crouse, 357 F.2d 174 (10th
Cir. 1966).
264. Appellant in Pate v. Robinson, 383 US. 375 (1966), argued that failure to raise
a claim to a hearing on competency after claiming a hearing on insanity proved a delib-
erate bypass. Brief for Appellant, p. 24. The Court found the claim had been sufficiently
raised.
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It seems reasonable generally to assume that an applicant's failure to
comply with a rule of forfeiture was intentional, if it can be shown
both that he knew of the right at stake and of the rule involved. As
we have seen, it is often proper to assume defendant was aware of his
rights from the fact that he was represented by competent counsel.
Moreover, if competent counsel is present, it is generally irrelevant
whether defendant himself was aware of the state's forfeiture rule,
since counsel is usually expected to know of such rules and has the
duty of complying with them. It is often possible, therefore, to find
"intentional" noncompliance with a state rule by assuming it from an
assumed awareness, because of the presence of competent counsel, both
of the right at stake and the rule involved. Problems arise, however,
when habeas applicants claim that failure to comply with the rule was
in fact unintentional, or that counsel acted without consulting them or
against their express wishes.
When an applicant claims that his default was unintentional, a
number of factors should be considered. If it can be shown that the
defendant was actually aware of the right at stake, or if the rule of
forfeiture was announced by the state judge to defendant and coun-
sel,265 it will be difficult to prove noncompliance was unintentional.
Furthermore, the possibility of benefit from the course of action fol-
lowed tends to prove at least a motive for intentional noncompliance. "00
That the course of conduct may have backfired completely is irrelevant
so long as a possibility of advantage existed when the choice was made,
and so long as the choice was not so unreasonable that it demonstrates
265. The Court stated in Henry that the adequate non-federal ground test for pro-
cedural rulings spelled out in its opinion "will not lead inevitably to a plethora of attacks
on the application of state procedural rules; where the state rule is a reasonable one and
clearly announced to defendant and counsel, application of the waiver doctrine will
yield the same result as that of the adequate nonfederal ground doctrine in the vast
majority of cases." 379 US. at 448 n.3.
266. If the defendant did not take the stand, and therefore failed to develop the ma-
terial facts underlying some constitutional claim, he may have done so to avoid Impeach-
ment. Counsel may let a confession into evidence so he can discuss at length the possi.
bility of police coercion, or he may allow illegally obtained information Into evidence in
the form of testimony with the hope of impeaching the witness. It is even reasonable for
counsel to refrain from pressing some minor points to avoid antagonizing the judge and
jury. An excellent example of trial tactics is Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1965).
The district court held that counsel's stipulation in defendant's presence that the case
be heard on the transcript of the preliminary hearing with each side retaining the right
to introduce further evidence was not an effective waiver. The circuit court reversed,
finding a basis for a tactical choice in surrendering the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine prosecution witnesses, in that the testimony at a trial would have been far more
harmful to defendant than the simple facts recited by the victim of the crime at the pre.
liminary hearing. Countless other examples could be imagined.
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ineffectiveness of counsel. 267 Any direct evidence that a deliberate
choice was made would, of course, be highly persuasive, such as where
the claim involved is considered by the defense but abandoned,2es is
advanced but withdrawn,2°9 is stipulated away,2-"  or is deliberately
withheld to secure additional hearings.27' On the other hand, evidence
that the default was a blunder or resulted from neglect tends to
demonstrate an absence of intent. Thus where counsel objected in-
artfully,272 or failed because of insufficient preparation or other neglect
to marshall all crucial evidence underlying a federal claim,- 3 a know-
ing default should not be found, although counsel may have been aware
both of the right at stake and of the applicable rule. Moreover, once
the state court rules against the defense on a given point, a knowing
failure to raise the point again is not intentional in the sense required
for a deliberate bypass. The defense, in fact, is justified in changing
267. In Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1965), the court found a bypass
despite the absence of any good reason why counsel failed to object to the admiion of
certain important evidence. Compare Ledbetter v. Warden, 239 F. Supp. 869. 378 (D. 'Md.
1965), refusing to impose a bypass where no reason for not objecting to evidence ap-
peared, despite the assumption that the failure to object did not amount to ineffective
assistance. As to the possibility that an unsound decision may demonstrate ineffective
assistance, see supra notes 250-51.
268. E.g., United States ex rel. Reid v. Richmond, 295 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.) (en bane)
(counsel said "no objection" to admission of confession after hearing held on surrounding
facts), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961). In Henry the state filed an affidavit alleging that
an attorney for the defendant rose as if to make an objection when the evidence later
claimed to have been illegally seized was admitted, and that another of defendant's at-
torneys pulled him down. This allegation was enough, the majority felt, to justify an
evidentiary hearing on waiver. 379 U.S. at 450. Compare Justice Black's comment: "It is
hard for me to see how one could infer from this 'jerk on the coat tail' even a suspicion
that petitioner had consciously and knowingly waived his right to object to the evidence
offered against him." Id. at 454 n.2 (dissenting opinion).
269. See Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 289 (1924), discussed and approved in
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 9-10, 18 (1963).
270. E.g., Cruzado v. People, 210 F.2d 789 (Ist Cir. 1954).
271. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 18 (1963) (dictum); Berman v. Warden. 232
Md. 642, 645, 193 A.2d 551, 552 (1963); see Egan v. Teets, 251 F.2d 571, 576 (9th Cir.
1957) (two other arguments advanced at time of motion to dismiss appeal).
272. Rhay v. Browder, 342 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1965).
273. In Townsend the expert witnesses failed to use the "truth serum" characterization.
The Court held: "Mhe medical experts' failure to testify fully cannot realistically be
regarded as Townsend's inexcusable default." 372 U.S. at 322. Actually, this "failure" to
testify was no more than a failure by counsel to develop the relevant facts through his
witnesses. The Court's refusal to regard this failure as an inexcusable default reflects its
position that unintentional flaws of counsel should not bar the assertion or full develop-
ment of federal rights. The usual rule is that evidence obtainable by the defense before
or during trial cannot later be advanced as "newly discovered." See United States v.
Soblen, 203 F. Supp. 542, 565 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), afJ'd, 301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.). cert. de-
nied, 370 U.S. 944 (1962).
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tactics after an adverse ruling and in taking steps which normally
would result in forfeiture of the claim involved. In Henry the Court
refused to rule on the question "whether petitioner's cross-examination
of the officer, before raising any objection [to the admissibility of his
testimony], 'cured' the effect of the inadmissible testimony . . . ," but
it stated flatly: "Of course, nothing occurring after the judge's refusal
to honor petitioner's objection could have this curative effect." -7'
There will be times when the correct result is not so clear. In one case
the prosecutor stated in his opening remarks that a confession would
be introduced, but none was. In the absence of any ruling on the
admissibility of the confession, defense counsel went ahead and elicited
statements relating to the treatment of his clients. This line of question-
ing, ruled the court, was a tactical choice, and to the extent that it,
rather than the prosecutor's opening statement, brought the jury's
attention to a confession, it was considered in determining whether
due process was violated by the prosecutor's comment, which the
court ruled did not itself sufficiently implant a confession in the jury's
mind to bring the case within Jackson v. Denno.2T 5 Undoubtedly, de.
fendants and their counsel should not be allowed to take tactical ad-
vantage of a situation where it would be unreasonable to conclude
that a failure to act would cause prejudice. But counsel is obliged to
act in his client's behalf when there is reason to believe action is
prudent, even though perhaps unnecessary. Another problem situation
is where one co-defendant alleges that he failed to preserve a point
because he assumed the court would rule against him as it had against
his co-defendant. While each co-defendant normally should be required
to comply with the relevant rules to preserve his claim, there should
be some room for cases where circumstances strongly indicate that one
co-defendant's default occurred only because of the other's lack of
success.276
Even if an intentional choice can be proved, it is open to the appli-
cant to argue the choice was counsel's and not his own. Noia insisted
upon a standard of waiver which "at all events . . . depends on the
considered choice of the petitioner. ' 277 In Henry, however, the Court
made it clear that the right to assert or develop a claim may be lost
274. 379 U.S. at 449 n.6. Accord, Dupes v. Johnson, 353 F.2d 109, 106 (6th Cir. 1965).
See generally 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 18, at 331 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1964).
275. United States ex rel. Fernanders v. Fay, 241 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
276. See discussion of United States ex ret. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1965), supra note 247, where the issue is discussed in the context of whether a valid state
interest remains to be served by the state's forfeiture ruling. A deliberate bypass requires
also that the procedural default be intentional.
277. 372 U.S. at 439.
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because of litigation strategy adopted by counsel without consulting
his client.2 78 It is not enough, therefore, for applicants to claim counsel
did not consult with them, where the default stemmed from a decision
involving trial strategy. Important rights are often lost, however, when
trial strategy is not involved.27 0 There is no reason to give attorneys
more power to waive defendants' rights than they need in order to
represent their clients effectively. When the decision to be made does
not require a speedy judgment or involve factors which are beyond the
ordinary defendant's ability to understand, consultation should nor-
mally be necessary.
The state will often be assisted, however, in contesting allegations of
no consultation by the presumption generally adhered to that an at-
torney acts with his client's consent when he chooses a course of con-
duct in his client's presence, without objection.280 This presumption
cannot apply when the right involved is one that must be waived by
the defendant himself.281 Nor should it be applied without a hearing
where the habeas applicant alleges in a non-frivolous petition that he
can prove he was dissatisfied with counsel.28
2
An applicant may allege that, although counsel consulted him, the
default resulted from a course of conduct the applicant opposed. It is
clear that it is not ineffective assistance for counsel to refuse to accede
278. 379 U.S. at 451-52.
279. "The decision as to whether to appeal is not part of trial strategy. It is one that
is made by the client, not his attorney. There are numerous others, e.g.. whether to plead
not guilty, nolo, or guilty, whether to waive a jury [Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276
(1930)], that fall in this class." Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81 n.6 (9th Cir. 1965)
(dictum). Other rights which probably fall within this group include confrontation, Cru-
zado v. People, 210 F.2d 789 (Ist Cir. 1954), public trial, United States v. Sorrentino, 175
F.2d 721 (3d Cir. 1949); and presence at trial, Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C.
Civ. 1963); see Fa. R. CRit. P. 43. See Wainwright v. Simpson, 360 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.
1966) (foregoing right to move for new trial or to appeal without consultation with
defendant constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
280. E.g., Cruzado v. People, supra note 279, at 791; United States v. Sorrentino, supra
note 279, at 723; Eury v. Huff, 141 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1944) (waiver of jury of twelve for
jury of ten).
281. Although early federal cases applied the presumption to the extent of allowing
counsel to plead defendants guilty, e.g., Brown v. United States, 182 F.2d 933 (8th Cir.
1950); United States v. Moe Liss, 105 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1939), the present practice in the
federal courts is to have the defendant plead. See Fa. R. CRLNt. P. I1, which allows
the court to accept a guilty plea only when "made voluntarily with understanding of the
nature of the charge." See also FED. R. CuM. P. 7(b), allowing prosecution by infor-
mation for offenses punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or at hard labor
only if defendant, "after he has been advised of the nature of the charge and of his
rights, waives in open court prosecution by indictment."
282. But see United States ex tel. Reid v. Richmond, 295 F.2d 83, 86 n.4 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948 (1961).
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to his client's wishes.2 3 But where consultation is necessary, a bypass
should be found only when the attorney adhered to his client's choice,
if at all reasonable.2 4 The purpose for a rule requiring consultation
where feasible is to premise bypass rulings as much as possible upon the
actual choice of defendants rather than upon fiction or inference. It
would make little sense to require consultation and then to allow
counsel to ignore his client's choice. Where counsel feels defendant's
choice would be prejudicial, counsel should bring the matter to the
state court's attention. The court should explain the risks involved,
and if defendant is competent to choose and persists, a record will have
been made to demonstrate a conscious choice.
Where no consultation is required, however, attorneys should argu-
ably be free to act on the basis of their own judgment even though they
may have consulted with and found their clients opposed to their plan
of action.2sa Matters concerning trial strategy are peculiarly within
counsel's expertise. Counsel will usually be a better judge of whether
a defendant or witness should be put on the stand, of the impeachment
value of evidence, and of countless other tactical considerations. A
283. Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965).
284. An interesting, very recent Supreme Court case throws some light on this Issue.
In Brookhart v. Janis, 34 U.S.L. Wm., 4351 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1966), petitioner contended
in a direct appeal from a denial of state habeas corpus relief that he had been denied
his right to confront the witnesses against him. The state court had ruled that petitioner
waived this right by agreeing through counsel to a prima facie trial in which the state
would have to make only a prima fade showing of guilt, and defendant would neither
offer evidence nor cross-examine witnesses. The Supreme Court found that under Ohio
practice a prima fade trial is the practical equivalent of a plea of guilty, and that peti-
tioner had explicitly refused to plead guilty. The question then became "whether coun-
sel has power to enter a plea which is inconsistent with his client's expressed desire
and thereby waive his client's constitutional right to plead not guilty and have a trial
in which he can confront and cross-examine the witness against him." Id. at 4352. The
Court held counsel did not have this power.
285. This rule would explain Nelson v. California, 346 F.2d 73, 81-82 (9th Cir. 1965),
where the court found a deliberate bypass although it assumed the truth of petitioner's
contention that he had explicitly objected to counsel's decision not to contest the admis-
sion of certain evidence. The court did not, however, make the distinction made here
between situations requiring and those not requiring consultation as being determinative
of whether a defendant's choice must be adhered to by counsel. The distinction should
not be rigidly applied. Thus in Brookhart v. Janis, supra note 284, at 4353, Justice Harlan
took the position that "a lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how
to run a trial even in the face of his client's incomprehension or even explicit disap-
proval," and cited the decision "whether or not to examine a specific witness . . ." as
an example. He pointed out, however, that the prima facie trial procedure, which was a
waiver of the right to introduce any evidence and to examine all witnesses, "involved so
significant a surrender of the rights normally incident to a trial that it amounted almost
to a plea of guilty or nolo contendere," and took the position that "such a plea" cannot
be entered over a client's protest. Ibid.
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rule requiring counsel to adhere to a defendant's trial strategy might
therefore do defendants more harm than good. And since consulta-
tion is not required in these situations, counsel may tend to shun
consultation even where it is possible, to avoid being bound by a
course of action he believes is against his client's best interests. To the
extent that consultation where possible is a benefit to counsel in
making his decision, reluctance to consult would be unfortunate. So
long as defendant's position is treated as irrelevant in matters of trial
strategy, the problem of proving consultation occurred and that defen-
dant actually objected to a proposed course of action (or would it be
enough if he just had a plan of his own?), would be avoided.
Despite these arguments the better practice would bind counsel to
his client's proven choice of tactics even in those cases where, had
counsel acted without consultation, his choice would bind his client.
Counsel's choice, made without consultation, is binding in matters
involving trial strategy largely because of the need for a quick decision.
If counsel was able to consult in a particular case, or the client able to
express his preference, reliance on the rationale that there was a need
for a quick decision is misplaced. This also is true where the client
volunteers his desire before the tactical decision is made. The danger
that defendants will suffer because counsel might be reluctant to
consult on decisions involving trial strategy is highly speculative. The
difficulties of proof possibly caused by a rule that no bypass may be
found when counsel acts against his client's wishes can substantially
be avoided if counsel is required to bring to the court's attention the
fact that his client disagrees with his plan of action. -60
In some cases, even after a tactical decision has been proved, "excep-
tional" circumstances will be present which will preclude a bypass
ruling despite a fully considered choice by counsel or defendant. In
Henry the Court cited Whitus v. Balkcom2- T as an example of a case
presenting an exceptional circumstance. There, Judge Wisdom refused
to find a bypass of the state's rule that objection to the selection of
juries must be made when the jury is formed, and from that finding to
infer a waiver of the right to a jury from which Negroes have not been
systematically excluded. Trial counsel admitted he knew of this right
and that he consciously decided not to raise it. The exceptional circum-
stance was his reason for failing to raise the claim: fear of hostility from
judge, jury and community which would effectively eliminate any
286. Cf. Note, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1434, 1446 (1965).
287. 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 931 (1964).
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chance of success at trial. 288 Noia presented a similar situation. The de-
fendant there knew of his right to appeal but did not exercise it because
he feared a death sentence on retrial instead of the sentence of life im-
prisonment he had received. The Court recognized the tactical nature
of Noia's choice, pointing out that its holding did not preclude a bypass
ruling "in every case where a heavier penalty, even the death penalty,
is a risk incurred by taking an appeal or otherwise foregoing a proce-
dural right .... "289 But the Court found an exceptional circumstance
which made Noia's decision not "merely tactical .... -200 This was the
fact that the trial judge's statement to Noia at the time of sentencing
"made the risk that Noia, if reconvicted, would be sentenced to death,
palpable and indeed unusually acute."
'291
The common threat in Whitus and Noia is the presence of pressure
upon defendant or his counsel of a sort which the Court apparently
feels is illegitimate. In Whitus the state is not allowed to rely upon
counsel's tactical choice to proceed to trial by an improperly selected
jury because the element which made counsel's choice tactical-his
fear of antagonizing the judge and jury in a racially prejudiced area
by claiming his client's rights-was unacceptable as the basis for a
deliberate choice to forego a federal right. Noia differs in that the trial
judge's comments were not so obviously improper. It might be argued,
in fact, that his comments did Noia a favor in that they apprised him
fully of the risk he would be taking if he appealed. Perhaps the Court
felt the trial judge's statement was unfairly emphatic. But the trial
court apparently genuinely believed Noia was lucky getting off with life
imprisonment and told him so. In any event, the Court's holding in
288. Presumably, this exceptional circumstance would be present in most cases from
states which practice systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries. The Fifth Circuit has
gradually extended its refusal to find waivers of the right to be indicted or tried by
such juries until it now seems safe to say the right is virtually non-waivable. See Cobb v.
Balkcom, 339 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1964), and cases cited therein. Compare Randel v. Beto,
854 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1965) (counsel asked to accede to suggestion that trial judge
be substituted in order that judge meet important political engagement).
289. 372 U.S. at 440. Compare Larson v. United States, 275 F.2d 673, 679.80 (5th Cir.
1960).
290. 372 U.S. at 440. (Emphasis added.)
291. Ibid. At the time of Noia's trial, a judge in New York was not bound to accept
a jury's recommendation of mercy. Thus, when sentencing Noia, the court said:
I have thought seriously about rejecting the recommendation of the jury in your
case, Noia, because I feel that if the jury knew who you were and what you were
and your background as a robber, they would not have made a recommendation.
But you have got a good lawyer, that is my wife. The last thing she told me this
morning is to give you a chance.
Id. at 396 n.3.
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Noia is unlikely to do more than encourage judges to be silent when
sentencing defendants.& 92
A more principled stand would be to disallow waiver rulings based
on bypassing of state procedures where the bypass was caused by the
rule allowing severer sentences at a new trial. That the rule is constitu-
tional2 93 does not prevent a federal habeas corpus court from denying
it effect in deciding whether under federal law the right to assert a
federal claim has been lost. The rule would not be invalidated, but
would be left to operate in cases where the presentation of federal
rights is not affected. The state has little if any interest, when a defen-
dant appeals a conviction, in securing a penalty harsher than the one
obtained at the first trial, so the rule's interference with the full and
free assertion and development of federal claims is all the more unac-
ceptable.
This reasoning would appear to allow habeas corpus petitioners, at
least in some circumstances, to assert federal claims despite having
pleaded guilty. It is arguable, for example, that a guilty plea induced
by an involuntary confession or illegally seized evidence should not
preclude an allegation that the conviction based upon the plea is void
because the confession was coerced. At present, a guilty plea waive%
these and most other defects.-2 94 This is a problem of immense dimen-
sion, far beyond the scope of this discussion. It may be that guilty pleas
292. United States ex rel. Moore v. Fay, 238 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). is a strik-
ingly similar case, at least in principle. The habeas petitioner had been charged with
murder but was convicted of manslaughter. He attacked his conviction because of a
juror's conduct in consulting with a friend with respect to a question the judge had
allowed, and in subsequently telling the prosecutor it w¢as good that a manslaughter ver-
dict had been returned, since the conviction would less likely be reversed. When the
court told defendant and his counsel of these events and of its own inquiry into them,
defense counsel withdrew motions for a new trial and to set aside the verdict which
were then outstanding. The federal district court found a deliberate choice in failing to
press the claim based on defendant's fear of a retrial at which he might be convicted
of murder. That petitioner was silent seems adequate proof under the circumstances
that he acquiesced in counsel's decision. But even under a narrow view of Noia, the
juror's statement, with its implication that at least he had supported a manslaughter
conviction to avoid reversal because of what he felt was an error by the trial judge, may
have heightened the defendant's fear of a more severe penalty, and thereby provided
an "exceptional" circumstance which made the choice not "merely" tactical.
293. Stroud v. United States, 251 US. 15, 18 (1919); see Palko v. Connecticut. 30-2
U.S. 319 (1937). But see State v. Wolf, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 2423 (N.J. Jan. 24, 1966); People v.
Henderson, 386 P.2d 677, 685-86 (Cal. 1963), invalidating the rule under state consti-
tutions. See generally Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Sue-
cessful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YAr.x L.J. 606 (1965).
294. E.g., Stack v. Bomar, 354 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1965); Hoffman v. United States. 327
F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1964). But see Shelton v. United States, 292 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1961).
cert. denied, 369 US. 877 (1962).
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perform so essential a function in the criminal law, both in settling
litigation quickly and in affording defendants an opportunity for
reduced sentences, that their finality should be disturbed only in the
most engaging circumstancesm 5 On the other hand, extensive use of
guilty pleas may in itself make necessary further re-examination of the
doctrine that defects occurring prior to the plea should not be open to
challenge. The rule that a plea of guilty is a waiver of all prior defects
may at least have to be supplemented by a requirement that it be af-
firmatively shown that the defendant is aware of all claims of any sub-
stance but chooses to plead guilty anyway.20
0
In concluding this discussion of deliberate bypassing it should be
noted that, although the Court has authorized district courts to deny
relief or, in the Townsend context, to refuse hearings for the purpose
of developing crucial evidence relating to a federal claim, the power
of the district courts in their discretion to hear claims or grant hearings
despite a deliberate bypass is specifically assured.21 Since the states
have no way of knowing when to hear a claim despite a deliberate
bypass, and since a bypass ruling is premised upon findings of a sub-
stantial state interest and a tactical choice, federal courts should be
reluctant to exercise this power.208 There is, in fact, very little danger
that this power will be abused, and if a district court does go too far,
its decision will, of course, be reviewable by higher federal courts as
an abuse of discretion.
295. Courts readily examine whether the defendant was competent when he pleaded
guilty, Sanders v. United States, 873 U.S. 1 (1963), whether the plea was obtained Involun-
tarily through threats or promises, Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962),
whether defendant was represented by counsel at the time of the plea, Doughty v. Max-
well, 376 U.S. 202 (1964); United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 850 F.2d 803 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964), and whether counsel was ineffective, Pearce v.
Cox, 354 F.2d 884, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1965).
296. See Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1964); Cooper v. Holman, 356
F.2d 82, 88 (5th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion of Rives, J.) (record should be made dem-
onstrating plea was because of actual guilt rather than previously made confession or
bargain. Compare Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927): "[O]n timely appli-
cation, the court will vacate a plea of guilty shown to have been unfairly obtained or
given through ignorance, fear or inadvertence." That a guilty plea is "more than" an
admission, compare White v. Pepersack, 852 F.2d 470 (4th Cir. 1965) (testimonial admission
does not preclude attack on earlier defects), or extrajudicial confession, but is Itself a
conviction, hardly serves to advance the argument. Convictions are subject to collateral
attack for all constitutional defects.
297. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
298. One occasion which seems appropriate for the exercise of this power is where the
habeas applicant made an apparently genuine attempt to correct his default. Cf. Stevans
v. Marks, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 4173, 4176 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1966) (waiver of right against self-
incrimination may effectively be withdrawn).
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States that wish to avoid federal hearings on the ground that evidence
crucial to the adequate consideration of a federal claim was not pre-
sented in the state courts should provide post-conviction procedures
without time limits for hearing important evidence relating to federal
claims. The deliberate bypassing test will qualify the availability of
such remedies so as to assure the adequate vindication of legitimate
state interests reflected in rules of forfeiture.
G. Full and Fair Hearing
The Court recognized in Townsend that it could not anticipate
all the circumstances in which district courts should be required to
grant hearings. It therefore left an "open-ended" category, which re-
quires federal hearings in all cases where the state court hearing falls
short of being "full and fair" in some way other than the specific ways
covered in its first five categories. Any attempt to "explain" this require-
ment is, therefore, necessarily speculative. There are, however, a
number of situations which seem clearly to require new hearings, but
which do not readily fall within any of the Court's specific criteria.
The issue most likely to arise which finds no comfortable place in
any of the Court's specific criteria is the allegation that the state court
hearing was deficient because the petitioner was not allowed to be
present and testify. As the Court in Townsend pointed out: "Where
an unresolved factual dispute exists, demeanor evidence is a significant
factor in adjudging credibility. And questions of credibility, of course,
are basic to resolution of conflicts in testimony."' 9 If a petitioner is not
given the opportunity by the state courts to testify at a post-conviction
proceeding, it may well be that the federal court will have to start anew
by granting a hearing. While there should be no broad constitutional
rule in this area, where even the federal courts handle the matter as one
involving discretion, the importance of demeanor testimony in some
cases will render the state court hearing deficient.
Spelling out some generalizations concerning the need to allow post-
conviction applicants to attend and testify at hearings is not too dif-
ficult. The Court has already done so, though it has done little more.
And although most of the Court's pronouncements relate to the remedy
for federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, they are equally appli-
cable to habeas corpus for state or federal prisoners, since the language
of § 2255, if anything, more clearly gives the courts power to decide
issues without the petitioner's presence.3 00 Thus it is clear that, before
299. 372 U.S. at 322.
300. The habeas corpus statute provides: "Unless the application for the writ and the
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being entitled to be present, the petitioner must allege a constitutional
deprivation in a petition which raises a factual dispute. Despite some
broad language in Walker v. Johnston,301 raising just any factual dis-
pute is not enough. The petitioner's testimony must have some bear-
ing on the dispute. Courts have recognized this by requiring that the
petitioner have "knowledge" of the dispute,302 or that the dispute
pertain to an event in which he participated. 31 3 It seems correct, how-
ever, to state the rule simply as requiring production of the petitioner
"where his testimony would be material."30' Other considerations
return present only issues of law the person to whom the writ is directed shall be re-
quired to produce at the hearing the body of the person detained." 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(1964). 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides: "A court may entertain and determine such motion
without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing." The most persuaslvc
argument for allowing less discretion in habeas corpus under the different statutory
language is that the motion to vacate was passed to enable the federal courts to handle
post-conviction claims in the court of sentencing rather than the court nearest the place
of confinement, where habeas corpus petitions are handled. See generally United States v.
Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952). As a result, it became possible that cases would arise In
which § 2255 petitioners would have to be transported large distances in order to be pres-
ent at hearings in the sentencing court. The Congress, it is arguable, therefore authorized
a rule which gave district courts broader discretion in ruling without the applicant's
presence than they had exercised in habeas corpus. Even if this is true, of course, the
§ 2255 cases would apply a fortiori to habeas corpus. But in any case, there is no evi-
dence that Congress compared § 2255 to habeas corpus and then came up with a rule
allowing broader discretion under § 2255. The problem of transporting prisoners long dis-
tances was, of course, recognized, and undoubtedly led to the specific authorization to
pass on motions without the petitioner's presence, see 342 U.S. at 215 n.23; btt Congress
was well aware of this possible disadvantage, and felt it was outweighed by the statute's
advantages, see especially id. at 217 n.25 & 219. Of course, to the extent that a district
court could refuse the right to be present at a § 2255 hearing to a petitioner who would
have that right in habeas corpus, see Stidham v. Swope, 82 F. Supp. 931 (D. Cal, 1949),
§ 2255 would become inadequate and ineffective, and he could obtain a full and fair
hearing through habeas corpus.
The real reason for the difference in language is possibly much more prosaic. The
language in § 2243, apparently too broad for Congress to swallow in passing § 2255, was
picked up from a loose statement in Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 285 (1941), that
"if an issue of fact is presented," the "only admissible procedure" is to have the peti-
tioner produced and hold a hearing. See Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. § 2243. This was
simply an inaccurate statement of the law. See text immediately following this footnote.
301. Supra note 300.
302. United States v. Nickerson, 211 F.2d 909, 912 (7th Cir. 1954).
303. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952). Juelich v. United States, 316
F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
304. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 21 (1963). (Emphasis added.) An example
of a case where a state prisoner's testimony was not material is United States ex rel.
McKenna v. Myers, 232 F. Supp. 65, 67 (E.D. Pa. 1964), where the disputed factual Issue
was whether his mother had consented to a search outside his presence. See also Moorer
v. South Carolina, 244 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.S.C. 1965) (factual issue purely one involving
compilation of statistics). See generally Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 788, 815-18 (1963).
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should generally be irrelevant. The test should not vary, for example,
by giving special consideration to serious offenders who have received
severe sentences.s05 While judges cannot shut such things out of their
minds, all constitutional rights are important, and any doubt about
whether an applicant should have been present should be resolved in
his favor regardless of the seriousness of the crime and sentence in-
volved. Moreover, the distance 30 and danger in transporting a pris-
oner307 should not normally prevent a court from letting him attend.
In one old immigration case the court referred to the practice of dis-
pensing with the applicant's attendance when he was suffering from a
contagious disease, but even this practice was inapplicable when his
attendance would serve some useful purpose. 08
It should be noted that an applicant's presence may be necessary
although he has nothing material to say on a disputed issue. If counsel
is able to show it was necessary to have the petitioner at the court-
house for consultation, the state court's refusal to order his presence
should be grounds for a new hearing. That a petitioner's presence may
be significant in respects other than the need to testify is reflected in
the fact that the rule requiring the presence of defendants at all stages
of their trials is not conditioned on their having anything to say.
Still another deficiency which may be treated under this general "full
and fair" standard is the absence of counsel at the state post-conviction
305. But see Gregory v. United States, 233 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1956).
306. This is not presently a serious problem in habeas corpus, where the hearing is
held in the district in which the petitioner is confined. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, hovwever,
the hearing is held in the sentencing court, which may be a long distance from the
place of confinement. The inconvenience and the expense of transporting the prisoner
is generally outweighed, however, by the advantages of holding the hearing in the sen-
tencing court, where the record is located, and where needed witnesses usually are nearby.
After Hayman v. United States, 342 US. 205 (1952), it seems reasonably dear that dis-
tance should not be a factor.
Transportation of prisoners will become a problem, however, if Congress adopts a
proposal similar to that of the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas Corpus to
amend 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which would allow habeas applicants to file for relief in either
the district court where they are held in custody or the district court for the district in
which is located the state court of conviction and sentence. The district court in each
of these districts would have concurrent jurisdiction and would be empowered in "its
discretion and in furtherance of justice . . . (to] transfer the application to the other
district court for hearing and determination." Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conf. of the US., in ANN. REP. Din. ADsuN. OFricE U.S. Courrs 108 (1964). Presumably
the district court could balance the convenience of a hearing in the district of the
court of record against any inconvenience of transporting the applicant to that district.
307. See the well considered dicta in United States v. Newnan, 126 F. Supp. 94 (D.C.
1954).
308. United States ex rel. Schleiter v. Williams, 203 Fed. 292, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
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proceeding. The federal constitution does not require counsel in all
cases at the post-conviction stage. Post-conviction proceedings are char-
acterized as "civil," and the sixth amendment applies only to criminal
proceedings. This distinction is artificial; it is certainly not based upon
either the need for counsel or the stake involved in such cases.8 D0 There
are substantial arguments under both equal protection and due process
for requiring post-conviction counsel. 810 Some courts have held, in fact,
"that sound discretion, perhaps deriving from the Fifth Amendment,
requires that counsel be appointed for petitioners, at least in some
cases." 311 Even if no constitutional rule is established, however, where
state hearings appear deficient because counsel was not assigned, it is
open to the district courts to hold hearings after assigning counsel.
812
Townsend, in this situation, provides a flexible device for uncovering
injustice in particular cases, in the absence of a decision by the Supreme
Court requiring counsel, when states fail to provide counsel8 18
A number of other deficiencies which might warrant hearings under
this standard include allegations that the state court hearing was
less than full and fair because the state judge, defense counsel or some
material witness was either biased8 4 or mentally disturbed. 810 That the
309. Cf., e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 712 (1961): "The availability of a pro.
cedure to regain liberty lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon
a choice of labels"; People v. Breese, 213 N.E.2d 500 (111. 1966) (right to counsel applies
at commitment proceedings, though "civil'); State v. Loray, 34 U.S.L. W=EK 2503 (N.J.
Mar. 7, 1966) (compensation must be paid attorney for representation at post.conviction
stage since it is part of the criminal case).
310. See Note, 40 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 154, 189-90 (1965).
311. United States ex rel. Marshall v. Wilkins, 338 F.2d 404, 406 (2d Cir. 1964).
312. See United States ex reL. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960), hold.
ing that the district court's hearing was inadequate because, among other things, counsel
was not appointed.
313. Some state courts have taken steps to provide counsel. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Bower v. Banmiller, 323 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Note, supra note 310, at
187-89.
314. See Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764, 772 (5th Cir. 1965) (allegations involved actions
of presiding judge); Barber v. Gladden, 327 F.2d 101, 103 (9th Cir. 1964) (judge recounted
boyhood experience indicating prejudice), (compare FRANK, CoumRs ON TRIAL 152 (1963):
"[T]he trial judge is a man, with a susceptibility to such unconscious prejudiced 'Identi-
fications' originating in his infant experiences.'); Harris v. Thomas, 341 F.2d 560 (6th
Cir. 1965) (alleged counsel biased because of position as city attorney); Goodson v. Peyton,
351 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1965) (counsel prosecutor from other town).
315. See United States ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608, 613-14 (2d Cir. 1964)
(emotionally disturbed counsel held not ineffective); United States ex rel. Hicks v. Fay,
230 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (insane witness not violation of due process); see Note,
Effective Assistance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. Ray. 1531, 1550-51 (1963), on counsel's physical
and mental ability to defend.
[Vol. 75:895
HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS
Constitution is not violated by these or other deficiencies316 means only
that the applicant is not entitled to release on account of them. He
should still be entitled to a federal hearing on a federal claim if the
non-constitutional deficiency appears to have precluded a full and fair
hearing in the state courts.
H. Discretionary Hearings
There may be times when, although Townsend imposes no duty to
grant a hearing, the district judge feels one should be held. He has the
power to do so "in every case... constrained only by his sound discre-
tion ... ,"317 There is no reason to hold a hearing when the district
judge is presented with "an impeccable record."3 18 State triers of fact
should be able to assume federal courts will accept their findings when
properly made. The Court expressed its confidence that district judges
will be "mindful of their delicate role in the maintenance of proper
federal-state relations," and will not "subvert the integrity of state
criminal justice" or "waste the time of the federal courts in the trial
of frivolous claims."319 When district judges fail to exercise this broad
power properly, higher federal courts should reverse for abuse of
discretion.
There are a few occasions which seem appropriate for the exercise
of this power. The district judge should grant a hearing if he feels it
will be more convenient than to require the state to prepare a record
of its proceedings -.3 2 0 Furthermore, when both petitioner and respondent
agree to a hearing, granting one should not normally constitute an
abuse of discretion.3 2 1 Where the district court is convinced that the
decision of the state court is correct, but wishes to establish yet another
basis to support the state court judgment, a hearing may be appropriate
in a close case to avoid reversal.32 Finally, there must be some room
for those cases in which the federal judge simply has "a lurking
316. E.g., Noble v. Sigler, 251 F.2d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 1965) (refusal of state court to
allow filing of handwritten briefs may be basis for new hearing).
317. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963).
318. See Bator, Finality in the Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HAv. L. REv. 441, 503 (1963).
319. 372 U.S. at 318.
320. See id. at 219.
321. See Trotter v. Stephens, 241 F. Supp. 33, 36 (E.D. Ark. 1963); Rees v. Peyton.
225 F. Supp. 507 (E-D. Va. 1964).
322. In Trevino v. Texas, 326 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1964), the district judge, though
convinced that the state court's conclusion that a warrant supported only by hearsay
testimony was issued with probable cause, granted a hearing which demonstrated that
the warrant's issuance was supported by direct evidence as well.
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doubt"3 23 about the adequacy of state court findings. But courts should




The federal habeas corpus jurisdiction presently serves indispensable
functions in assuring vindication of the constitutional rights of state
prisoners. It has been our purpose to demonstrate that much can be
done consistent with this broad protection to lessen federal-state tension
and to assure a meaningful role for the state courts. The numerous
doctrines, rules and practices which enable federal courts to deny or
defer jurisdiction and to leave the states with more flexibility in cor-
recting constitutional defects should be resorted to whenever appro-
priate. When unacceptable state court fact finding results from a defec-
tive state adjudication of a constitutional right, federal courts should
consider whether the interests of federalism and of defendants would
best be served by declaring the procedure which resulted in the unac-
ceptable findings constitutionally deficient, thereby shifting back to the
states in those cases the task of producing acceptable findings. Finally,
federal courts should attempt to develop uniform, predictable rules
to govern the grant of fact-finding hearings, and should articulate those
rules for the guidance of state and other federal courts. The rules
adopted must ultimately be designed to uncover the truth, but should
reflect an awareness of the difficulty and uncertainty inherent in the
process of fact finding, and of the need to leave room for a meaningful
state court role.
Few areas of law illustrate as strikingly as habeas corpus, however,
that the future of our federal system of criminal adjudication is ulti-
mately in the hands of the states. While expanding constitutional
protections make virtually all criminal proceedings subject to federal
review, the degree of federal protection has been and will continue to
be affected by the failure of state courts to provide adequate machinery
properly to adjudicate and review federal claims. At present, district
courts must defer to state findings of fact made after full and fair hear-
ings, thereby leaving with state courts the power to control the ultimate
828. Lovedahl v. North Carolina, 888 F.2d 512, 518 (4th Cir. 1964).
824. Compare Sanders v. United States, 878 U.S. 1, 17 (1968): "[T]he burden Is on
the applicant to show that, although the ground of the new application was determined
against him on the merits on a prior application, the ends of justice would be served
by a redetermination of the ground."
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disposition of federal claims in most cases. But this allocation of fact-
finding responsibility is not inviolate. The Supreme Court has made
clear that federal courts have power to review both law and fact. It
is up to the states whether this power will eventually be exercised to
the full.
